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PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS & PRODUCTS
Ron A. Bouchard†
Abstract
Governments around the world are increasingly engaged with
the political mandate of innovation, which is seen as a fundamental
gateway to national productivity and prosperity. To date, innovation
is measured primarily using quantitative methods, particularly with
regard to patents. However, even though these methods are widely
considered to be problematic, a model that assesses patent value at
numerous stages in the product lifecycle using qualitative methods
has not yet emerged. This article describes a qualitative innovation
index that may fill some of the gaps in patent valuation. An innovation
index is given that provides a measure of patent quality that is
specific to pharmaceutical patents and products. The index is based
on regulatory preferences and evidentiary requirements for various
types of new and follow-on drugs and yields a method that is not only
graded incrementally but which reflects the social value of the
products. The innovation index rewards innovation both in the new
drug approval stream and for follow-on approvals in proportion to
the degree of innovation evidenced by the resulting products. Given
that policy-makers no longer need to wait for licensing, litigation, or
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prior art citations to occur, the innovation index reported here may
allow for regulatory decisions to be made earlier and more rapidly.
The index is sufficiently flexible to be used at several stages of the
product lifecycle, including during the regulatory approval stage and
post-market surveillance stage. The index may also provide
regulators with a mechanism to make judgments about which types of
patents should be listed on the patent register under linkage laws in
an objective and evidence-based manner. Finally, the attribute of
flexibility may lend itself to customization of the index by jurisdictions
with analogous food and drug law. Customization is not limited to
qualification of technology in the pharmaceutical sector, but may be
used to qualify any indicator, provided that the evidentiary
requirements for and prioritization of the indicator within different
classes have been stipulated by regulators.
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ABBREVIATIONS

ANDS
ER
FIC
NAS
NCE
NDS
NDS NAS
NDS ER
NDS FIC
NDS Me Too
NDS MI
NOC
NOC/c
PR
SANDS
SNDS
SNDS ER
SNDS FIC
SNDS Me Too

Abbreviated New Drug Submission
Expedited Review
First in Class
New Active Substance
New Chemical Entity
New Drug Submission
NDS drug containing a NAS
NDS drug undergoing ER
FIC drug approved via NDS route
Me Too drug approved via NDS route
Most Innovative NDS Drug
Notice of Compliance
Notice of Compliance with Conditions
Priority Review
Supplemental Abbreviated New Drug Submission
Supplemental New Drug Submission
SNDS drug undergoing ER
FIC drug approved via SNDS route
Me Too drug approved via SNDS route

II. INTRODUCTION
Governments around the world have become uniformly locked in
to the political mandate of innovation, both in developed and
developing nations. It is a race no one wants to lose. Yet, despite the
non-rival nature of knowledge,1 it is one few will win. Innovation is
widely accepted to be a fundamental gateway to national and global
productivity and prosperity.2 Nowhere is this truer than in the fields of
1. Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 197
(2005).
2. 1 EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, PEOPLE AND EXCELLENCE: THE HEART
OF SUCCESSFUL COMMERCIALIZATION 6 (2006); BRIAN GUTHRIE & TREFOR MUNN-VENN,
LEADERS’ ROUNDTABLE ON COMMERCIALIZATION, SIX QUICK HITS FOR CANADIAN
COMMERCIALIZATION ii, 1 (2005); see COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, INNOVATE AMERICA:
NATIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVE SUMMIT AND REPORT 7 (2005), for an analogous discussion
of the importance of industrial intellectual property incentives in national productivity and
prosperity in the United States. For a review of the history of innovation systems theories and
their basic dependence on an “economistic” worldview that emphasizes the central role of
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science and technology, particularly in the life sciences.3 The
argument in favor of patenting in the pharmaceutical industry has
been made consistently and with vigor for over a half-century.4 The
pharmaceutical industry claims that its research and development
(R&D) activities are responsible for most new and innovative
medicines.5 Indeed, a major justification for high and increasing drug
expenditures is that such profits are necessary to underpin the
development of new and innovative drugs.6
To date, innovation is measured using primarily quantitative
methods.7 Patents are usually used as the prime measure.8 Methods
most often reported include counting patents, patent citations, prior
art citations and related litigation outcomes.9 These measures are used
extensively in prominent domestic, regional and global reports
focused on productivity and prosperity.10 Indeed, much of what
businesses in translating science and technology knowledge into national prosperity and
productivity, see Mathieu Albert & Suzanne Laberge, The Legitimation and Dissemination
Processes of the Innovation System Approach, 32 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 221, 226
(2007).
3. See, e.g., EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY, THE EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY
ROAD MAP TO 2010: PREPARING THE GROUND FOR THE FUTURE (2005) (Doc. Ref:
EMEA/H/34163/03/Final); FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY
ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW MEDICAL PRODUCTS (2004); Alan Bernstein, Toward Effective
Canadian Public-Private Partnerships in Health Research, 168 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 288 (2003);
Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Balancing Early Market Access to New Drugs with the Need for
Benefit/Risk Data: A Mounting Dilemma, 7 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 818, 823-24
(2008); Elias Zerhouni, The NIH Roadmap, SCIENCE, Oct. 3, 2003, at 63, 64.
4. See generally PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA,
BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION (1st ed. 2003); JERRY AVORN,
POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (1st ed.
2004); MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 241 (2008); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT
FAILURE (2008).
5. Drug Safety and Pricing Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Health, Educ., Labor and
Pension, 106th Cong. 91 (2000) [hereinafter Holmer] (testimony of Alan F. Holmer).
6. See, e.g., Joseph P. Cook et al., Generic Utilization Rates, Real, Pharmaceutical
Prices, and Research and Development Expenditures 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 15723, 2010), available at http://nber.org/papers/w15723.
7. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1521-22 (2001); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2005); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Using Patent Data to Assess the Value of
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 176, 177 (2009).
8. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 4; BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, for review
of many empirical studies.
9. See id.; see also Lemley, supra note 7; Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7.
10. See, e.g., Outterson, supra note 1, at 196; 1 EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION,
supra note 2, at 6; GUTHRIE & MUNN-VENN, supra note 2, at 5, 8; COUNCIL ON
COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 2, at 38.
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governments understand about innovation is currently shaped by
measurements of patenting activity. For example, patenting licensing,
litigation, and prior art citation data can be useful as indicators of how
general knowledge flows within and between different industries,11
and has helped to shape priority areas for government investment,12
including several sectors within the life sciences rubric.13 Citation
counting has demonstrated differences between public and private
patentees in the medical research and product development sector,
leading some to conclude that non-profit patents, such as those to
universities, are valuable to the ultimate commercialization of
medicines.14 Others have suggested patents are a good indicator of
employee productivity.15
However, a focus on quantifying intellectual property, and
patents in particular, relating to life sciences inventions is
acknowledged to be problematic for an array of reasons. First, not all
innovating firms perform R&D with the express purpose of inventing
new and innovative technologies, and not all R&D outcomes are
necessarily patented.16 Even when firms do obtain a substantial
amount of patents, this may simply reflect the size of the firm or its
commitment to obtaining more patents.17 Many firms and industry
leaders do not consider patents an effective appropriation mechanism,
focusing instead on secrecy, lead time, and learning curve
advantages.18 In addition, patent filings are often indiscriminate with
respect to determinations of the value or quality of a patented
11. See, e.g., Manuel Trajtenberg, A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the
Value of Innovations, 21 RAND J. ECON. 172 (1990); Rebecca Henderson et al., Universities as a
Source Of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting 1965-1988, 80
REV. ECON. STAT. 119 (1998); David C. Mowrey et al., Learning to Patent: Institutional
Experience, Learning and the Characteristics of U.S. University Patents after the Bayh-Dole
Act, 1981-1992, 48 MGMT. SCI. 73 (2002); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patent
Quality and Research Productivity: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, 114 ECON.
J. 441 (2004).
12. See, e.g., Outterson, supra note 1, at 214.
13. See, e.g., 1 EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, supra note 2, at 6; GUTHRIE &
MUNN-VENN, supra note 2, at 2; COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 2, at 18.
14. See, e.g., Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 7, at 180.
15. See, e.g., Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research
and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 798 (1987).
16. Id. at 812-15.
17. See, e.g., NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, R&D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY
(Zvi Griliches ed., 1984).
18. See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 3 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552; Levin et al., supra note 15, at 793.
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invention,19 although there is some evidence that patents cited as prior
art in later patent applications should be accorded more value than
merely counting once.20 Even so, utilization statistics indicate that a
very low percentage of granted patents actually have value. One
widely quoted study showed that only 5% of patents are actually
implemented in the market through licensing or via litigation.21 This
is not surprising, since the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
apparently approves most of the applications it processes,22 leading
some to claim that patents are an “unwieldy measure of
productivity.”23
Other studies have demonstrated that the substantial majority of
granted patents create little or no revenues for patentees,24 and that
close to 50% of granted patents are abandoned by patentees rather
than paying renewal fees.25 There is also evidence suggesting that
citation counts do not account for a firm’s R&D priorities or
productivity in the pharmaceutical sector.26 Finally, even when
patents can be shown to have financial value, the numbers cited are
much lower than might be expected. For example, the mean patent
value in the US market was approximately $20,000, $15,000, $5,000,
and $4,000 for electronic, mechanical, chemical, and pharmaceutical
patents, respectively.27 Similar results have been demonstrated in the
European Union.28 Given the link between patenting incentives,
19. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 363 (2001); Lemley, supra note 7, at 1506.
20. See, e.g., Trajtenberg, supra note 11; Henderson et al., supra note 11; Mowrey et al.,
supra note 11, at 74-75; Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 443.
21. See, e.g., Mark Schankerman, How Valuable Is Patent Protection? Estimates by
Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77 (1998); Lemley, supra note 7, at 1507; see also
Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 14; The Valuation of Patents: A Review of
Patent Valuation Methods with Consideration of Option Based Methods and the Potential for
Further Research, 3, Econ. Comm’n for Europe, U.N. Doc. OPA/CONF.1/2002/6 (Aug. 21,
2002) (by Robert Pitkethly); Meir Perez Pugatch, What is the Value of Your Patent? Theory,
Myth and Reality, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FRONTIERS: EXPANDING THE BORDERS OF
DISCUSSION 14-15 (Anne K. Jensen & Meir Perez Pugatch eds., 2005).
22. Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and
Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 3 (2001).
23. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 24.
24. Richard J. Gilbert, Patents, Sleeping Patents, and Entry Deterrence, in STRATEGY,
PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 205 (Steven C. Salop ed., 1981).
25. Francesca Cornelli & Mark A. Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives,
30 RAND J. ECON. 197, 197 (1999).
26. See, e.g., Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 444.
27. See, e.g., Schankerman, supra note 21, at 94.
28. See, e.g., Ariel Pakes, Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding
European Patent Stocks, 54 ECONOMETRICA 755, 777 (1986).
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profits obtained by patent monopolies, and the use of some of these
profits for R&D into new and innovative drugs,29 the low value of
pharmaceutical patents is somewhat surprising. This issue will be
dealt with in greater detail below with regard to the rising prominence
of product cluster models of drug development.
When quantitative measurements of patent value are described,
they often provide less meaningful data than one might hope. This is
because one must often wait post hoc until licensing, prior art citation
and litigation events occur, when the public incurs a significant
fraction of related spillover costs. Even so, it is not necessary for
licensing or litigation events to occur for patents to be valuable in a
defensive context.30 This observation is strengthened in legal forums
that have brought in some form of pharmaceutical linkage, 31 where
highly selective listing of patents on a patent register can yield an
effective two-fold increase in the term of cumulative patent
protection.32 The costs to the public resulting from the absence of
qualitative patent value are potentially enormous. They are at least
proportional to the degree of litigation on contested patents in
general,33 the degree of litigation relating to patents eventually found
to be invalid or not infringed when assessed on the merits in
particular,34 and the delay between the original patent’s termination
date and the termination date of the latest listed patent.
Finally, it remains difficult to determine the degree to which an
individual patent represents a socially beneficial innovation in so far
as it is embodied in a product, service, or process. The question of
whether a new innovation represents a substantial source of new

29. See, e.g., Holmer, supra note 5; see generally Cook et al., supra note 6, at 2.
30. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 26-27.
31.
Ron A. Bouchard et al., The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and
Innovation: Who’s Leading Whom?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461, 1463 n.2 (2009)
[hereinafter Bouchard 2009].
32. See, e.g., Ron A. Bouchard et al., Structure-Function Analysis of Global
Pharmaceutical Linkage Regulations, 12 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 391 (2011) [hereinafter
Bouchard 2011].
33. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 2; C. Scott Hemphill &
Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77
ANTITRUST L. J. 947, 948 (2011).
34. FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY 20 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf
[hereinafter FTC 2002]. See also EDWARD HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD: EVERGREENING OF
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION UNDER THE PATENTED MEDICINES (NOTICE OF
COMPLIANCE) REGULATIONS OF CANADA’S PATENT ACT 20 (2004), available at
http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/en/news/docs/patently_absurd_04.pdf; Lemley, supra note 7.
But see Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33, at 41.
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value, significant change in practice, or is incremental in nature
always arises in this instance. The problem of incremental innovations
assumes critical importance in the pharmaceutical industry.35 This is
because many (though not all) follow-on innovations can have little
clinical benefit compared to existing therapies.36 A regulatory
preference for incremental innovation may present a particularly
intractable problem in sectors that privilege the cluster-based, or
portfolio-based, strategies for innovation.37 The same conclusion
applies under circumstances where patents of unknown value are
aggressively employed as a legal tool to game the system. 38

35. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi & Cherie Paquette, The Economics of Follow-on Drug
Research and Development: Trends in Entry Rates and the Timing of Development, 22 (Supp. 2)
PHARMACOECONOMICS 1 (2004); Joseph A. DiMasi & Laura B. Faden, Competitiveness in
Follow-on Drug R&D: A Race or Imitation?, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 23 (2011).
But see Aidan Hollis, Commentary, Comment on “The Economics of Follow-On Drug Research
and Development: Trends in Entry Rates and the Timing of Development”, 23
PHARMACOECONOMICS 1187 (2005).
36. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. RESEARCH AND EDUC. FOUND.,
CHANGING PATTERNS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 7 (2002); John Abraham & Courtney
Davis, A Comparative Analysis of Drug Safety Withdrawals in the UK and the US (1971-1992):
Implications for Current Regulatory Thinking and Policy, 61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 881 (2005);
Drugs in 2001: A Number of Ruses Unveiled, 11 PRESCRIRE INT’L 58, 58 (2002) [hereinafter
Drugs in 2001]; La Revue Prescrire, Editorial, European and French Pharmaceutical Market
Assessed by Prescrire in 2005: Mainly Bogus Innovation, 30 FARMACIA HOSPITALARIA 68
(2006); Kenneth I. Kaitin et al., Therapeutic Ratings and End-of-Phase II Conferences:
Initiatives to Accelerate the Availability of Important New Drugs, 31 J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 17 (1991); Joel Lexchin, Intellectual Property Rights and the Canadian
Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Where Do We Go From Here?, 35 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS. 237,
243 (2005); Donald W. Light, Bearing the Risks of Prescription Drugs, in THE RISKS OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1 (Donald W. Light ed., 2010); Domenico Motola et al., An Update on
the First Decade of the European Centralized Procedure: How Many Innovative Drugs?, 62
BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 610, 614 (2006); New Medicines in 2007: Regulatory
Agencies and Policy Makers Leave Public Health in the Hands of the Pharmaceutical Industry,
17 PRESCRIRE INT’L 78 (2008).
37. RON A. BOUCHARD, PATENTLY INNOVATIVE: HOW PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS USE
EMERGING PATENT LAW TO EXTEND MONOPOLIES ON BLOCKBUSTER DRUGS 187 (2011)
[hereinafter PATENTLY INNOVATIVE]; Ron A. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby: Canada’s
Continuing Support of U.S. Linkage Regulations for Pharmaceuticals, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 71, 130 (2011) [hereinafter Bouchard, MARQUETTE].
38. Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical
Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 172 (2008–
2009); Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, 4 INNOVATION POL’Y ECON.
145, 147 (2004); Andrew A. Caffrey, III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents
and Procedure: Generic Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act, 9
VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1 (2004). See Edward Hore, A Comparison of United States and Canadian
Laws as They Affect Generic Pharmaceutical Market Entry, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373 (2000).
But see Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for
Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman 14 (John M. Olin Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 209, 2004).
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The need for a rational and evidence-based mechanism to value,
or qualify, intellectual property is clear from the above discussion.
This is true not only in the debate between patent scholars and law
makers; an evidence-based mechanism that values patents at various
points in their product lifecycle would have critical importance for
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs who wish to commercialize new
products at varying points in the product and regulatory lifecycles.
The need for a lifecycle-based qualitative assessment of intellectual
property associated with pharmaceutical products assumes greater
importance as the number of patents per product increase, the number
of legislative and regulatory vehicles providing intellectual property
protection on pharmaceuticals expands over time, as the emphasis on
incremental innovation assumes more importance than breakthrough
innovations; and to the extent that lowered standards for drug
approval, patenting, and latent listing result in an increased capacity
to restrain competition between pharmaceutical firms and prolong
patent monopolies for older products that would otherwise come off
patent protection.
III. WHY QUALIFY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY?
A. Pancakes and Global Intellectual Property Waves
It is one thing to acknowledge that there is a patent bargain and
that leading appellate courts require reasonably proportional
balancing of public and private interests under the quid pro quo of
this bargain, but what do you do when there are two groups at the
table and one side has 30 pancakes on its plate and the other has 300?
Such is the state of affairs that developed, and increasingly
developing, nations face with regard to the public and private interests
in the nexus between food and drug law and intellectual property law.
This Section briefly reviews how and why the ratio of 300 to 30 has
occurred and why there are more pancakes on the pharmaceutical
plate than on most other plates at the table.
The debate over the social value of pharmaceuticals in developed
nations is usually framed in one of two contexts. The first is in
relation to the social value of patented medicines that are “new” drug
products versus products variously referred to by the courts, the
intellectual property bar and legal commentators as “follow-on,”
“incremental,” “line extension,” “me too,” or “supplemental.” A
number of critics have derided the social value of follow-on
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innovations,39 while others assert follow-on drugs to be a critical
component of pharmaceutical innovation.40 Indeed, the issue
consumes significant resources of drug regulators, who are tasked
with determining the mechanisms and priorities of evidentiary
standards for various types of new and follow-on drugs. The second
component of the debate over the social value of pharmaceuticals is in
regards to the ability of brand-name drug companies to forestall
generic entry on older blockbuster drugs under pharmaceutical
linkage laws using so-called weak or defensive patenting strategies
and practices. While it is now understood that both brand and generic
firms play the system for their own ends,41 support of generic firms
has taken on a life of its own due to the presumed cost savings aspect
of generic substitutes.42
While there has been widespread criticism of the ability of the
patent system to encourage innovation,43 the pharmaceutical industry
in particular has been singled out as a successful example of the need
for strong intellectual property protection.44 Indeed, over the last 25
years the global public has witnessed a veritable landslide of patent
and related regulatory protection mechanisms. This has occurred via
alterations in the standards of patentable subject matter, obviousness,
novelty, prolongation of the terms of single patents and cumulative
patent portfolios, and prolongation in the terms of data exclusivity
protection for clinical trial data required for regulatory approval. Most
recently, we have seen new forms of legal protection for drugs at the
39. See, e.g., James Love, Evidence Regarding Research and Development Investments in
Innovative and Non-Innovative Medicines, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, 20 (Sept. 22,
2003), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/rnd/evidenceregardingrnd.pdf; Drugs in 2001, supra
note 36, at 58; Lexchin, supra note 36, at 243.
40. See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt et al., The Impact of Incremental Innovation in
Biopharmaceuticals: Drug Utilisation in Original and Supplemental Indications, 24 (Supp. 2)
PHARMACOECONOMICS 69, 69 (2006); Joshua Cohen & Kenneth Kaitin, Follow-On Drugs and
Indications: The Importance of Incremental Innovation to Medical Practice, 15 AM. J.
THERAPEUTICS 89, 91 (2008); DiMasi & Faden, supra note 35; DiMasi & Paquette, supra note
35.
41. See, e.g., Avery, supra note 38, at 172; Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 398-99;
Bulow, supra note 38, at 163-73; Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 38, at 1; HORE, supra note 34, at
3.
42. See, e.g., Hollis, supra note 35, 1189-90; Paul Grootendorst et al., Canada’s
Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Laws: The Case for Fundamental Reform, CANADIAN
MED. ASS’N. J. (forthcoming 2012).
43. See generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4; BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 4.
44. See generally ANGELL, supra note 4; AVORN, supra note 4. See also Stuart
Macdonald, When Means Become Ends: Considering the Impact of Patent Strategy on
Innovation, 16 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 135, 135-36 (2004), available at
http://www.stuartmacdonald.org.uk/pdfs/Macdonald.pdf.
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end of their patent life in the form of so-called “linkage regulations,”
which tie generic entry to all patents deemed relevant to the marketed
reference product.45 In this manner patent law has become
fundamentally linked to food and drug law through the specific legal
nexus of linkage regulations.
These means of protecting life sciences inventions have come
into being as a result of purposeful, and largely targeted, intellectual
property-based policies in the United States. The basket of policy and
legal vehicles to achieve this end are widely accepted to include the
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the
Bayh-Dole Act, the Hatch-Waxman Act, the consolidation of
intellectual property appellate courts into the Federal Circuit, and the
institution of fee-for-service provisions in the grant of both drug
approvals and drug patents.46
Based on a review of applicable literature, it appears there have
been at least three distinct waves of intellectual property reform
largely centered in the United States that have swept the globe over
the last half century. The first of these came about as a result of major
reforms to the U.S. Patent Act47 in 1952.48 One of the most significant
amendments removed the “flash of genius” requirement for invention
and replaced it with the skill level appropriate to a “person having
ordinary skill in the art,” otherwise known as the PHOSITA.49 This
rendered what was once considered to be “mere workshop”
improvements patentable.50 This had two long-ranging effects on
pharmaceutical law and practice. First, it gave rise to an increase in
45. See, e.g., SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF
PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research
and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1633, 1710-12 (1996); Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US
Academic Research in the 20th Century: The World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y
772, 780-81 (2006).
46. See, e.g., KRIMSKY, supra note 45; Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1670-71; Sampat,
supra note 45, at 773.
47. Patents, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006).
48. William Kingston, Intellectual Property’s Problems: How Far Is the U.S.
Constitution to Blame?, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 315, 332-35 (2002).
49. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions From the
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 885, 885-88 (2004); Ron A. Bouchard,
Living Separate and Apart Is Never Easy: Inventive Capacity of the PHOSITA as the Tie that
Binds Obviousness and Inventiveness in Pharmaceutical Litigation, 4 OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1,
17 (2007) [hereinafter Bouchard, PHOSITA].
50. See, e.g., Ron A. Bouchard, Should Scientific Research in the Lead-up to Invention
Vitiate Obviousness Under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations: To Test
or Not to Test?, 6 CAN. J. L. & TECH. 1, 1–27 (2007) [hereinafter Bouchard, Obvious];
Bouchard, PHOSITA, supra note 49, at 9-10.
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the perceived value of incremental innovation, which paved the way
legally for the accumulation of such inventions into clusters of patents
and related products.51 It is these clusters to which linkage laws would
later add the new tool of patent listing. Secondly, and consistent with
the lowering and broadening of the standard of invention, the 1952
amendments also rendered the PHOSITA capable of being
represented by entire teams of skilled technicians, as is abundantly
clear in the case law pertaining to pharmaceuticals and
biotechnology.52 Similar changes were made to patent legislation in
Japan, Sweden, France, Germany and Britain between 1959 and
1977.53
The second wave of global legal reform relating to patenting in
the life sciences sector came in the 1980s. The 1980 decision by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Chakrabarty began the process,54 under which
“everything under the sun” became patentable, including for the first
time, living matter.55 The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act allowed university
inventors to patent their inventions,56 launching an intense pursuit by
domestic universities of licensing and other technology transfer
revenues.57 In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act yielded patent term
restoration at the front end of the product lifecycle for inventors
whose products were held up in regulatory review for a significant
portion of patent term.58 Hatch-Waxman also gave generic firms
significant patent rights, in particular, an exception to patent
infringement narrowly construed to mean the ability to “work up”
generic versions of products that were still under patent protection.59
In exchange for the working up exemption, Hatch-Waxman gave to
brand firms extended patent terms for older blockbuster drugs at the
back end of the product lifecycle by obliging generics to litigate all
51. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 48, at 332-34; Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra
note 7, at 57-60; Ron A. Bouchard et al., Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval – Drug
Patenting Linkage for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 174, 18182 (2010) [hereinafter Bouchard 2010].
52. See, e.g., Bouchard, Obvious, supra note 50, at 4-5; Bouchard, PHOSITA, supra note
49, at 28-32.
53. Kingston, supra note 48, at 334-35.
54. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, The Life Sciences and the Rule of Law, 319 J. MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY 891, 895 (2002); Sampat, supra note 45, at 784.
55. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
56. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000).
57. See, e.g., KRIMSKY, supra note 45.
58. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000)) (commonly known
as the Hatch-Waxman Act) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act].
59. See, e.g., Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 413-14.
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relevant patents to the reference product prior to gaining market
entry.60 Hatch-Waxman has been credited for successfully launching
the generic drug industry in the United States.61
Currently, we are witnessing a third major wave of global patent
reform favoring strong intellectual property protection. The leading
edge of this wave occurred in the early 1990s, at which time the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS)62 was negotiated and ratified by many nations.63 This was
followed by additional nations signing bi-lateral or multi-lateral Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the United States.64 FTAs in
particular are proving to be an excellent vehicle for the global spread
of pharmaceutical linkage.65 As patent protection available for
pharmaceutical products under linkage provisions extends beyond the
harmonized patent regime under TRIPS, linkage is referred to as
TRIPS-Plus.66
In addition to expanded patent rights, TRIPS and other FTAs
also provided for data protection, whereby brand firms are provided
with a guaranteed period of market exclusivity tied to their regulatory
approval submission packages.67 During the period of market
60. See Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 448.
61. Gerald J. Mossinghof, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the
Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 194 (1999); Epstein & Kuhlik, supra
note 38, at 9-10.
62. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) (between the Governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States; entered into
force Jan. 1, 1994); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) of
the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)).
63. Robert S. Tancer, Foreign Investment in North America and the Pharmaceutical
Industry in Canada, 39 INT’L EXE. 283 (1997); Christopher Scott Harrison, Protection of
Pharmaceuticals as Foreign Policy: The Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement and Bill C-22 Versus
the North American Free Trade Agreement and Bill C-91, 26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 457,
460 (2000–2001).
64. Carlos María Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on Access to
Medicines, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 399, 399–404 (2006); Judit Rius Sanjuan, PatentRegistration Linkage, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, 1 (Apr. 3, 2006),
http://www.cptech.org/publications/CPTechDPNo2Linkage.pdf.
65. Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 397; Overview on Patent Linkage, FINSTON
CONSULTING, LLC, 1 (Aug. 7, 2006),
http://www.finstonconsulting.com/version03/files/Overview.pdf (UK Consulting Report).
66. Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 397.
67. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information
Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM
L. REV. 477, 483 (2003); Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United States and
European Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 479-80 (2004); Trudo Lemmens & Ron A.
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exclusivity, generic firms cannot rely on the evidence of safety and
efficacy of the brand reference drug and hence cannot obtain
regulatory approval to market generic substitutes.68 Under conditions
where the regulatory approval stage was lengthy, data protection
ensures that brand firms have some form of legal protection for their
drug development efforts should the patent protection expire prior to
approval and marketing.
Thus far, we have seen how the pancakes have been stacked on
our two sets of plates. On the one plate, the one with 300 pancakes,
we have patent laws and regulatory rights favoring the development
of “new and innovative” products by “innovator” firms. Importantly,
the policy underpinning these reforms was purposefully directed to
encouraging the development of breakthrough remedies as opposed to
low-level incremental innovations. We saw that the flash of genius
requirement for patenting was obviated in favor of workshop
improvements, and that the inventor no longer need be a lone genius
working in the basement, but, in fact, can be a whole team of PhDs
and MDs working in well lighted laboratories of multinational firms
towards incremental innovations. This change in the law gave rise to a
new emphasis and appreciation on the value of the whole stack of
pancakes, rather than the skill in rendering one particularly beautiful
pancake. After this, we observed a series of legal changes that
lowered the standard of patentability relating to subject matter,
obviousness, and utility, increasing the stack of pancakes further. In
addition, more people obtained licenses to make pancakes, furthering
the number of pancakes yet again. Finally, through TRIPS and FTA,
we saw a new round of pancake appreciation, increasing the height of
the stack through a combination of patent rights and data protection
rights. The pièce de résistance is a new type of pancake syrup
developed at this time, which prolongs the life of older pancakes at
the bottom of the stack that would have otherwise been thrown out.
This last touch, of course, was provided by the TRIPS-Plus
pharmaceutical linkage regime.
On the other plate, the one with 30 pancakes, we have patent
laws favoring the development of “copycat” products by generic
firms. We saw the pile increase from zero to 30 pancakes through the
early working provisions of Hatch-Waxman. This legislation is
responsible for increasing the percentage of generic drugs as a
Bouchard, Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in Canada, in CANADIAN HEALTH LAW AND POLICY
311, 312 (Jocelyn Downie et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007).
68. Eisenberg, supra note 67, at 484.
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fraction of all domestic US prescriptions from 19% in 1984 to 69% in
2008.69 However, this stack of 30 pancakes seems to increase and
decrease in number fairly frequently, as the linkage system is gamed
by both the people making and serving the pancakes.70 As a result, the
people eating the copycat pancakes never quite know what their share
will be, or how much they will have to pay for a pancake on any
given day. Moreover, in other nations, the system of producing these
pancakes does not work as well as it does in the United States,
resulting in much less than 30 pancakes per stack.71 Some nations
have decided not to cross “picket-lines” set up as a result of differing
opinions on whether to allow access to generic drugs because of
differing interpretations of TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus obligations.
Combined, these factors have led to some nations and major
economic regions such as the European Union and India deciding
against having the second stack at all as it applies to pharmaceutical
linkage.72 This has, not surprisingly, created much havoc in nations
with less bargaining power and more hunger for pancakes.73 In total,
of the legislation brought into force over the last 25 years alone in the
United States designed to stimulate the production of new and
innovative drugs and encourage timely generic entry; six of seven
legislative vehicles are aimed at facilitating innovation by brand firms
and one is directed to encourage the timely entry of generic drugs.74
Adding to the uncertainty in patent and innovation policy is the
observation that the identity of the first and second stacks is becoming
increasingly blurred over time. This is for two reasons. First, because
69. Cook et al., supra note 6, at 3-4 fig.1.
70. See, e.g., FTC 2002, supra note 34, at i-ii; Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 38, at 1;
Bulow, supra note 38, at 145; Avery, supra note 38, at 173; HORE, supra note 34, at 3.
71. See, e.g., Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 408-09.
72. For a discussion of drug shipments seized by nations who allege that the shipments
are in violation of domestic patent laws linked to international trade instruments such as TRIPS
or other FTAs, see, for example, Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 401; WTO Dispute over
Seized
Drug
Shipment,
THE
PHARMA
LETTER
(Feb.
16,
2009),
http://www.thepharmaletter.com/file/91762/wto-dispute-over-seized-drug-shipment.html. For a
discussion of the reasons why the EU and India rejected linkage based on anti-competitive and
public health grounds, see, for example, European Comm’n, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry
Final
Report,
at
315
(July
8,
2009),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf
[hereinafter EC Final Report]; Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, No. LPA 443/2009, 6, 20 (Delhi
H.C. Feb. 9, 2010) (India), available at http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/SMD/judgement/09-022010/SMD09022010LPA4432009.pdf.
73. See, e.g., Correa, supra note 64, at 400; Sanjuan, supra note 64, at 1-2; Overview on
Patent Linkage, supra note 65, at 1–2; GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND THE LIFE SCIENCE INDUSTRIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2d ed. 2009).
74. Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 419 fig.1.
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emerging empirical data demonstrates that the brand pharmaceutical
landscape is increasingly dominated by low level innovations that by
and large parallel the innovative characteristics of so-called “copycat”
generic products. Data from the companion study show clearly that
the vast majority of drug development and patenting by multinational
pharmaceutical firms is in relation to line extension drugs generally,
and line extension Me Too drugs specifically. Secondly, generic firms
are accruing, and indeed exercising, ever greater intellectual property
and regulatory rights in order to protect their inventions.75 For
example, in the companion paper we demonstrated that generic firms
are accruing larger numbers of regulatory approvals, patents, and
chemical compound designations that may have been previously
recognized on their products, such that it is becoming increasingly
difficult to distinguish between the drug development and intellectual
property strategies of brand and generic firms. As a result, it is not
only getting more difficult to tell the two sectors apart from one
another from an output perspective, but also more challenging to
justify distinctions in patent and innovation policy for the two sectors
under conditions where the outputs of both systems mirror one
another so strongly.
B. Product Clusters: Path of Least Resistance to Patent
Portfolios
In addition to the number of intellectual property mechanisms
over time, there has also been a slow evolution away from
highlighting the value of single patents resulting from the exercise of
the flash of genius toward clusters,76 or portfolios,77 of patents on
incremental innovations held under common control. In fact, some
have gone so far as to say the era of the individual patent is over.78 In
this way, not only are individual pancakes in the stack assumed less
75. For an analysis of US outcomes, see Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33, at 10-11,
and Hemphill & Sampat, infra note 279, at 1. For an analysis of Canadian outcomes, see
Monika Sawicka & Ron A. Bouchard, Empirical Analysis of Canadian Drug Approval Data
2001-2008: Are Pharmaceutical Players “Doing More With Less”?, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH
85, 97–114 (2009); Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1505-06; Bouchard 2010, supra note 51,
at 174; Ron A. Bouchard, Qualifying Intellectual Property I: Harmonized Measurement of New
and Follow-On Drug Approvals, Patents and Chemical Components. 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
(forthcoming 2012). [hereinafter Bouchard 2012].
76. Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 226-27; PATENTLY INNOVATIVE, supra note 37, at
243-58. For a description of an analogous scenario in the EU, see infra Part VII.C.3.
77. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 48, at 327; Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note
7, at 1.
78. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 51.
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attractive, but the value of the stack has grown in proportion to the
sum of individual pancakes.
As noted by Kingston, rational investment in a portfolio of
relatively high-risk products becomes increasingly attractive when the
risk attaching to the portfolio as a whole is statistically lower than that
of the more risky individual components.79 Such investments are
more attractive when patents are easier to come by and defend, and
where drug development strategy is focused on rational drug design
rather than the (apparently) more creative or flash of genius oriented
drug screening methods. Patent portfolios have also been described by
Polk and Parchomovsky, who observed that the right to exclude
conferred by a collection of related patents under common control is
greater than the sum of individual patents.80 These authors properly
point out that the portfolio literature and practice is at least a decade
old,81 stating that “the value of patent portfolios has been widely
recognized in commercial circles, but has received little attention (and
virtually no discussion of its implications outside of antitrust) in the
legal-academic circle.”82 Citing an array of literature, they define a
patent portfolio as a strategic collection of discrete yet related patents
under common control that, when combined, offer advantages to the
patentee that would not otherwise occur.83
As previously noted in the context of the complex nature of
technological invention,84 an important feature of patents in a
portfolio is their degree of functional relatedness. The value of
obtaining a cluster of related patents on a number of related drug
products has been recognized in the pharmaceutical industry for some
time.85 This property of relatedness contributes to the scaling effects
79. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 48, at 327.
80. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 5, 33, 52.
81. Id. at 27 n.99.
82. Id. Similar statements cite literature dating as far back as 1991 (n.107) and 1982
(n.109).
83. Id. at 27, 29, 30.
84. W. Brian Arthur, The Structure of Invention, 36 RES. POL’Y 274, 275 (2007); ERIC
VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 3 (2005).
85. In the Parliamentary debate leading up to linkage and TRIPS in Canada, Dr. Stephen
Schondelmeyer, a US pharmacologist and health economist, gave evidence before the House of
Commons to the effect that it is not the term of single patents that mattered most, but rather how
patents add cumulatively to extend market exclusivity, a claim the government at the time
vigorously denied. Compare testimony of Dr. Stephen Schondelmeyer (Professor, University of
Minnesota) and Dr. Elizabeth Dickson (Director General, Chemical and Bio-Industries Branch,
Department of Industry, Science and Technology). Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at
105. See also Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 227, 233 n.27 (2001) (citing
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of portfolios, which provides non-linear market power to patentees
that would be impossible with single patents.86 It is this scale feature
that led both Kingston87 and Polk and Parchomovsky88 to speculate
that the power of portfolios is greater than the sum of individual
patents.
The scaling effect of patent or product clusters has been
demonstrated empirically to shift power in the litigation arena to the
portfolio-holder; the likelihood of success in a given case increases as
the number of litigated patents in the portfolio increases. This is true
even if the chance of success on individual patents is low.89
Observations such as these help to explain the very large number of
patents per drug for pharmaceutical products (41:1 to 48:1) as well as
the finding that the percentage of listed patents can increase quite
considerably with drug profitability (from 5-27%).90 The patent
portfolio theory also helps to explain the observation that while up to
50-75% of patents in linkage litigation can be invalid or not
infringed,91 brand firms still win in approximately 50% of litigation
on the merits.92
As we have noted previously in the context of drug
The Gale Group, Intellectual Property Rules: A Delicate Balancing Act for Drug Development,
23 CHAIN DRUG REV. RX13 (2001)).
86. Kingston, supra note 48, at 327; Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 5,
33; Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 424-25.
87. Kingston, supra note 48, at 327.
88. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 32.
89. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 15-16 fig.6 (1984).
90. Comparing results from our Berkeley and Northwestern studies of the top 16, and the
top 95 blockbuster drugs, the data indicate that fractional listing of patents on the patent register
under linkage laws increased from 5% on the largest cohort (Northwestern), then to 10% as the
cohort was narrowed to the top 16 drugs (Berkeley) and, finally, to 27% of all patents granted on
two versions of a top selling blockbuster drug (Berkeley; Losec and Nexium). Bouchard 2009,
supra note 31, at 1494; Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 217.
91. FTC 2002, supra note 34; HORE, supra note 34, at 10-11. For an update of these
numbers, see generally, Adam Greene & D. Dewey Steadman, Pharmaceuticals: Analyzing
Litigation Success Rates, RBC CAPITAL MARKETS (Jan. 15, 2010),
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/pharmareport.pdf; Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33, at 48. For
a discussion of parallel rates of litigation and findings of invalidity in the EU, see EC Final
Report, supra note 72, and the European Comm’n, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary
Report, at 113-14 (Nov. 28, 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_report.pdf
[hereinafter EC Preliminary Report].
92. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33, at 48; Greene & Steadman, supra note 91. The
rate is lower than in the previous decade when generics won 73% of cases (FTC 2002, supra
note 34) because of an increase in settlements. See, e.g., Avery, supra note 38, at 182; Hemphill
& Lemley, supra note 33, at 48.
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development,93 product clusters appear to be a fundamental feature of
the regulated Therapeutic Product Lifecycle (rTPL) that characterizes
drug development.94 The rTPL has characteristics of a complex
adaptive system, where the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts.95 In a regulatory landscape with complex features, scale effects
occur as a result of the degree of interconnection and interdependence
of actors and institutions in the innovation ecology. This ecology can
be local or global,96 with appropriate scaling. The value-added aspect
of a complex innovation ecology comes from the combination of
nodal interdependence and the resulting increase in cumulative
market exclusivity afforded to the entire cluster of products and
patents.97 The specific nature of the scaling effect in the context of
pharmaceutical linkage is a direct function of patent law interacting
with food and drug law through linkage regulations. Our empirical
data to date wholly support the notion of patent portfolios, and
extends the concept to include not only patents, but also multiple
related products and patent listing under the tandem of patent law
acting in conjunction with newer forms of linkage laws.98 The issue of
clusters or portfolios becomes even more problematic for policymakers and other stakeholders when the technology that is the subject
of product clusters was also the recipient of substantial public funding
in earlier stages of development.99

93. For discussion of product-patent clusters and the relation of such clusters to linkage
law, see Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 125-28; PATENTLY INNOVATIVE, supra note
37, at 244-53. For discussion of cluster-based drug development as a consequence of the larger
intellectual property-intensive regulated Therapeutic Product Lifecycle (rTPL), see Sawicka &
Bouchard, supra note 75, at 88; Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1516; Bouchard 2010, supra
note 51, at 174.
94. Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 88; Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1516;
Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 174.
95. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 48, at 327; Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note
7, at 1; Ron A. Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 2: Impact of U.S. Supreme Court Patent Law on
Canadian and Global Systems-Based Innovation Ecologies, 15 HEALTH L.J. 247, 250-52
(2007).
96. Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal
Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401, 406 (2004); Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at
404-05; Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 225.
97. Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 174.
98. Id. at 192.
99. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 48, at 332; KRIMSKY, supra note 45; Ron A.
Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the Commercialization of Publicly Funded
Medical Research: Is There a Role for Compulsory Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B.U. J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 120, 141 (2007) [hereinafter Bouchard 2007]; Ron A. Bouchard & Trudo Lemmens,
Commentary, Privatizing Biomedical Research—a ‘Third Way’, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
31, 32 (2008).
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Combined, these possibilities highlight the importance of
providing a rational and evidence-based mechanism to qualify as well
as quantify intellectual property rights associated with pharmaceutical
products. An index of this nature would be particularly valuable if it
had sufficient functional utility and flexibility to extend to other
regulated technologies and to mitigate the types of restrained
competition that have been observed to occur between brand and
generic pharmaceutical firms in jurisdictions with linkage laws.
C. Summary
In summary, it seems reasonable to speculate that the transition
from the flash of genius approach to the PHOSITA approach
underpinning invention was meant to be commercially “inclusive.” In
other words, the amendments were intended to avoid preventing or
otherwise chilling incremental inventions that could have as much
value as breakthrough inventions. With time, and serial legal reforms,
more and more emphasis has been made on protecting the possibility
of innovation by minimizing the legal hurdles for innovators and
maximizing incentives. This evolution of intellectual property law has
occurred with perhaps less effort going toward the other side of the
balance that ensures that only inventions with significant social
benefits are rewarded with the grant of patent.100 The result is that we
have moved from a comparatively single-inventor single-product
system focused on breakthrough innovation to a multiple-inventor
multiple-product system concentrated on incremental innovation.
Tellingly, this transition has been fully enabled by law.
As a result of the history reviewed above, we have wound up
with a tall stack of pancakes that are perhaps less tasty and less
nourishing, but more impressive from a dimensional perspective.
Despite claims to the effect that all the good wheat for making
pancakes has been used up (low hanging fruit)101 or that good tasting
and nourishing pancakes have become too expensive to make (rising
R&D costs),102 it remains possible the bakers are simply making more
100. An elegant discussion of rights balancing in this regards can be found in the U.S.
Attorney General’s Amicus Curiae brief in KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc. (decided April 30, 2007).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2006/3mer/1ami/20041350.mer.ami.pdf.
101. See, e.g., Fredric J. Cohen, Macro Trends in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 4 NATURE
78, 78 (2005).
102. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003).
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lower quality pancakes because they are given substantial subsidies to
do so (basket of IP rights). As noted previously,103 the implication of
this scenario is that bakers are aiming ex ante at legal targets which
provide the most return on investment rather than the most benefit to
the public. This result parallels data from studies of complex political
systems, where “yardsticks” designed to measure progress reorient
behavior narrowly towards fulfillment of yardstick metrics.104 In the
present instance, it is possible that the relevant yardstick is
represented by a “paradoxical drug approval drug patent linkage,”
whereby firms can obtain the largest scope of cumulative patent
protection and market exclusivity with products with relatively low
levels of innovation.105 This yardstick is a function of weak
evidentiary standards for patents, approvals, and listed patents that
combined do not provide the greatest benefit to society but do provide
103. Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1513. The notion of “capturing” legal rights
necessary to restrain competition is hardly new.
Over the last twenty years, there has been an enormous extension of intellectual
property; a far-ranging enclosure movement over the public domain, paralleling
the eighteenth century’s enclosure of common lands. Intellectual property rights
have been broadened to cover more subjects, deepened to cover them for a longer
time, widened to cover them in more ways. Current law is actually nibbling at the
two areas that supposedly could never be owned, facts and ideas respectively.
James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2010 (2000).
104. For a discussion of complex political systems and how these systems often work
narrowly in service of identifiable goals, outcomes, and outputs, see ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM
EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 87 (1997); COMPLEXITY IN WORLD
POLITICS: CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF A NEW PARADIGM (Neil E. Harrison ed., 2006).
105. For a discussion of the concept and data relating to paradoxical drug approval drug
patent linkage in our earlier work, see Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 176, 183, 219-21;
Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 86, 94, 127; PATENTLY INNOVATIVE, supra note 37,
at 252-53. The latter reference describes the paradox in relation to growth in the spatiotemporal
nature of product clusters over time, stating that:
[A]s the number of follow-on drugs in the cluster grows over time, so too does
cumulative market exclusivity and innovator firm profit. The maximum point of
inefficiency occurs when the product cluster has a very long duration of
cumulative market exclusivity with little or no therapeutic benefit to the larger
population compared with the original pioneering drug on which the cluster is
based. This is referred to as the most “paradoxical” drug approval-drug patenting
nexus from a public policy perspective because the two goals of pharmaceutical
linkage are to increase the production of new and innovative drugs and to
facilitate timely generic entry. Both goals are frustrated with increased market
exclusivity on poorly innovative clusters. Any move away from the point where
the special provisions of pharmaceutical linkage to provide enhanced intellectual
property protection for older blockbuster drugs is no longer balanced by a
proportional benefit to society under the patent bargain is thus deemed to be
paradoxical.
Id.
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the least risk and most benefit to pharmaceutical firms in their drug
development activities.106
IV. STUDY OBJECTIVES
As we have seen with the pancake analogy, the result of
sequential waves of intellectual property reforms is that there is now a
significant amount of patent and related regulatory rights associated
with pharmaceutical products. We are no longer primarily looking to
make tasty and nourishing pancakes, but towering stacks of pancakes
with impressive visages. Of course, with these rights come prolonged
periods of market exclusivity and monopoly pricing, the costs of
which are passed on to consumers. One question that arises from this
discussion is what is society getting in return for all these rights? In
particular, is this new basket of intellectual property and regulatory
rights for private firms balanced by a proportional social benefit to the
public? As the legal mechanisms for patent protection generally, and
patent protection in the life sciences sector in particular, become
increasingly harmonized globally, the presence or absence of
empirical data to support the harmonized model becomes central. As
noted in Section III supra, nowhere is the need more great than for
qualifying patent value.
Considerations such as these motivated the present study. The
objective was to develop a novel innovation index to qualify
intellectual property rights associated with pharmaceutical products.
A second goal was to design the index such that it could qualify the
value not only of drug patents, but also of related drug approvals and
chemical components associated with particular drugs as well as other
drug-related metrics deemed relevant to innovation and its valuation.
The primary reason for investigating chemical components in addition
to approvals and patents was to gain some understanding of the utility
of chemicals to cluster-based drug development. This was based in
part on our earlier and somewhat surprising observation that chemical
patents represented the lowest quantity of patent classifications for a
cohort of the most profitable drugs.107 A third goal was to create an
innovation index that accorded with both the plain meaning of the
words “new” and “innovative” but also a purposive legal
interpretation that accorded with the first principles of statutory
interpretation and leading jurisprudence on the patent bargain.108
106.
107.
108.

Bouchard 2010, supra note 51; PATENTLY INNOVATIVE, supra note 37.
Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 202-03 fig.6.
Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 432. In previous work, these issues, as discussed by
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Through the terms of the patent bargain, as modified by the specific
nexus between food and drug law and patent law via newer forms of
linkage law,109 the index would therefore reflect the degree of social
benefit attached to varying degrees of innovation. A fourth goal was
to create an index that could be used to qualify patents for listing on
the patent register. This need follows the growing divergence of
listing practice from the policy underpinning linkage regulations in
both originating jurisdictions, which placed clear limits on the scope
of patents allowed to be listed on the register. A final objective was to
design an innovation index that would be sufficiently flexible to be
customized by jurisdictions in accordance with their food and drug
laws interacting with domestic and global intellectual property laws,
as well as for other technologies with regulatory requirements
stipulated and prioritized by federal or state regulators.
V. METHODS
A. Drug Approval Nomenclature and Classification
The rationale and methods for categorizing drug approvals, drug
patenting, and associated chemical components, as well as that for
drug class nomenclature are the same as in the companion paper.110
Briefly, drug approvals, patenting, and associated chemical
components were analyzed across numerous classes within the
broader categories of “new” and “follow-on” drugs. This included
approvals in the new drug approval route directed to First in Class
drugs (NDS FIC), Me Too drugs (NDS Me Too), drugs containing a
New Active Substance (NDS NAS), drugs undergoing one of the two
pathways (NOC/c; PR) for expedited review (NDS ER) and drugs
deemed to be the most innovative (NDS MI) in the cohort of analyzed
drugs. Drugs moving through the new drug approval route that did not
have an extra designation (NDS) were also quantified. Line extension
drugs approved via the follow-on pathway were studied alone
(SNDS) or in conjunction with FIC (SNDS FIC), Me Too (SNDS Me
Too), and ER (SNDS ER) designations. Finally, generic drugs
undergoing the conventional (ANDS) and follow-on (SANDS)
abbreviated review were studied. Terms and abbreviations were those
the Supreme Court and government branches of both the United States and Canada, have been
analyzed in the context of both a regulated Therapeutic Product Lifecycle (rTPL) and clusterbased drug development.
109. Id. at 439-40.
110. Bouchard 2012, supra note 75, at 47-55.
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in the companion paper, and drugs are said to be in approval, patent,
chemical cohorts and indicators, new and follow-on classifications,
and the various FIC, Me Too, ER, NAS, and MI classes. The
nomenclature for analysis of all data relating to new and follow-on
drugs is summarized for convenience in Table 1.
Table 1.
Classification Scheme for New and Follow-On Drugs

B. Innovation Index
Using the quantitative data in the companion as a starting point,
a qualitative innovation index was constructed. The innovation index
is a linear representation of the qualitative value of drug approvals,
patents, and chemical components. Calculated values represent
transformed data in that the raw quantitative values pertaining to drug
approvals, patents and chemicals are substituted with innovation
index values. As discussed in greater detail below, the transformed
data were determined by a combination of objective and subjective
analysis of the degree of difficulty in obtaining regulatory approvals
in various new and follow-on categories and the prioritization of
various drug classes as described and determined by drug regulators
in relevant disclosures of both pharmaceutical and innovation policy.
As the innovation index values reflect regulatory goals and
priorities set by federal regulators in pursuit of their public health
mandate informed by patent and innovation policy, it is reasonable to
assume they accord with the plain reading of the terms “new” and
“innovative” and thus represent a good first order approximation of
the patent bargain as it is guided by the three legal vehicles
underpinning pharmaceutical innovation: patent law, linkage law, and
food and drug law.
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The method for constructing the innovation index and resulting
index values are illustrated in Table 2. The index is linear, moving up
and to the left generally with increasing qualitative value. The various
new and follow-on drug classes are represented in the top of each
column. The four major categories of approvals (NDS, SNDS,
ANDS, and SANDS) are represented in the first column. Both the
classes and categories have individual multipliers (indicated in
brackets) that were calculated to yield the innovation index for each
drug class. As before, these move from the lowest level of innovation
(LOI) values at the bottom right of the table associated with follow-on
generic drugs (LOI= 0.5) to the highest LOI values for NDS MI drugs
(LOI= 15) at the top left of the table. All four sets of tabulated LOI
values for the Total Approval, MP Approval, MP Patent, and MP
Chemical Cohorts follow this pattern (Tables 4-7).
Table 2.
Innovation Index for Pharmaceutical Products
DRUG TYPE*

MI
(5)

ER
(4)

FIC
(3)

NAS
(2.3)

Me Too
(1.5)

NDS
(1.3)

NDS (3)

15

12

9

7

4.5

4

8

6

SNDS (2)
ANDS (1)
SANDS (0.5)

3

SNDS
(1)

ANDS
(1)

SANDS
(1)

2
1
0.5

*NDS, New Drug Submission; SNDS, Supplementary New Drug Submission;
ANDS, Abbreviated New Drug Submission; SANDS, Supplementary Abbreviated
New Drug Submission; MI, Most Innovative; ER, Expedited Review (Priority
Review + NOC/c); FIC, First in Class; NAS; New Active Substance. Note the
numbers in parentheses are multipliers. The rationale to determine multipliers is
discussed in Methods.

The index has been constructed using data obtained from Health
Canada websites and personal interviews conducted with Health
Canada regulators with the intent of elucidating metrics that
objectively demonstrate the level of difficulty in obtaining approval
for new and follow-on drugs and that meet the requirements for
prioritized forms of drugs as defined by regulators (e.g., drugs
meeting set criteria for Most Innovative, Expedited Review, New
Active Substances, First in Class, and Me Too drugs). These metrics
were then cross-referenced by analyzing the global drug regulation
literature with the aim of gaining further information about what

15 BOUCHARD (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/23/2012 11:41 AM

INNOVATION INDEX FOR PHARMACEUTICALS

313

metrics and drug classes various groups (regulators, patient groups,
industry-funded scholars, independent scholars, etc.) prioritized or
otherwise defined as “new” or “innovative” in their analyses. Where
there was a clash between criteria, the regulatory requirements
enumerated by the federal government were given privilege.
Where Phase 1-3 trials demonstrate that the potential therapeutic
benefits of a given new pharmaceutical outweigh its potential risks,
the manufacturer may file a New Drug Submission (NDS).111 The
NDS contains data on drug safety, efficacy, and quality, including
data from all relevant preclinical studies and clinical trials pertaining
to a drug’s manufacturing, packaging, labelling, claimed therapeutic
value, conditions for use, and side effects.112 A Supplemental New
Drug Submission (SNDS) may be filed by a manufacturer for changes
to a drug product already marketed by that sponsor.113 Drugs of this
nature are referred to as “line extension” drugs.114 When NDS and
SNDS applications contain sufficient data on drug safety, efficacy,
and quality to warrant approval, they received a market authorization
referred to as a Notice of Compliance or NOC.115
Manufacturers of generic drugs submit an Abbreviated New
Drug Submission (ANDS) in order to obtain market authorization. An
ANDS requires that the generic drug be pharmaceutically equivalent
to the reference brand name product.116 In this context, “equivalence”
means that the generic product must be the same as the reference
product with regard to (a) chemistry, (b) manufacturing, (c) route of
administration, (d) conditions of use, and (e) therapeutic and adverse

111. Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 67, at 325; see also Food and Drug Regulations,
C.R.C., c. 870 § C.08.002(1)(a) (2011). The Food and Drug Regulations are propagated under
the general authority of the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27 (2011) (Can.).
112. Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 67, at 325; Food and Drug Regulations, supra note
111, at § C.08.002(2). For details, see HEALTH CANADA, THERAPEUTIC PRODUCTS PROGRAMME
GUIDELINE: PREPARATION OF HUMAN NEW DRUG SUBMISSIONS (1991) [hereinafter HEALTH
CANADA
1991],
available
at
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfbdgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/prephum-eng.pdf.
113. Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 111, at § C.08.003.
114. Ron A. Bouchard & Monika Sawicka, The Mud and the Blood and the Beer:
Canada’s Progressive Licensing Framework for Drug Approval, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 49,
55 (2009); Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 106; Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 146667, 1469.
115. Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 111, at § C.08.002(2); Lemmens &
Bouchard, supra note 67, at 329; see also HEALTH CANADA 1991, supra note 112.
116. Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 67, at 325-26. For definition of “Canadian
reference product” and “pharmaceutical equivalent”, see Food and Drug Regulations, supra note
111, at § C.08.001.1.
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systemic effects when given to patients under the same conditions.117
Similar to brand name sponsors, generic sponsors may also submit
Supplemental Abbreviated New Drug Submissions (SANDS) where
certain changes are made to a generic drug that is already on the
market. Consequently, both brand name and generic firms can make
“new” and “supplemental” submissions.
Compared to NDS drugs, SNDS drugs (typically called line
extensions) involve relatively minor changes to dosage, strength,
formulation, method of manufacture, labelling, route of
administration, or indication.118 For this reason, the first distinction
made in the present study was that between drugs approved via NDS
and SNDS pathways. NDS and SNDS classes with no additional
metrics or attributes (in other words no FIC, ER, or NAS designation)
were given the value of LOI= 4 and 2, respectively. The two-fold
increase in NDS value compared to the SNDS value reflects the
difference between drugs that are “new” and those that are “followon” in nature. The values also reflect the relative similarities in
evidentiary hurdles between the two categories.
Given their so-called “copycat” nature it is not surprising that
generic drugs will have lower values than NDS and SNDS drugs.
Generic drugs undergoing conventional bioequivalence-based
approval (ANDS) received an LOI value= 1 whereas SANDS
approvals received a value of LOI= 0.5 for what essentially amounts
to a follow-on generic approval.
Moving upwards on the innovation index we come to Me Too
drugs in the new drug and line extension categories. As with
conventional NDS and SNDS drugs, the LOI values were low. For
NDS Me Too drugs there need only be a demonstrable change in
benefit-risk or chemical structure. This class of drugs is not the first
product on market for a given indication and chemical class, hence its
designation Me Too. A typical Me Too drug offers a better
therapeutic option than existing drugs in this class.119 By contrast, a
line extension (SNDS) Me Too drug represents a better therapeutic

117. Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 67, at 326; Food and Drug Regulations, supra note
111, at § C.08.001.1.
118. Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 67, at 326; Food and Drug Regulations, supra note
111, at § C.08.003(2).
119. Letters between author and David K. Lee, Dir., Office of Legislative and Regulatory
Modernization, Health Can.; Dr. Maurica Maher, Senior Scientific Advisory, Progressive
Licensing Project, Health Can.; Lesley Brumell, Supervisor, Submission and Info. Policy Div.,
Health Can. (Apr.-July 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Health Canada Personal
Communications].
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option in combination with a change in chemical form compared to
existing products. Regarding the index, NDS Me Too drugs represent
a slightly higher value compared to the NDS class in the absence of
any further class designations. A higher value for NDS Me Too drugs
encompasses the hypothetical possibility that a small fraction of NDS
Me Too drugs may be close to their corresponding First in Class
drugs by dint of differences in regulatory lag.120 Having said this, the
scientific, therapeutic, and economic value of Me Too drugs have
been routinely scrutinized by many industry observers and regulatory
agencies. For this reason, the value of NDS Me Too drugs was set to
LOI= 4.5, slightly greater than that for NDS approvals without a
further class designation (LOI= 4). The value for the SNDS Me Too
class (LOI= 3) reflects the need for this class of drugs to be lower
than the corresponding value for NDS Me Too drugs while also
acknowledging the increase in regulatory requirements of needing to
have a positive change in benefit-risk combined with a change in
chemical form compared to existing drugs.
It is considered a hallmark of innovation by many for a drug to
contain a novel chemical form and, indeed, some commentators have
claimed a drug should be considered new or pioneering when NCE or
new active substance (NAS) status is conferred.121 This plays out in
the current regulatory context in one of two ways: drugs may either
contain a new active substance or have sufficient chemical novelty
and use characteristics to be denoted First in Class.122 For now, we
will focus on the NAS designation.
Previously referred to as a new chemical entity (NCE),123 the
definition of a NAS encompasses a wide range of chemically active
substances, including (1) a chemical or biological substance that has
not been previously approved for sale as a drug; (2) an isomer,
derivative, or salt of a chemical substance that is already approved for
sale as a drug but differs in safety and efficacy properties; or (3) a
biological substance previously approved for sale as a drug that
differs in molecular structure, the nature of the source material, or the
manufacturing process.124 Given the wide breadth of chemical
120. See, e.g., DiMasi & Paquette, supra note 35; DiMasi & Faden, supra note 35.
121. J. D. Kleinke, Commentary: Much Ado About a Good Thing, 325 BRIT. MED. J. 1168
(2002).
122. Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 189.
123. Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 91.
124. Drugs Directorate, New Active Substance, HEALTH CAN., (June 4, 1991),
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/nas_nsa_pol-eng.pdf
[hereinafter Drugs Directorate]; Notice Of Compliance (NOC) Database Terminology, HEALTH
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modification encompassed by the NAS definition, although not as
wide as for that for SNDS drugs, a high LOI value cannot reasonably
be ascribed to this class of drugs. A value of LOI= 7 was given for
NDS NAS drugs. This value was chosen to reflect the relative
difficulty of synthesizing compounds that meet the regulatory criteria
for the NAS designation but which would also appropriately fall
below the regulatory hurdles required to meet the standard for
corresponding FIC and ER drugs.
The next class of drugs for valuation is drugs that are First in
Class approved in either the new or the follow-on approval pathways.
As reviewed in the companion paper,125 First in Class drugs approved
via the new drug approval route (NDS FIC) are those that consist of
either a completely new family of active ingredient(s) comprising a
NAS,126 or old active ingredient(s) used for the treatment of a
completely new indication. A drug is an NDS FIC drug if there is no
other drug on the market that belongs to the same compound family
that is used for the same indication.127 NDS FIC drugs have received
an LOI value= 9, reflecting a higher value than NDS NAS drugs and a
lower value than NDS ER drugs, but a higher value than SNDS FIC
drugs. It also reflects the regulatory requirement that the NDS FIC
chemical form must be truly first in class whereas the SNDS chemical
form requirement is in line with that of the SNDS category generally.
As with Me Too drugs, drugs approved through both new and
follow-on submission routes can be First in Class. For the “line
extension” SNDS route, relatively small changes to existing chemical
structures such as salts or isomers may still yield an SNDS FIC or Me
Too designation. Compared to Me Too drugs, the difference is that
while both SNDS FIC and Me Too drugs can cover new chemical
forms,128 only line extension drugs that are directed to both a new
chemical form and a new use may be deemed NDS FIC drugs.129
Those that do not are Me Too drugs.130 Because even a follow-on
First in Class drug must be directed to a new use as opposed to just a
new chemical form with altered benefit-risk, a higher level of
CAN., http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/prodpharma/notices-avis/noc-acc/term_noc_acc-eng.php
(last modified Aug. 19, 2010).
125. Bouchard 2012, supra note 75, at 10.
126. See, e.g., Drugs Directorate, supra note 124; Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at
55; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 94.
127. Health Canada Personal Communications, supra note 119.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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innovation is typically ascribed to SNDS FIC drugs as opposed to
SNDS Me Too drugs.131 The SNDS FIC drug class has thus been
given an LOI value= 6, reflecting the significant degree of innovation
compared to SNDS Me Too drugs. The LOI value for SNDS FIC
drugs is lower compared to that for NDS NAS drugs (LOI= 7), owing
to the comparatively lower standard of approval for SNDS compared
to NDS drugs, but also reflecting the relatively similar array of
chemical modifications allowed under either category, including
relatively simple modifications via salts, enantiomers, crystalline
forms, dosage form, etc.
The next group of drugs assessed is comprised of drugs
undergoing some form of expedited review. As with FIC and NAS
drugs, industry commentators often ascribe a significant level of
innovation to drugs selected by regulators to undergo some form of
priority review. Regulators may grant approval in an expedited
fashion under domestic food and drug law in two ways.132 One is
through Priority Review, which refers to the fast-tracking of eligible
drug candidates “intended for the treatment, prevention or diagnosis
of serious, life-threatening or severely debilitating diseases or
conditions” with an “unmet medical need or for which a substantial
improvement in the benefit/risk profile is demonstrated.”133
Evidentiary requirements for safety, efficacy, and quality parallel
those for non-priority submissions; the main difference is an
accelerated review time.134 In the second path, sponsors may be
granted an “NOC with conditions”135 (NOC/c) for eligible NDS or
SNDS submissions directed to serious, life-threatening, or severely
debilitating diseases, or conditions for which there is promising
evidence of clinical effectiveness based on available data.136 In
addition to less onerous evidentiary requirements, the targeted review
time for NOC/c approval is significantly accelerated compared to that

131. For a comparison of Canadian and WHO First in Class and Me Too classifications
schemes see Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 108 (comparing Tables 2 and 5).
132. See generally Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 58–59.
133. HEALTH CAN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PRIORITY REVIEW OF DRUG SUBMISSIONS
1,
4
(2009),
available
at
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfbdgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/priordr-eng.pdf.
134. Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 67, at 328.
135. NOC/c approvals are granted pursuant to § C.08.004(1), in compliance with the
conditions of use stipulated in §§ C.08.002(1)(g), C.08.002(1)(h), C.08.006(2)(b), and
C.05.006(2)(a) of the Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 111.
136. HEALTH PRODS. & FOOD BRANCH, HEALTH CAN., GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: NOTICE
OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS (NOC/C) (2007).
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for standard NDS review.137 The main difference with Priority
Review is that NOC/c licensure is granted on the condition that the
sponsor will perform additional post-market studies to confirm the
alleged benefits and risks.138 It is also possible for one drug to have
both NOC/c and Priority Review designations (PR-NOC/c). Unless
otherwise stated, for the purposes of this Article all three NOC/c,
Priority Review and PR-NOC/c pathways for approval are collapsed
together under the single heading of Expedited Review (ER).
Because firms must produce substantial evidence to regulators
relating to (a) diagnosis of serious, life-threatening or severely
debilitating diseases or conditions with (b) an unmet medical need (c)
for which a substantial improvement in the benefit/risk profile or
which promising evidence of clinical effectiveness has been adduced,
drugs in the ER category are assumed to represent a high level of
innovation and social benefit. The relatively high LOI value of 12 is
given to NDS ER drugs based on its position ahead of all other drugs
on the linear scale discussed thus far. A value of LOI= 8 is given to
SNDS FIC drugs based on its position as the most innovative drug in
the SNDS stream. It receives a lower grade compared to only the
NDS FIC and NDS ER drugs. It does so based on the comparative
difficulty in achieving the regulatory requirements for an NDS FIC
where there is no other comparator, and to reflect the fact that a drug
firm must have significant, if not substantial, experience with a drug
that undergoes review in the SNDS compared to the NDS approval
pathway.
The final step in setting the values in the model was the
definition of the most innovative drug class. As discussed in the
companion paper, this was done according to a review of the literature
regarding previously published definitions of the terms “new” and
“innovative” in relation to drug products. As expected, the results
were highly contingent on the industry affiliation of the authors. For
example, depending on the source and degree of industry association,
published definitions of what constitutes an “innovative drug” vary
considerably, from as low a threshold as simply containing an
NAS,139 to the slightly more stringent requirements of either being

137. HEALTH PRODS. & FOOD BRANCH, HEALTH CAN., ACCESS TO THERAPEUTIC
PRODUCTS: THE REGULATORY PROCESS IN CANADA 10-11 (2006), available at http://www.hcsc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/pubs/access-therapeutic_acces-therapeutique-eng.pdf.
138. See, e.g., Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 59; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra
note 75.
139. See, e.g., Kleinke, supra note 121, at 1168.

15 BOUCHARD (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/23/2012 11:41 AM

INNOVATION INDEX FOR PHARMACEUTICALS

319

directed to FIC therapies140 or to follow-on drugs that nevertheless
undergo Priority Review.141 However, as discussed previously,142
merely containing a NAS is an insufficient basis for designating a
drug as pioneering or strongly innovative because there is ample room
in the definition for minor changes to previously approved medical
ingredients, including salts, esters, solvates, polymorphs, and
enantiomers. A similar conclusion applies to drugs that are only
directed to FIC therapies, as these can also be follow-on versions of
previously marketed products containing slightly modified medical
ingredients or directed to new uses within a therapeutic class.
Moreover, where Priority Review need only be directed to drugs
demonstrating moderate clinical improvement over existing therapies,
it is also an insufficient proxy for strong innovation.
The most reasonable definition for a most innovative drug is one
that is truly pioneering and accords to the plain meaning of the words
new and innovative.143 That is, a drug that is approved via the new
drug approval pathway (NDS), contains a NAS, undergoes some form
of Expedited Review, and is directed to a FIC therapy.144 Only in
combination do these requirements approach a reasonable definition
for a truly breakthrough technology. This drug class has been
designated NDS MI. Keeping with the qualitative linear scheme, NDS
MI drugs are awarded an LOI value= 15.
As a methodological matter, it may be pointed out that the
qualitative data obtained using the LOI method are consistent with the
quantitative data reported in the companion paper and vice versa. The
method in the companion paper emphasizes absolute and fractional
percentage analyses, whereas the innovation index described here
hinges primarily on the raw number of approvals, patents, and
chemicals. Moreover, data in the companion paper do not qualify the
numbers of indicators per cohort in an incremental and rational
manner. For example, as reviewed in our Berkeley study,145 one
person’s gold standard (innovation equivalent to only a NAS or FIC)
is another person’s “moderate” or “mild” degree of innovation. The
140. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 101, at 78; NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, PROSPECTUS FOR
NATIONAL KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT, COMMITTEE ON KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT (1996)
[hereinafter PROSPECTUS].
141. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. RESEARCH AND EDUC. FOUND.,
supra note 36.
142. See generally Kleinke, supra note 121.
143. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 101, at 78; PROSPECTUS, supra note 140.
144. See Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1508.
145. See Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1507-09.
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designation of the NDS MI class as the most innovative may incur
some debate among those who are industry supporters, but the
designation is reasonable in light of both the plain meaning and
purposive legal interpretation of the terms “new” and “innovative.”146
Further, in a primarily quantitative model, there is more
uncertainty as to which class of indicator per cohort should reflect the
next level of innovation as opposed to the NDS MI class and so on, as
one proceeds from one class to the next. For example, both indices
reflect the difficulty in obtaining drugs in the expedited review
categories (NOC/c and Priority Review) as well as the difficulty in
obtaining FIC approvals in the new drug approval stream (NDS
FIC).147 However, as one can see in Figures 6 and 7 of the companion
paper, when approval, patenting, and chemical indicators in more than
one drug class increases across cohorts either separately or together, it
is difficult to appreciate which drug class is relatively more
important.148 The same will be true when two or three classes are
evolving with the broader NDS and SNDS classes either within a
given indicator or across cohorts.
Compared to the quantitative model, the innovation index is
therefore less concerned with trends in fractional percentages between
drug classes, and thus avoids bias in emphasizing these numbers (e.g.,
assuming that because there are significant differences between
SNDS FIC or NDS and SNDS ER approvals across NDS and SNDS
categories or between indicators that these classes of drugs must be
the most important classes). In addition, quantitative data alone do not
tell us which class is the more innovative class. Only a rational,
graded, and evidence-based index does so.
Based on the discussion thus far, it can be argued that the
innovation index provides a rational and evidence-based measure of
the value of each drug class to society. This conclusion stems from
basing the index on specific regulatory requirements and priorities
rooted in publicly disclosed evidence of safety, efficacy, and quality;
unmet medical need; improvements in benefit-risk; and whether drugs
occupy categories of socially beneficial innovation described by
regulators in Canada and elsewhere.
A final observation is that only the qualitative innovation index
displays the numerical “long tail.” This term refers to the statistical
property of a data set whereby a significant fraction of data is found
146.
147.
148.

See Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 110.
See generally Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 97-114.
Id. at 98.
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within the tail-end of a probability distribution. The long tail is
inherently valuable to the LOI data, because the numbers in the higher
end of the index represent the most innovative drugs. As a result, even
though in practice data at the high end of the LOI range invariably
comprise a much smaller percentage of the total values, they represent
the most important classes of drugs studied.
C. Examples of LOI Compound-Indication Classifications
A noteworthy characteristic of the innovation index described in
this Article is that it rewards innovation for both new and follow-on
drugs. It does so based on the degree of innovation objectively
demonstrated to be associated with a given drug based on
corresponding regulatory requirements and priorities. This is
particularly important in the pharmaceutical sector, where many have
claimed that incremental and/or follow-on innovation is critical not
only to later breakthrough developments,149 but also important in and
of itself.150
Two examples of proportional rewards in developing new and
follow-on drugs are provided in Table 3. The data illustrate that brand
firms are clearly rewarded for developing difficult SNDS FIC and
SNDS ER drugs compared to several classes of new drugs. This is
appropriate as SNDS FIC drugs encompass both new use and new
chemical form requirements. This can be compared to NDS NAS
status, which can be based on small chemical modifications to an
already marketed drug. Similarly, SNDS ER drugs are meeting a
substantial unmet medical need as defined by regulators as well as
displaying an improved benefit-risk over products already available
on the market. For this reason the LOI value is greater than NDS,
NDS NAS, and NDS Me Too drugs.

149.
150.

See Cohen, supra note 101, at 78-79.
See, e.g., DiMasi & Faden, supra note 35; DiMasi & Paquette, supra note 35, at 12.
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Table 3.
Examples of LOI Compound-Indication Classifications

In essence, the data in Table 3 demonstrate that, as a given drug
fans out over time from a “new and innovative” drug with significant
objective evidence of its innovativeness derived from regulatory
requirements (NAS, FIC, ER) to progressively lower levels of
innovation over time, the innovation index value goes down
correspondingly. As noted above, while the index rewards innovators
both at the NDS and SNDS levels, the index provides lower values to
firms as the degree of innovation diminishes and as the product
cluster grows to encompass first lower level line extension products
and then generic products.
D. Curve Fitting
As noted in the Introduction, in assessments of innovation found
in many government reports and documents, one often finds the
assumption that an increase in the number of patents in a given
technology sector equals increased innovation in that sector.151 Here
also one finds arguments linking increased innovation and patenting
to increased domestic productivity and prosperity as well as enhanced
competitiveness on the global stage.152 The link between the two is
the final assumption that patenting has social benefits that are
proportional to the invention disclosed. There is no allowance, or, at
the very least, precious little, made in political discourse for the
possibility that sectors with high and increasing patent activity may be
getting near the point of diminishing returns. Thus, while it is rarely
151.
152.

1 EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, supra note 2, at 6.
Id.
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explicitly stated, there is built into a great deal of intellectual property
policy, the assumption that innovation, prosperity, and productivity
are positively correlated with patenting. A negative correlation would
contradict a certain fraction of patent policy and a good deal of drug
firm lobbying.
Our model allows us to obtain some relevant information
pertaining to this debate. The reason for this conclusion is that the
qualitative index is derived from regulatory standards that are
themselves at least a first order approximation of social benefit. Thus,
the trend between innovation and patent quality may be positive or
negative and this trend can be either linear or exponential.
For a positive correlation, a linear increase in LOI with indicator
number would imply that for every increment in drug approval or
drug patenting there would be a corresponding increase in social
benefit. A log increase in patenting or approval with LOI would
suggest a positive non-linear relationship between indicator number
and social benefit. In this scenario the majority of either indicator
would reside in the lower LOI value bins, implying that the majority
of inventions measured would be likely to be poorly innovative with
correspondingly low social benefit. In comparison, an exponential
increase would suggest that the majority of either indicator would
reside in the higher LOI value bins. For both the log and exponential
scenarios, the extent to which the 25th, 50th, 75th or any other
percentage of maximal indicator would be in a relatively low or high
portion of the index would depend on the power of the exponent,
which in turn depends on the distribution of the data across LOI bins.
The implications are reversed for a negative correlation. A linear
decrease in LOI with indicator number would imply that for every
increment in drug approval or drug patenting there would be a
corresponding decrease in social benefit. An exponential decrease in
patenting or approval with LOI would suggest that the majority of
indicators would reside in the lower LOI value bins, again with
correspondingly lower social innovation value. Conversely, a log
decline would suggest that the majority of indicators would reside in
comparatively higher LOI value bins, with accordingly greater
probability of higher value innovation at all levels of LOI up to the
maximal value.
As discussed in the context of the Results (cf. note 155), the
choice of numerical functions to describe the dependence of indicator
on LOI value was not based on a specific model, econometric or
otherwise. Rather, the purpose of analyzing the data in this manner
was to provide a set of numerical benchmarks from which to assess
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the descriptive properties of the data across the various new and
follow-on categories and classes. The hybrid objective-subjective
nature of the resulting transformed data is addressed below in Part
VII.B.
E. Data Analysis
Drug approval, patenting, patent listing, and chemical data were
collected, statistically analyzed, and graphed as described in the
companion paper153 using a combination of Excel® (Microsoft. Corp.,
Redmond, WA), Access® (Microsoft.Corp., Redmond, WA),
GraphPad Prism® (Graphpad Software, Inc., La Jolla, CA), and
SigmaPlot® (Systat Software, Inc., San Jose, CA). Approval data were
obtained from the Health Canada website and patent and chemical
data were obtained from Canadian (CIPO) and US (USPTO) patent
databases. Patent listing data were obtained from the Canadian Patent
Register website maintained by Health Canada.
VI. RESULTS
A. Presentation of Data
As outlined in the Methods and summarized in Tables 4-7, drug
approvals, patents, and chemical components were analyzed across
numerous drug classes within the broader categories of new and
follow-on drugs. This included approvals in the new drug approval
route directed to FIC drugs (NDS FIC), Me Too drugs (NDS Me
Too), drugs containing an NAS (NDS NAS), drugs undergoing one of
the two pathways for expedited review (NDS ER), and drugs deemed
to be the most innovative (NDS MI). Drugs moving through the new
drug approval route that did not have an extra designation (NDS)
were also studied. Line extension drugs approved via the follow-on
pathway were studied alone (SNDS) or in conjunction with FIC
(SNDS FIC), Me Too (SNDS Me Too), and ER (SNDS ER)
designations. Finally, generic drugs undergoing the conventional
(ANDS) and follow-on (SANDS) abbreviated review were studied.
Quantitative data were transformed into index values for drug
approvals in the full cohort of 2,087 Notices of Compliance (NOCs),
or approvals, associated with 608 drug products by regulators
between 2001 and 2008, updated to November 2010 (Total Approval
Cohort). The starting point for analysis was 2001, as major
153.

See generally Bouchard 2012, supra note 75, at 13.
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amendments to the nation’s food and drug legislation and regulations
which affected both the goals and mechanism of national drug
regulation were made at this time.154 LOI values were next calculated
for a sub-set of 375 of these approvals associated with 95 of the most
profitable drugs approved over this period, also updated to 2010 (MP
Approval Cohort). In addition to approval data, LOI values were
calculated for patents and chemical components associated with the
MP Approval Cohort. These are referred to as the MP Patent Cohort
and the MP Chemical Cohort, respectively.
LOI values were derived for approvals, patents, and chemicals in
each of the drug classes enumerated above. In addition, LOI values
across indicators were normalized for submissions within new (NDS),
line extension (SNDS), and generic categories, both as a percent of all
indicators investigated and as a percent of brand and generic
approvals. Manipulation of data in this matter was not as extensive as
undertaken in the companion paper, and generally was restricted to
normalization for brand submissions following excision of generic
data. Thus, the main data presented in Figures 1-4 follows the same
pattern: First, raw LOI data are provided for all NDS, SNDS, ANDS,
and SANDS classes (Figs. 1a-4a), following which only brand data
are analyzed. This includes raw data for each indicator for only brand
drug companies (Figs. 1b-4b), followed by fitting of raw and
normalized data to various parametric functions (Figs. 1c-4c and Figs.
1d-4d).
A number of methods were utilized in order to quantify the
numerical characteristics of the increase and decrease in LOI values
with the numbers of approvals, patents, and chemical indicators as
well as changes in LOI baseline values from one indicator to the next.
First, approval, patent, and chemical indicators were assessed using
the curve fitting approach described in Part V.D. Brand data were
represented in a scatter diagram with corresponding fits (Figs. 1c-4c).
With trial and error, we found that the decline in indicator with LOI
value shown in Figs. 1c-4c could be best fit to an exponential function
of the form Y = A*exp(-Index/λ) + B, where A is the amplitude, λ is
the rate constant for decline, and B is the baseline value. The
statistical properties of the fit are given by the R2 value, which
represents the goodness of fit of the data to the function.
Next, LOI data were normalized to the cumulative maximum for
each indicator (Figs. 1d-4d). This was done to assess how “fast” or
“slow” the data rise to peak LOI levels in different cohorts.
154.

Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 107.
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Cumulative data in Figs. 1d-4d were best fit by a 4-parameter
sigmoidal function of the form Y = B + A/[1 + (Index/S)Q],where B is
the constant baseline, A is amplitude, S is the scaling factor, and Q is
the power factor. Again, goodness of fit was assessed using R2 values.
It can be verified by visual inspection of the data and best-fits in
Figures 1c-4c and 1d-4d that the exponential and sigmoidal functions
have opposite dependence on index values, with the exponential
decreasing and the sigmoid increasing with increasing LOI values.
The opposite dependence of the magnitude of the two functions on
LOI values arises because the cumulative plots (Figs. 1d-4d) are an
approximation to an integral of the declining plots (Figs. 1c-4c).155
Cumulative data were further quantified by calculating the
normalized LOI value at 50% (CNV50) and 80% (CNV80) of
maximum. The values were calculated for the Total Approval, MP
Approval, MP Patent, and MP Chemical Cohorts. These data were
then described in the Results relative to Figures 1d-4d and compared
directly to one another in Figure 5b and Figure 6b. The method for
calculating the values is given in the inset to Figure 1d, which
illustrates the manner in which the CNV50 and CNV80 values are
calculated from the fitted curves. The goal of obtaining and
comparing CNV50 and CNV80 data is parallel to that for assessing
dose-response curves for biologically active compounds and the
effective concentration at 50% maximum, typically referred to as the
EC50 value. As such, the CNV50 value allows for a comparison of the
number and type of drug classes that comprise the fiftieth percentile
of maximal innovation in each cohort. The value at 80% maximal was
chosen over the maximal value in order to gain an understanding of
whether the data were accumulating in a linear or a non-linear
manner. The purpose of both sets of analyses is to obtain descriptive
information, in this case, about the manner in which LOI values
change with indicator number across the different drug classes chosen
for study.
The difference between peak LOI values for each indicator

155. The choice of exponential and sigmoidal functions to describe the dependence of
indicator on LOI value was not based on any particular model. The purpose of the fitted
functions was to provide simple global metrics that could describe the properties of the data set
contained in each cohort. The exponential and sigmoidal functions were found to provide
adequate, yet simple and quantitative descriptions for the raw data (Figs. 1c-4c) and the
cumulative data (Figs. 1d-4d). It is likely that other functions could provide similarly “good” fits
to the data, but at the expense of additional complexity. However, the excellence of the fits of
the sigmoidal function to the cumulative data suggests that very little would be gained by using
a more complex function.
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minus the corresponding baseline LOI value for that indicator (PeakBaseline) for LOI values ≥ 6 were calculated and represented in
graphical form (Fig. 6a). Peak values were the maximal LOI value per
indicator and the Baseline value was taken as the mean of LOI values
between LOI= 6 and LOI= 15.
Finally, in order to gain an understanding of which drug classes
might be contributing to changes in baseline, raw LOI data and the
change from one new and follow-on drug class to the next for Me
Too, FIC, ER, and NAS drugs were compared across NDS and SNDS
categories and between MP Approval, Patenting, and Chemical
Cohorts (Tbl. 8). Differences between drug classes are also analyzed
in Figure 7, which summarizes the data in spider plot format. Spider
graphs are particularly useful in this context, as they permit direct and
simultaneous visual comparison of all new and follow-on drug classes
across all four cohorts studied. Raw data for all four cohorts studied
are provided in Tables 4-7 below.

Table 4.
Innovation Index Data for Total Approval Cohort
TOTAL COHORT
- APPROVALS

MI
(5)

ER
(4)

FIC
(3)

NAS
(2.3)

Me Too
(1.5)

NDS
(1.3)

NDS (3)

22

47

65

130

245

311

56

73

SNDS (2)

976

SNDS
(1)

ANDS
(1)

SANDS
(1)

1049

ANDS (1)

580

SANDS (0.5)

147

Table 5.
Innovation Index Data for MP Approval Cohort
MP COHORT
- APPROVALS

MI
(5)

ER
(4)

FIC
(3)

NAS
(2.3)

NDS (3)

20

44

20

39

46

34

SNDS (2)

ANDS (1)
SANDS (0.5)

Me Too
(1.5)

NDS
(1.3)

31

51

194

SNDS
(1)

ANDS
(1)

SANDS
(1)

228
57

11
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Table 6.
Innovation Index Data for MP Patenting Cohort
MP COHORT
- PATENTING

MI
(5)

ER
(4)

NDS (3)

550

SNDS (2)

FIC
(3)

NAS
(2.3)

1049

550

995

1057

1076

Me Too
(1.5)

NDS
(1.3)

742

1182

2514

SNDS
(1)

ANDS
(1)

SANDS
(1)

2577

ANDS (1)

744

SANDS (0.5)

508

Table 7.
Innovation Index Data for MP Chemical Cohort
MP COHORT
- CHEMICALS

MI
(5)

ER
(4)

FIC
(3)

NAS
(2.3)

Me Too
(1.5)

NDS
(1.3)

NDS (3)

20

43

20

39

30

48

26

24

SNDS (2)

ANDS (1)
SANDS (0.5)

62

SNDS
(1)

ANDS
(1)

SANDS
(1)

64
13

5

B. Total Approval Cohort
Results for the Total Approval Cohort are illustrated in Figure 1a
and Table 4. The two values at the lowest end of the index are, not
surprisingly, those for conventional (ANDS) and follow-on (SANDS)
generics. After excision of generic data (Fig. 1b), the calculated LOI
values for brand approvals can be observed to decline smoothly in
bins with decreasing numbers of approvals. One of the most
important results of this study is that the classes with the two largest
numbers of approvals had the lowest LOI values next to generics;
SNDS (LOI= 2) and SNDS Me Too (LOI= 3) drugs. The classes
represent line extension drug generally and line extension Me Too
drugs specifically. As illustrated in Figure 1b, SNDS and SNDS Me
Too drugs dominated the data set, with each class containing
approximately 1,000 approvals. The next greatest class was the NDS
class, which contained a little over 300 approvals. This indicates that
there were over 300% more line extension approvals than new drug
approvals. From an LOI value of ≥ 3, there was a smooth decline in
calculated LOI value as the number of approvals in each class
decreased.
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Figure 1.
Innovation Index Data for Total Approval Cohort

Fig. 1. Innovation Index Data for Total Approval Cohort. Bar graphs showing the
number of total approvals expressed as a function of the level of innovation (LOI)
before (a) and after (b) excision of generic data. c. Brand approvals as a function of
LOI shown in scatter plot format. Solid line is a fit of the data to a single exponential
function of the form Y = A*exp(-Index/λ) + B. d. Cumulative normalized brand
approvals expressed as a function of LOI. Solid lines are fits using a sigmoidal
function of the form Y = A + B/[1 + (Index/S) Q]. Inset. Method for calculating
cumulative normalized values at 50% (a; CNV50) and 80% (b; CNV80) maximal.

Figure 1c shows the brand data in a scatter diagram with
corresponding curve fitting. The declining LOI data in Figure 1c was
well fit to a single exponential function of the form Y = A*exp(Index/λ) + B. The R2 value, representing the goodness of fit of the
data to the function, was 0.891. The data demonstrate a clear and
convincing negative correlation between the number of approvals in a
given new or follow-on drug class and its corresponding LOI value.
Thus, of the range of possible numerical relationships between
approval number and the corresponding level of innovation in the
various drug classes investigated (see Part V. Methods), an
exponential decline in LOI with approval number was observed. This
finding supports the conclusion that the large majority of approvals in
the Total Approval Cohort reside in the lower LOI value bins with
correspondingly lower social benefit values.
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That the bulk of approvals accumulate with the greatest
frequency in lower LOI bins is supported by the cumulative
normalized data and fit in Figure 1d. The cumulative data normalized
to maximum were well fit by a sigmoidal function of the form Y = B
+ A/[1 + (Index/S)Q], with an R2= 0.998. Supporting the conclusion
that the majority of pharmaceutical innovation resides in low value
LOI bins, CNV50 and CNV80 values for the Total Approval Cohort
were 1.97 and 3.45, respectively. This result indicates that 50% and
80% of all innovative value for the 2,087 approvals studied occurred
at LOI values that were only 13% and 23% of maximal (LOI= 15).
Not only are these values very low, especially the CVN80 value, but
the results are skewed heavily by the largest two classes of approvals
in the Total Approval Cohort that have the lowest LOI values, SNDS
and SNDS Me Too drugs. Thus, the vast majority of all drug
approvals granted by regulators over the ten year test period were of
very low innovative value.
Finally, the data in Figure 1, particularly the fits in Figures 1c
and 1d, illustrate the value of the innovation index in identifying and
measuring the long tail of the data set. As noted in the Methods, this
portion of the LOI index represents the statistical property of a data
set where a small but significant fraction of data is found within the
tail end of a probability distribution. As illustrated by the raw index
data in Figure 1b especially and the corresponding fit to the data in
Figure 1c, the long tail is invaluable for investigation of LOI data, as
it represents the locus of the most innovative drugs. While the fraction
of drug classes at the higher end of the innovation index is not large in
the Total Approval Cohort, we will see below that the size and
distribution of classes within the long tail changes substantially across
cohorts and indicators.
C. MP Approval Cohort
In order to address innovation index values for the most valuable
drugs, LOI data for the MP Approval Cohort were calculated. The
data obtained had analytical parameters that were very similar to
those in the Total Approval Cohort and are provided in Figure 2 and
Table 5. As shown by a visual comparison of Figures 1 and 2, the
pattern and trends in the data for the MP Approval Cohort were
similar to those observed for the Total Approval Cohort.
The first observation is that the two values at the lowest end of
the index again represent conventional (ANDS) and follow-on
(SANDS) generics. These values are somewhat of a surprise given the
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MP Approval Cohort reflects a narrower group of most valuable
drugs in the total cohort. The presence of substantial ANDS and
SANDS approvals demonstrate that a significant percentage of brand
drugs came off patent protection during the test period.
Second, the two largest classes of drug approvals in the entire
data set pertaining to brand pharmaceuticals had the lowest LOI
values. As in the Total Approval Cohort, these were SNDS approvals
(LOI= 2) and SNDS Me Too drugs (LOI= 3). As shown by the data in
Table 5 these two classes represented the majority of all approvals in
the MP Approval Cohort. There were 200 approvals in the SNDS
category compared to 50 in the NDS category. Thus, there were four
times more line extension drug approvals than new drug approvals in
the most profitable cohort.
Figure 2.
Innovation Index Data for Most Profitable Approval Cohort

Fig. 2. Innovation Index Data for Most Profitable Approval Cohort. Bar graphs
showing the number of most profitable approvals expressed as a function of the level
of innovation (LOI) before (a) and after (b) excision of generic data. c. Brand
approvals expressed as a function of LOI in scatter diagram format. Solid line is a fit
of the data to a single exponential function of the form Y = A*exp(-Index/λ) + B. d.
Cumulative normalized brand approvals expressed as a function of LOI. Solid lines
are fits using a sigmoidal function of the form Y = A + B/[1 + (Index/S) Q].
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Third, after excision of generic data (Fig. 2b), the calculated LOI
values again declined smoothly in drug classes with progressively
decreasing numbers of approvals. From an LOI value of 3 onwards,
there was a gradual decline in calculated LOI value as the number of
approvals in each class decreased, with relatively greater jitter at the
NDS ER (LOI= 12) and SNDS ER (LOI= 8) data points. More will be
said about this later.
As in the Total Approval Cohort, data in the MP Approval
Cohort scatter diagram indicate that the data points were well fit using
an exponential function, with an R2= 0.839. As illustrated in Figure
2c, the goodness of fit to the exponential was similar to that observed
in the Total Approval Cohort (R2= 0.891). As a result, there was a
clear negative correlation between the number of approvals in a given
new or follow-on drug class in the MP Approval Cohort and its
corresponding LOI value. This finding supports the conclusion that
the majority of approvals in the Total Approval Cohort reside in the
lower LOI value bins with lower social innovation value.
The scatter around the fit was improved when the data were
normalized for cumulative growth across classes (Fig. 2d). The R2
value was 0.986, which was almost identical to the goodness of fit to
the Total Approval Cohort (Fig. 1d; R2 = 0.998). CNV50 and CNV80
values for the Total Approval Cohort were 2.48 and 5.26,
respectively. These data reveal that that 50% and 80% of all
innovative value for the 347 approvals studied in the MP Approval
Cohort occurred at LOI values that were 17% and 35% of maximal.
These values were low in view of the fact that all drugs assessed
occupied the “most profitable” category, but improved compared to
the corresponding data in the Total Approval Cohort (13% and 23%).
The most significant increase occurred for drugs with LOI values of 7
(NDS NAS), 8 (SNDS ER), and 12 (NDS ER).
While the value of the NDS NAS, SNDS ER and NDS ER
classes increased in a small but significant manner, the data in Figure
2 nevertheless demonstrate that the large majority of approvals
associated with the most profitable drugs approved during the eight
year test period were of very low innovative value. As in the Total
Approval Cohort, the results remain heavily skewed by the largest
two classes of approvals in the MP Approval Cohort with the lowest
LOI values, SNDS and SNDS Me Too drugs. Consequently, while the
innovative value of the cohort increased somewhat compared to the
Total Approval Cohort, the large majority of drug approvals granted
by regulators over the test period were of low innovative value. The
relative increase in LOI values for the more innovative classes shows
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up visually as a small but observable increase in the baseline of the
long tail, both in the raw LOI values (Fig. 2b) and in the fitted curves
(Fig. 2c). Similarly, the slope of the cumulative normalized brand
LOI values in Figure 2d is shallower and shifted rightward as it drives
towards its maximum.
D. MP Patenting Cohort
One of the most important reasons for conducting this study was
to determine the innovative value of patents associated with various
classes of new and follow-on drugs. Following much of the patent
literature and government reports on topic, one might expect to see a
positive relationship between those drug classes perceived to be the
most valuable and patenting activity in relation to those drugs. Even if
this were not true across all classes of drugs, it would be reasonable in
light of the persistent claims by industry and its supporters to expect
lower patenting numbers on drugs with the least innovative value. To
the degree that the data do not support these expectations, it would
then be plausible to speculate whether portfolio, or cluster-based,
drug development strategy is in fact driving much of firm approval
and patenting behaviours.
As illustrated by the data in Figures 3a-3c, a positive correlation
between drugs with the greatest number of patents and their
associated innovation index value was not observed. Indeed, exactly
the opposite pattern was demonstrated; that is, drugs with the lowest
LOI values had the greatest number of associated patents. As with the
drug approval data in Figures 1 and 2, line extension drugs generally
and SNDS Me Too drugs in particular attracted the greatest number
of patents. Conversely, the drug class with the lowest number of
patents was that with the highest LOI value corresponding to the NDS
MI class. The distribution of remaining patents was spread relatively
equally across drug classes with comparatively higher LOI values
than that observed for both approval cohorts.
As observed for the Total Approval Cohort and MP Approval
Cohort, the two values at the lowest end of the index encompassed
conventional (ANDS) and follow-on (SANDS) generics. Indeed, the
number of patents in the generic drug classes was surprisingly large.
The most significant observation in this regard is that the number of
generic patents exceeded those for brand drugs in many of the new
and follow on drug classes investigated (Fig. 3a). In a similar vein,
there was a significant fraction of total generic patents in what
amounts to the generic follow-on class. These values are remarkable
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given that the MP Patent Cohort reflects the more narrowly defined,
most profitable, cohort. Combined with the data in the MP Approval
Cohort, patenting data in the MP Patent Cohort indicate that,
notwithstanding the low LOI values attached to generic patents,
generic firms appear to be leveraging the same approval and patent
strategy as brand firms.
Figure 3.
Innovation Index Data for Most Profitable Patent Cohort

Fig. 3. Innovation Index Data for Most Profitable Patent Cohort. Bar graphs
showing the number of patents associated with most profitable approvals expressed
as a function of the level of innovation (LOI) before (a) and after (b) excision of
generic data. c. Patents associated with brand approvals in the MP Approval Cohort
were identified, expressed as a function of LOI, and shown in scatter plot format.
Solid line is a fit of the data to a single exponential function of the form Y = A*exp(Index/λ) + B. d. Cumulative normalized patents expressed as a function of LOI. Solid
lines are fits using a sigmoidal function of the form Y = A + B/[1 + (Index/S) Q].

Of the general trends in the patenting data, the most important is
that the dominance of the SNDS and SNDS Me Too classes extends
to drug patenting as well as drug approval. As illustrated in Figure 3b,
following excision of generic data the two largest classes of drug
patents again had the lowest LOI values. These were SNDS patents
(LOI= 2) and SNDS Me Too patents (LOI= 3). As shown by the raw
data in Table 5 these two classes represented a substantial majority of
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all patents in the MP Patent Cohort. There were approximately 2,600
patents associated with line extension (SNDS) drugs, compared to
1,200 patents associated with new (NDS) drugs. Thus, it is not the
most innovative or even moderately innovative drugs that are
attracting the greatest firm patenting effort. Rather, it is the least
innovative brand drugs of all classes investigated that is attracting the
greatest patent protection.
When only data from innovator firms are analyzed (Fig. 3b), the
calculated LOI values for brand drugs declined progressively across
all drug classes studied. The lowest number of patents in the entire
data set was in the NDS MI class. As with the MP Approval Cohort,
there was a comparatively smaller decline in calculated LOI values in
the NDS ER (LOI= 12) and SNDS ER (LOI= 8) classes. This resulted
in a larger baseline at higher LOI values.
The data in the scatter diagram in Figure 3c show that the data
points continued to be reasonably well fitted to an exponential
function, with an R2 value= 0.768. The goodness of fit to the data was
not as strong as that in the MP Approval Cohort (R2= 0.839). As
noted above, this is due to the greater scatter and higher baseline
component of the fit, which itself was due primarily to the single data
point for NDS ER drugs (LOI= 12). The data in Figures 3a and 3b
demonstrate convincing negative correlation between the number of
patents in a given new or follow-on drug class and its corresponding
LOI value. As such, the data in Figure 3 answer the question raised
earlier in the Article of whether there is, in fact, a positive or negative
correlation between the social benefits of innovation and patenting
activity, at least using the present methodology.
The scatter around the fit was improved when the data were
normalized for cumulative growth across classes (Fig. 3d). The data
were well fit by a sigmoid function, with an R2 value= 0.993. The fit
supports the conclusion of an exponential decline in LOI with
patenting number (Fig. 3c). Combined the data in Figure 3 suggest
that, like the two approval cohorts assessed in Figures 1 and 2, the
majority of patents in the MP Patent Cohort reside in the lower LOI
value bins with correspondingly lower social innovation value. This is
supported by the CNV data. CNV50 and CNV80 values were 3.4 and
7.3, respectively. This result indicates that 50% and 80% of all
innovative value for patents associated with the 375 approvals in the
MP Approval Cohort occurred at LOI values that were 23% and 49%
of the maximal LOI value possible. These values are greater than the
17% and 35% observed in the MP Approval Cohort, and much higher
than corresponding values in the Total Approval Cohort (13% and
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23%). Therefore, while the value ascribed to drug patents using the
innovation index is low given the “most profitable” designation of the
drugs in this data set and the historical claim of a positive relationship
between drug patenting and the social benefits of innovation, the
baseline level of innovation at index values ≥ 6 is higher than
observed for either the Total Approval Cohort or the MP Approval
Cohort. Thus, despite their shortcomings, patents appear to be a better
indicator of innovative value compared to approvals.
The relative increase in LOI values for the more innovative
classes shows up visually as an increase in the baseline of the long
tail, both in the raw LOI values following excision of generic data
(Fig. 3b) and in the fitted curves (Fig. 3c). Similarly, the slope of the
cumulative normalized brand LOI values in Figure 3d is shallower as
it reaches its maximum. Finally, the point on the index at which LOI
values began to increase occurred at an innovation index value of 6,
as opposed to an LOI value= 8 for the MP Approval Cohort. As with
the approval data in Figure 2, the single data point at an LOI value of
12 (NDS ER) seemed responsible for much of the increase in the
baseline of the fit.
E. MP Chemical Cohort
As noted in the Introduction, the primary reason for investigating
chemical components in addition to qualifying approvals and patents
was to gain an understanding of the utility of chemicals to clusterbased drug development. This objective arose from the observation in
an earlier study that chemical patents accounted for the lowest
fraction of patent classifications in the MP Approval Cohort.156
Patents directed to combination therapies, routes of administration
and uses exceeded chemical patents. Even within the chemical class,
chemical patents that appeared to be directed to follow-on drug
development prevailed (chemical derivatives; crystalline forms; salts;
and enantiomers). With this in mind, we looked to see what drug
classes had the greatest number of chemicals disclosed in patent
claims. Much like the results expected for the MP Patent Cohort one
might anticipate a positive relationship between chemicals and the
level of innovation. In contrast, the opposite result may be expected to
the extent that the cluster-based innovation strategy is dominant. The
results obtained support the cluster-based strategy but also
demonstrate the highest level of functional utility across all indicators
studied.
156.

Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 202 fig.6.

15 BOUCHARD (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/23/2012 11:41 AM

INNOVATION INDEX FOR PHARMACEUTICALS

337

Figure 4.
Innovation Index Data for Most Profitable Chemical Cohort

Fig. 4. Innovation Index Data for Most Profitable Chemical Cohort. Bar graphs
showing the number of chemicals associated with most profitable approvals
expressed as a function of the level of innovation (LOI) before (a) and after (b) of
generic data. c. Chemicals identified in the MP Patent Cohort were expressed as a
function of LOI and shown in scatter diagram format. Solid line is a fit of the data to
a single exponential function of the form Y = A*exp(-Index/λ) + B. d. Cumulative
normalized chemicals expressed as a function of LOI. Solid lines are fits using
sigmoidal function of the form Y = A + B/[1 + (Index/S) Q].

Figure 4 illustrates that the negative correlation between the
number of indicators observed in a given drug class and its
corresponding LOI value is maintained in the MP Chemical Cohort.
That is, line extension SNDS drugs generally, and SNDS Me Too
drugs in particular, continued to attract the greatest number of
chemicals. However, as discussed more fully below, the distribution
of the remaining chemical components was spread more evenly
across all other drug classes than in the Total Approval Cohort, the
MP Approval Cohort, or the MP Patent Cohort.
Similar to the other cohorts, conventional (ANDS) and follow-on
(SANDS) generics represented by far the lowest number of chemicals
(Fig. 4a). This is not surprising since, compared to approvals and

15 BOUCHARD (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

338

3/23/2012 11:41 AM

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 28

patents, the development of novel chemical forms does not comprise
a significant element of bioequivalence approval pathways. Even so,
the number of chemical forms associated with generic products was
not insignificant.
As with MP Approval and MP Patent Cohorts, SNDS and SNDS
Me Too classes represent the two largest classes of chemical
components. As demonstrated in Figure 4b, of the 130 chemicals
identified in the study, approximately 65 were associated with the
SNDS drug class. By comparison, the NDS class was associated with
50 chemicals. As a result, while line extension drugs accounted for
the majority of chemicals (57%), new drugs accounted for 43% of all
chemicals associated with brand drugs. This result in general supports
the importance of subtle variations in drug chemistry to cluster-based
drug development in the pharmaceutical sector but also highlights the
importance of chemicals in the context of new drug development
(setting aside the issue of whether these are chemical derivatives,
crystalline forms, esters, salts, or enantiomers of already approved
and marketed drugs).
Unlike the other cohorts studied, there were significant numbers
of chemicals occupying all other class bins, including all drug classes
with LOI values ≥ 3 (Fig. 4b). Here we see, for the first time, the
prominence of chemicals in the NDS category, with significant
increases in the number of chemicals in the NDS MI (LOI= 15), NDS
ER (LOI= 12), NDS FIC (LOI= 9), and NDS NAS (LOI= 7) classes.
Similarly, there were significant increases in SNDS ER (LOI= 8) and
SNDS FIC (LOI= 6) classes. The data suggest that, in addition to an
increase in the number of chemicals occupying the most innovative
class of all (NDS MI), elevation in the general baseline level of
innovation is accounted for by a strong showing in several NDS and
SNDS classes. This is especially true for both new and line extension
ER and FIC drugs.
The scatter diagram in Figure 4c show that the data could be
reasonably well fit using an exponential function, with an R2 value of
0.704. However, continuing the trend observed moving from the Total
Approval Cohort to the MP Approval and MP Patent Cohorts, the
goodness of fit observed was less strong. As observed with the MP
Patenting Cohort, this was due to the elevated baseline in the raw and
fitted data, which itself was due strongly to the increased value for
NDS ER drugs (LOI= 12). While the baseline was significantly
increased at all levels of innovation, the relationship between
chemicals and innovation continued to be negative, with an
exponential decline from peak values. Therefore, the method tested
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here yields the same result for drug approvals, patents, and chemical
components.
Similar to all other cohorts studied, the goodness of fit was
improved when cumulative data were normalized (Fig. 4d).
Cumulative data were well fit using a sigmoidal function, with an R2
value of 0.992. The fits in Figures 4c-4d suggest an exponential
decline in LOI with drug class chemical number.
The results thus far suggest that like the other three cohorts
studied, the majority of chemicals in the MP Chemical Cohort reside
in the lower LOI value bins with correspondingly lower social
innovation value. The caveat to this conclusion, which is significant
for this indicator, is that the baseline level of LOI values across the
index is much more evenly spread out across the various drug classes.
This can be visualized by the higher baseline values for raw chemical
data (Fig. 4c) as well as the much lower slope of the cumulative
normalized data to its maximum (Fig. 4d).
Consistent with this conclusion, the CNV50 value increased to
4.08 and the CNV80 value increased to 8.19. These data suggest that
50% and 80% of all innovative value for chemicals associated with
approvals in the MP Approval Cohort occurred at LOI values that
were 27% and 55% of the maximal LOI value. This represents a
substantial jump from the CNV50 and CNV80 values of 13% and 23%
in the Total Approval Cohort, and a significant increase compared to
values for the MP Approval Cohort (17% and 35%) and even the MP
Patent Cohort (23% and 49%). Importantly, the increase in innovative
value of chemicals is observed for all drug classes with an LOI ≥ 3.
Taken together, the data in Figures 1-4 and Tables 4-7 suggest
that the rank order of functional utility of the indicators studied is
chemical components > drug patents > drug approvals. Having said
this, only approvals and patents provide firms with the legal license to
operate in the pharmaceutical sphere and can be used as legal tools in
cluster-based drug development.
F. Class Trends Across Indicators
As discussed in Part V.A. above, a number of methods were used
to quantify trends in the LOI data and to identify which drug classes
might be driving the fits across indicators and cohorts. The data are
directly compared and summarized in Figures 5, 6, and 7. From these
data six general trends across indicators can be extracted: (1) line
extension (SNDS) and line extension Me Too (SNDS Me Too) drugs
represented the two largest drug classes across all approval, patent
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and chemical indicators studied; (2) the lowest number of approvals,
patent and chemicals studied was always in the most innovative drug
class (NDS MI); (3) there was a negative exponential relationship
between all approval, patenting and chemical indicators studied and
LOI value; (4) the baseline level of innovation at higher LOI levels
increased across the four cohorts; (5) in different cohorts, different
drug classes contributed differently to the baseline elevation; and (6)
the one exception to the previous rule is that the NDS ER class (LOI=
12), and to some extent the SNDS ER class (LOI= 8), appeared to be
primarily responsible for the baseline elevation across cohorts and
indicators. The remaining data in the Results section explore these
trends in more detail.
The numerical relationship between LOI values for drug classes
across indicators is summarized in Figure 5. Figure 5a provides
comparative data relating to the exponential decline in LOI value with
decreasing indicator number across cohorts normalized to maximal
values. Figure 5b shows a comparison of the cumulative increase in
indicators with LOI across cohorts normalized to relevant maximal
values, from which CNV50 and CNV80 values were calculated.
Figure 5a directly compares the normalized exponential decline
in approval, patent, and chemical indicators with LOI value. The
decline of indicator number with LOI value was fit to a single
exponential function of the form Y=A*exp(-Index/λ)+B. R2 values
were 0.891, 0.839, 0.768, and 0.704, for the Total Approval, MP
Approval, MP Patent and MP Chemical Cohorts, respectively. For
convenience’s sake, only the fits to the data are compared. Following
removal of generic data, the two drug classes with the largest numbers
of indicators and lowest LOI values were invariably the SNDS line
extension drugs, followed by line extension Me Too drugs. From their
normalized maximal, LOI data in all four cohorts declined smoothly
with indicator number. The fits provide strong evidence in support of
an exponential decline in all approval, patent and chemical indicators
studied as the level of innovation increases from the lowest LOI value
of 2 for brand drugs (SNDS) to its maximal value of 15 for NDS MI
drugs. There was a clear negative correlation between the number of
approvals, patents and chemicals for both new and follow-on drug
classes and their corresponding LOI value. This finding supports the
conclusion that the majority of approvals, patents and chemicals
associated with approved drugs reside in the lower LOI value bins
with correspondingly lower social innovation value.
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Figure 5.
Comparison of Decline and Rise of Normalized LOI Data Across
Approval, Patent, and Chemical Indicators
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Fig. 5. Comparison of Decline and Rise of Normalized LOI Data Across
Approval, Patent, and Chemical Indicators. Fits compared are those to brand data
for Total Approval Cohort (─ ; strongest exponential decline), MP Approval Cohort
(─ ; next strongest exponential decline), MP Patent Cohort (─ ; moderate exponential
decline) and MP Chemical Cohort (─ ; weakest exponential decline). Top Panel.
Exponential decline in the number of brand approvals, patents and chemicals as a
function of LOI. Data have been normalized to maximal values for each of the four
cohorts studied. Solid lines are a fit of the data to a single exponential function of the
form Y = A*exp(-Index/λ) + B. R2 values were 0.0.891, 0.839, 0.768, and 0.704, for
the Total Approval, MP Approval, MP Patent and MP Chemical Cohorts,
respectively. Bottom Panel. Cumulative increase in the number of brand approvals,
patents and chemicals with LOI normalized to maximal values. Solid lines are fits
using a sigmoidal function of the form Y = A + B/[1 + (Index/S)Q]. R2 values were
0.998, 0.986, 0.993, and 0.992 for the Total Approval, MP Approval, MP Patent and
MP Chemical Cohorts, respectively.
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Figure 6.
Changes in Peak-Baseline Values and CNV50 and CNV80 Values
Across Approval, Patent, and Chemical Indicators

Fig. 6. Changes in Peak-Baseline Values and CNV50 and CNV80 Values Across
Approval, Patent, and Chemical Indicators. a. Blue bars () represent the
difference between peak LOI values and baseline LOI values for the Total Approval,
MP Approval, MP patent, and MP Chemical Cohorts. Peak value was taken as the
peak LOI value per indicator. Baseline was calculated as the mean of LOI values ≥ 6.
b. Bars represent the change CNV50 () and CNV80 () values across cohorts and
indicators.

The second major observation in Figure 5a is that the baseline
level of innovation at higher LOI values increases as one moves
progressively from the Total Approval Cohort to the MP Approval,
MP Patenting, and MP Chemical Cohorts. As such, the news is not all
bad regarding pharmaceutical innovation. This finding is not
surprising however, as the latter three cohorts have already been
vetted by the market to be the most profitable. Elevation of LOI
values across drug classes shows up visually as an increase in the
baseline of the long tail, which as noted above refers to the property
of a data set where a significant fraction of data is found within the
tail-end of a probability distribution. That data reveal consideration of
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the long tail is pertinent to the LOI model because the numbers in the
higher end of the index represent the most innovative drugs yet
invariably comprise a smaller fraction of the total values. As shown in
Figure 5a, the baseline of the tail increases across cohorts, suggesting
a rank order of innovation of chemicals > patents > approvals.
The analysis of normalized cumulative data in Figure 5b was
undertaken to assess the frequency of accumulation of indicator in
lower LOI bins in the various cohorts. The increase in cumulative
indicator to its normalized maximum across the LOI scale was fit to a
sigmoidal function of the form Y=B+A/[1+(Index/S)Q]. R2 values
were 0.998, 0.990, 0.995, and 0.994 for Total Approval, MP
Approval, MP Patent, and MP Chemical Cohorts, respectively. The
data demonstrate that there is a significant difference in the slope of
the cumulative LOI values across indicators as the fits drive towards
their maximum values; the “faster” the fit drives to its maximum, the
greater fraction of total indicator resides in lower LOI bins. The
fastest increase was observed for the Total Approval Cohort, the
slowest for the MP Chemical Cohort, with the MP Approval and MP
Patent Cohorts straddling the difference. These data suggest that a
significant majority of all approvals, patents and chemicals indicators
studied reside in relatively low value innovation index bins with
accordingly low social benefit. The specific rank order of cohorts
weighted more heavily in lower LOI bins was Total Approval Cohort
> MP Approval Cohort > MP Patent Cohort > MP Chemical Cohort,
essentially the inverse of the rank orders for the increase in baseline
values in Figure 5a.
Figure 6 quantifies the rise in baseline levels in Figure 5a using
two methods. The first, shown in Figure 6a, is a simple calculation of
the difference between measured peak values and baseline values.
The height of the bars in the graph reflect the numerical difference
between the peak LOI value for a given indicator minus the average
LOI value for all drug classes with LOI values ≥ 6 (e.g., all drug
classes with LOI values greater than SNDS FIC drugs). The data
demonstrate a clear increase in the Peak-Baseline value as it
represents the sum of all changes in the fraction of NDS NAS drugs
(LOI= 7), SNDS FIC drugs (LOI= 6), SNDS ER drugs (LOI= 8),
NDS FIC drugs (LOI= 9), NDS ER drugs (LOI= 12), and NDS MI
drugs (LOI= 15). The values increased from 4.8% of the peak
indicator value in the Total Approval Cohort to 12.5% in the MP
Approval Cohort to 27.2% and 46.2% of peak values for MP Patent
and MP Chemical Cohorts, respectively.
Figure 6b summarizes results from the second method, described
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above for calculating CNV50 and CNV80 values. The former values are
represented by open bars and the latter by closed bars. As with the
Peak-Baseline values, both CNV50 and CNV80 values increased from
their lowest value in the Total Approval Cohort to their maximal
value in the MP Chemical Cohort. More specifically, the CNV50 value
increased from 1.97, to 2.48, 3.4 and 4.08, amounting to a 2.1-fold
increase across indicators. Similarly, the CNV80 value increased from
3.45, to 5.26, 7.3 and 8.19, amounting to a 2.4-fold increase across
indicators. The difference between the two is accounted for by the
non-linear nature of the fits to the data.
The comparative data in Figures 5 and 6 reveal that the baseline
amount of innovation generally increases from the Total Approval
Cohort to the MP Approval, Patent and Chemical Cohorts but
provides little information as which specific drug classes are driving
the trend. In order to investigate this issue further the LOI values
across indicators and drug classes were compared against one another
in spider graph format. Certain data were then extracted and
expressed relative to maximal approval, patenting and chemical data
for brand pharmaceutical firms. Drug classes selected for analysis
were new and follow-on Me Too, FIC, ER and NAS drugs. The
resulting data are presented in Figure 7 and Table 8.
Figure 7 summarizes all raw LOI data analyzed in this Article
using the spider plot format. Spider graphs are particularly useful in
the present context, as they permit direct and simultaneous visual
comparison of all new and follow-on drug classes across cohorts.
Data trends in the plots can be seen to be comprised of two distinct
components; a “shoulder” component at LOI values between 2 and 3
and a smaller “core” component corresponding to the baseline
component in Figures 1-5 at LOS values ≥ 6. Whereas the fits in
Figures 1-5 tend to smooth out small but significant differences in the
data, these same data points are particularly visible in the spider plots
(and are also visible in the raw data in Figures 1c-4c).
The graphs illustrate well the three most important trends across
indicators. That is, the peak values always occur at LOI values
between 2 and 3, the lowest LOI value always occurs at the maximal
LOI value of 15, and the core, or baseline, LOI values increase across
cohorts. Comparison of Figures 7a and 7b reveal surprisingly little
difference in radial plots between the Total Approval Cohort
containing all 2,087 approvals over the eight year study period and
the 347 approvals contained in the much narrower Most Profitable
Approval Cohort. There was a small but significant elevation in the
data at LOI values of 12 and 8, corresponding to the NDS ER and
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SNDS ER classes. As noted above, these differences were smoothed
out by the curve fitting procedure, but are quite visible when graphed
in the format used in Figure 7. The only other major difference is the
notable decline in generic drugs at LOI values lower than 2, as would
be expected in the most profitable cohort.
Figure 7.
Summary and Comparison of Innovation Index Data for Total
Approval, MP Approval, MP Patent, and MP Chemical Cohorts

Fig. 7. Summary and Comparison of Innovation Index Data for Total Approval,
MP Approval, MP Patent, and MP Chemical Cohorts. Spider graphs illustrating
the relationship between the number of indicator and its corresponding innovation
index value in the Total Approval Cohort (a), MP Approval Cohort (b), MP Patent
Cohort (c) and MP Chemical Cohort (d). Data are normalized to the peak LOI value
of 15 in each instance to increase separation of data at lower LOI values to the
maximal degree. Peak values are 1049, 228, 2577 and 64 in Panels a-d, respectively.
Note that each plot has an equal number of radial tics from zero to the maximal value.
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As one moves to the MP Patent and Chemical Cohorts in Figures
7c and 7d, the most striking observation is the strong increase at LOI
values of 12 (NDS ER drugs). Also visible are increases in drug
classes at LOI values of 6, 7 and 8, corresponding to SNDS FIC, NDS
NAS, and SNDS ER drugs, respectively. The largest change from the
MP Approval Cohort to the MP Patent Cohort was NDS ER drugs
(LOI= 12) and SNDS ER drugs (LOI= 8), whereas the largest change
for the MP Chemical Cohort was for NDS ER drugs (LOI= 12) and
NDS NAS drugs (LOI= 7).
Table 8 further quantifies the data relating to changes in NDS
and SNDS Me Too, FIC, ER, and NAS classes for the MP Approval
Cohort, MP Patent Cohort, and the MP Chemical Cohort. The data are
expressed as a percentage of total brand approvals, patents, and
chemicals for each indicator. The numbers in brackets illustrate the
percent increase in Me Too, FIC, ER, and NAS classes in the MP
Patent and MP Chemical Cohorts compared to the MP Approval
Cohort, which was used as a convenient benchmark.
Table 8.
Change in New and Follow-On Sub-Categories Across Indicators

*Data are expressed as a percent of total brand approvals for Most Profitable drugs
approved between 2001-2008 (updated to November 2010). Parentheses represent the
percent change from Approval Values. Note that even where the total fraction of

15 BOUCHARD (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/23/2012 11:41 AM

INNOVATION INDEX FOR PHARMACEUTICALS

347

approved drugs do not change from one Indicator to the next (e.g. Me Too), that the
percentage of drugs in NDS and SNDS sub-categories change substantially.

The results from this analysis confirm the results in Figure 7 and
supply further information pertaining to new and follow-on Me Too
and FIC drugs. As with the spider plots, the data show that the
increase in the level of baseline innovation has a differing mechanism
for the approval, patenting and chemical cohorts. For approvals, by
far the greatest class was SNDS Me Too drugs. However, this was
followed by a significant number of approvals in the NDS and SNDS
ER classes, consistent with the data peak at LOI values of 12 and 8 in
Figures 2 and 7. In the patenting cohort, there was also a significant
spike in SNDS Me Too patents. However, we also see large numbers
of new (NDS) and follow-on (SNDS) ER drugs and follow-on SNDS
FIC drugs. The pattern switches up for the chemical cohort, where
there is a very large spike in NDS ER drugs and NDS NAS drugs
compared to NDS or SNDS FIC drugs. The data for each cohort are
consistent with the patterns identified in Figure 7.
These differences can also be approximated using rank order
data. The rank order of combined NDS and SNDS drug classes was
Me Too > ER > FIC > NAS for the MP Approval Cohort. This can be
compared with FIC > NAS > ER > Me Too in the MP Patent Cohort
and NAS > FIC > ER > Me Too for the MP Chemical Cohort. These
rank orders differ substantially from one cohort to the next, and are
responsible for the differing contributions of different drug classes to
the baseline in different cohorts. Not surprisingly, with a more
granular level of detail there were also significant differences in the
ratio of new drug to follow-on drug indicators, with the largest ratio
observed for approvals (7:1), patents (3.5:1) and chemicals (2:1) in
Me Too class within the MP Approval Cohort, compared to minimal
differences in other cohorts and drug classes (maxing out at 2:1 for
patenting in the FIC drug class and 1:2 in the ER drug class for
chemicals).
Nevertheless, while the classes responsible for the increased
baseline LOI values at index values ≥ 3 differed significantly between
cohorts, the common denominator driving these changes was an
increased focus on both NDS and SNDS ER and FIC drugs. A
secondary consideration was an increased focus on NDS and NDS
NAS drugs, especially for the MP Chemical Cohort.
VII. DISCUSSION
The primary observation in this Article is that it is possible to
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move beyond methods employed to count or quantify patents, patent
citations, and related litigation data and, instead, to provide a
qualitative measure of patents on pharmaceutical products that is
coherent with the first principals of patent law and policy. A new
qualitative innovation index is presented that is rational and based on
objective evidence that provides a means to qualify patent protection
attached to drug products. A second important characteristic of the
model is that the index is sufficiently flexible to gain a measure of the
quality, or social value, of patents at various stages of regulatory
approval, including before drugs are approved and during the postmarket surveillance period. Thus, the index may have utility in newer
“lifecycle” models of drug approval which contemplate drugs being
marketed after Phase 2 clinical trials with greater post-market
surveillance.157 A third advantage of the model is that, in addition to
calculating the quality of patents, the index can also be used to qualify
other legal and technological components associated with drug
products, including regulatory approvals, patents that are listed on the
patent register, market exclusivity periods attached to a given drug, as
well as related chemical components, patent classifications, WHO
Anatomic Therapeutic Classes, and other related information. Fourth,
unlike the majority of counting models, it is not necessary to wait
until the patent has been licensed, litigated, or granted long enough to
be cited as prior art; patents may be qualified using the index before
these events create full spill-over effects to the public. A fifth
advantage of the index is that there is sufficient flexibility in the index
for recalculating the LOI value on a moving basis for a given drug as
it transitions from one stage of its product lifecycle to another over
time. The index may also be used to qualify technologies other than
pharmaceuticals, provided that regulatory requirements and priorities
have been elucidated by regulators. Finally, given that it is based on
values and priorities set by regulators in their mandate to balance
public health and industrial and economic policy, the index is
consistent with the first principles of patent law.

157. See, e.g., Eichler et al., supra note 3, at 823; Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at
66. This utility would apply not only to government regulators and pharmaceutical firms, but
also to university technology transfer offices, venture capital, and other funders of early- to midstage technologies and products.
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A. Interpretation of the Data
1. Drug Approval
The vast majority of brand approvals in both the Total Approval
and MP Approval Cohorts were for the classes of drugs with the
lowest LOI values, in particular SNDS (LOI= 2) and SNDS Me Too
(LOI= 3) drugs. These drugs occupy the two lowest LOI value bins in
the index next to conventional (ANDS; LOI= 1.0) and follow-on
(SANDS; n= 0.5) generic drugs. The fraction of SNDS and SNDS Me
Too drugs accounting for NDS, SNDS, and total approvals for both
Total Approval and MP Approval Cohorts, are quantified in the
companion paper and will not be discussed further here. Suffice to say
that just these two drug classes alone accounted for 55% of all brand
drugs studied over the test period.
As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, the number of drug approvals
for products with LOI values ≥ 3 fell strongly with LOI in both the
Total Approval and MP Approval Cohorts. As such, a major
observation of this study is the negative correlation between the
number of approvals in various drug classes and the corresponding
innovation index value. The fall in LOI value with approval number
could be fit to a single exponential function. An exponential decline
in approval LOI values is consistent with the conclusion that that the
large majority of drug approvals reside in the lower LOI value bins.
A finding consistent with this conclusion is provided by the
CNV50 and CNV80 data. As indicated in the discussion pertaining to
Figures 1 and 2, and the data in Figures 5 and 6, 50% of all approvals
in the Total Approval and MP Approval Cohorts resided at LOI
values ≤ 2.5, or 13% of peak innovation. This is very low, especially
for the MP Approval Cohort. The value comes up to an LOI= 5.25
when the CNV80 data are used, but even so this means that
approximately 80% of all regulatory approvals investigated over the
eight year test period have an innovation index value that is only 35%
of maximal. A CNV50 value of 2.5 indicates that 50% of all brand
drugs approved are generic (ANDS, SANDS) and brand line
extension (SNDS) drugs. A CNV80 value of 5.26 indicates that 80% of
all brand drugs approved are comprised of conventional line
extension (SNDS) and line extension Me Too (SNDS Me Too) drugs
and conventional new (NDS) and NDS Me Too drugs. In either case,
the contribution of ER, FIC, and NAS classes in both NDS and SNDS
categories and NDS MI drugs is negligible. The contribution of these
classes is even more minimal in the Total Approval Cohort, as the
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CNV50 and CNV80 values were 1.97 and 3.45, or 80% and 66% of the
values for the MP Approval Cohort.
While an average LOI value equal to 5.26 (CNV80) in the MP
Approval Cohort demonstrates that 80% of all brand drugs approved
are SNDS, NDS, SNDS Me Too, and NDS Me Too drugs, the
contribution of more innovative classes unquestionably increases
compared with the Total Approval Cohort. As discussed in the
companion paper, this is sensible for two reasons. First, the MP
Approval Cohort has been vetted by the market prior to measurement.
Consequently, the reported values are for drugs that have already
been deemed by the market to be the most profitable. Second, drugs
in the MP Approval Cohort have been vetted comparatively early by
regulators, as nearly two thirds of the approved drugs went through
one of two expedited review processes. This is evident from both the
raw data in the bar graphs and the fitted cures in Figures 1 and 2. As
illustrated in Figure 1 for the Total Approval Cohort, the LOI data
decline rapidly from a peak of LOI= 2, with little contribution from
NDS NAS, SNDS FIC, SNDS ER, NDS FIC, NDS ER, and NDS MI
drug classes. Similarly, Figure 6 shows that the Peak-Baseline value
is close to zero, representing approximately 5-7% of the maximal LOI
value. By contrast, in the MP Approval Cohort, there is stronger
representation by more innovative drugs, including all drugs with an
LOI ≥ 3. This shows up in the higher baseline in the raw and fitted
data (Figs. 2b-2c), the slower rise to peak cumulative normalized
maximum (Figs. 2d and 5), the summarized CNV50 and CNV80 data
(Fig. 6b), and the larger Peak-Baseline calculation (Fig. 6a).
While the numbers are significantly reduced compared with
those for SNDS, NDS, SNDS Me Too, and NDS Me Too drugs, the
most significant elevation in the MP Approval Cohort is for the NDS
NAS, SNDS FIC, SNDS ER, NDS FIC, NDS ER, and NDS MI
classes. This can be seen in Figure 2 which shows that the LOI data
for the MP Approval Cohort decline rapidly from a peak value of 2 in
a manner similar to that observed for the Total Approval Cohort, but
to a slightly higher baseline. As indicated by the fits in Figure 2c, the
bar graph in Figure 6, and the fractional changes in Table 8, the
baseline is equal to roughly 12.5% of the peak LOI value, with
correspondingly greater numbers of NDS NAS, SNDS FIC, SNDS
ER, NDS FIC, NDS ER, and NDS MI drugs.
2. Drug Patenting
A major impetus for conducting this study was to assess the
qualitative relationship between patenting and the social benefits of
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innovation. Therefore, one of the most important findings in this
study is the negative correlation between innovation as measured by
the innovation index and patenting (Fig. 2). The patent and innovation
literature and government reports from numerous nations take as an
implicit assumption that more intellectual property protection means
more innovation and more social benefits, and indeed that patenting is
necessary for innovation to occur.158 The same assumptions find their
way into most policy debates on the ability of intellectual property
rights to appropriately incentivize innovation and thus to underpin
national productivity and prosperity,159 as well as specific legislative
vehicles intended to spur innovation and translational research.160
Indeed, nowhere are these assumptions more prevalent than in
the life sciences sector, and especially the pharmaceutical industry.
As noted in the Introduction, the pharmaceutical industry is
repetitively singled out as the single best example of the success of
traditional patent theory and thus the need for more extensive
intellectual property and regulatory rights. The data reported here cast
doubt on these assumptions, as the LOI index data clearly
demonstrate that drug products with the lowest level of innovation
(SNDS and SNDS Me Too) have, by far, the greatest number of
patents. In fact, not only did the least innovative products have the
highest patenting numbers, but the converse is true as well. That is,
the products with the highest LOI values had, by far, the lowest
number of patents.
Of note, the two classes of products where this trend is reversed
(NDS ER and SNDS ER) are, in a sense, separate classes of their
own. This is because the approval process is shorter, less onerous, or
both for expedited review pathways. As noted previously, based on
drug approval and related patenting data,161 this combination of
reduced evidentiary requirements and faster approval render this class
of approvals the best bet in the high stakes process of drug
development. The LOI data fully support this conclusion.

158. 1 EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, supra note 2, at 6.
159. 1 EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, supra note 2; GUTHRIE & MUNN-VENN,
supra note 2. See generally COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 2.
160. For a discussion of pharmaceutical law and policy generally, see DUTFIELD, supra
note 73. For a discussion of US pharmaceutical law and policy relating to technology
commercialization, see Sampat, supra note 45; Eisenberg, supra note 45. For a review of
American, Canadian, and global pharmaceutical linkage laws, see Eisenberg, supra note 67;
Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37; Bouchard 2011, supra note 32.
161. See, e.g., Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75;
Bouchard 2010, supra note 51.
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The data in Figures 3 and 5 illustrate that, following excision of
generic data, the declining trend of LOI values with increasing
innovation is well fit by an exponential function. This suggests that
there is not only a negative correlation between patenting and
innovation, but further implies that the large majority of total
patenting occurs in the lower end of the LOI spectrum. This
conclusion is supported by the cumulative normalized data in Figure
3d and Figure 5b, which demonstrate a “rapid” rise in cumulative
innovation at the lower LOI values.
Based on the statistical quality of the fit (R2= 0.768), it is, of
course, possible to debate the validity of the exponential fit to the
brand patenting data. This is where the unique status of NDS ER and
SNDS ER drugs assumes prominence. As it is, these two values are
primarily responsible for the elevated baseline of patenting at higher
LOI values (Figs. 3 and 7, Table 8). However, but for the lower
evidentiary requirements and faster approval times, it is reasonable to
speculate that the values for these groups might be more in line with
the lower NDS MI value and thus closer to the MP Approval Cohort
data.
Given that the goodness of fit and baseline value depends
strongly on one class of drugs (NDS ER; LOI= 12) either alone or in
combination with a related class (SNDS ER; LOI= 8), it is worth
noting that the Expedited Review class is comprised of both Priority
Review and NOC/c approvals. As noted in the Methods, the former
expedited class has essentially abbreviated approval times with
similar evidentiary requirements to NDS drugs, whereas the NOC/s
class has an abbreviated approval path as well as lower evidentiary
requirements prior to approval. This suggests that one of the two
paths for expedited review is more attractive to pharmaceutical firms
than the other. Indeed, we demonstrated previously that NOC/c
approvals increased exponentially over the period between 2001 and
2008 while Priority Review approvals declined linearly over the same
period,162 with the net effect that expedited review approvals
increased by 50%. It was concluded that NOC/c approvals were a
fundamental feature of lifecycle models of regulation, such as those
that governments in Canada, the United States, and the European
Union currently seek to establish.163 It is possible that, once again, but
for the policy goal of regulators to bring drugs onto the market faster
162. Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 101 fig.9.
163. See, e.g., Eichler et al., supra note 3, at 820-21; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75,
at 117-18.
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than in models of regulation that emphasize the precautionary
principal, that the data point at LOI= 12 would be more in line with
that for the NDS MI class. To the extent this is true, the baseline
would parallel that observed for the MP Approval Cohort, with an
accordingly stronger negative correlation and exponential decline.
Some evidence for this conclusion can be seen by a visual inspection
of the data in Figures 1-4 and the spider plots in Figure 7, which show
a demonstrable “bump” in the data at an LOI= 12 for all indicators
and cohorts studied. This bump resulted in a larger “steady-state”
component of all four fits that shows up as a clearly increasing ∆
Peak–Baseline value (Fig. 6a), CNV50 value and CNV80 value (Fig.
6b). In each case, if the value at LOI= 12 was closer to those for
either NDS MI (15) or NDS FIC (9) drugs, the ∆ Peak–Baseline,
CNV50 and CNV80 values, and thus the fitted curves, would all be
more similar to those for the Total Approval Cohort.
Setting aside the issue of curve fitting for the moment, the dual
finding that products with the lowest LOI values have the greatest
number of patents and products with the highest LOI values had the
lowest number of patents provides empirical support for the theory of
cluster-based drug development,164 also referred to as patent
portfolios.165 The social welfare consequences of a regulatory
preference for line extension drugs is worsened in nations with
pharmaceutical linkage owing to the iterative effect of low standards
for drug approval, drug patenting, and the listing of patents on the
patent register. Indeed, some have gone so far as to say that the era of
the individual patent is over.166 Others have observed that the multiple
waves of global patent reforms over the last half-century have
provided fertile grounds for drug development strategies that parallel
portfolio-based investment vehicles with comparatively lower risk
and higher rewards than otherwise would be the case with a focus on
breakthrough innovation.167 In earlier work, we referred to this
strategy of drug development as product cluster-based innovation.168
Similar clustering effects of drug and patents have been recently

164. PATENTLY INNOVATIVE, supra note 37, at 250.
165. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 48, at 327; Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note
7, at 2.
166. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 51.
167. For a discussion of the implications of pharmaceutical and patent law on
breakthrough vs. incremental innovation in the context of drug clusters see, for example, supra
Part III.A-C.
168. Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 133.
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observed elsewhere.169 The data reported here provide clear empirical
support for the product cluster theory, at least for pharmaceutical
products. The data are further consistent with the conclusion that drug
companies are aiming ex ante at legal targets that provide the most
return on investment rather than innovative products providing the
most benefit to the public where the two do not coincide.170
Despite the negative correlation between patenting and
innovation, there was nevertheless a significant trend towards more
high value patents compared to approvals. This can be seen for
example in the rightward shift of CNV data in Figures 3 and 5. While
the CNV50 value of 3.4 was similar to the 2.48 value observed for the
MP Approval Cohort, the CNV80 value increased from LOI= 5.26 in
the MP Approval Cohort to LOI= 7.3 in the MP Patent Cohort. This
represents a rightward shift in the 80th percentile data of about 40%.
The higher level of patenting with increased LOI values shows up
more clearly in the Peak-Baseline analysis in Figure 6a. Here it can be
seen that this value increased from about 12.5% in the MP Approval
Cohort to a little over 25% in the MP Patenting Cohort.
Thus, while the number of patents remained low for the products
with the highest LOI values, the level of innovation for drug patents
was approximately double of that for approvals with LOI values ≥ 5.
As such there were comparatively more NDS NAS (LOI= 6), SNDS
FIC (LOI= 6), SNDS ER (LOI= 8), NDS FIC (LOI= 9), NDS ER
(LOI= 12), and NDS MI (LOI= 12) patents than approvals (Table 8).
This finding suggests patents, despite their shortcomings, are a better
reflection of innovations with significant social value than approvals
per se.
The data presented in this Article also lend themselves to the
conclusion that the “rational ignorance” observed at the Patent
Office171 also extends to drug regulators as well. For example, it has
been suggested that 95% of all patent applications are granted in one
form or another,172 but that only 5% of granted patents have value in
terms of licensing and litigation.173 This suggests the standard of
approval for patents is low, a conclusion supported by the fact that
50-75% of all patents litigated in the pharmaceutical sector are invalid

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

EC Final Report, supra note 72, at 407-506.
Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1507.
See generally Lemley, supra note 7; Quillen & Webster, supra note 22.
Quillen & Webster, supra note 22, at 49.
Lemley, supra note 7, at 1507.
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or not infringed.174 The analogy to drug approvals is striking. For
example, the vast majority of drugs approved by domestic regulators
(85%) are follow-on drugs, and, of all approvals granted to brand
firms, 77% and 82% are directed to SNDS line extensions in the Total
Approval and MP Approval Cohorts, respectively.175 These drug
classes have the lowest levels of innovation for all brand drugs
studied.
There may, however, be a greater social cost to rational
ignorance at the drug regulator office compared to the patent office.
As noted supra, the evidentiary standard for a chemical modification
to meet the regulatory requirement for both new and line extension
approvals is very low, much like that for patenting. A major
difference between the two legal vehicles is that, while
pharmaceutical patents on line extension drugs may have a fairly low
value individually,176 the average profit from these drugs can be
considerable. Indeed combined SNDS Me Too and SNDS FIC drugs
accounted for 19 of the top 25 most profitable drugs in the year 2006,
for a total of $85,470,000 USD in sales in a single year.177 There are
three interactions between approvals and patents that may account for
this scenario. First, market authorizations provide an ex ante legal
device for entering the market, whereas patents typically provide an
ex post tool for defending a given product independent of whether or
not it is on the market. In other words, “but for” the approval license,
the drug would not be marketed regardless of the extent of patent
protection. Secondly, the economic value of an individual patent may
escalate in a scaled (non-linear) manner, given the ability of brand
firms to list the same patent on the patent register against numerous
drugs in a spatiotemporally growing product cluster.178 Finally, the
economic value of functionally related patents has the potential to
increase in value in a highly scaled manner owing to portfolio-effects
of the type described in Part III.B. This helps to explain the large ratio
of patents to approvals we observed in our earlier work (40:1 to
174. FTC 2002, supra note 34; HORE, supra note 34.
175. Bouchard 2012, supra note 75, at tbl.5.
176. Schankerman, supra note 21, at 92; see, e.g., Pakes, supra note 28, at 779; Lemley,
supra note 7, at 1506.
177. Bouchard 2012, supra note 75, at Part IV.4. Sales in the SNDS Me Too class
represented approximately 50% of the top 25 selling drugs and accounted for $45.7 billion US
dollars in 2006. Id. In comparison, SNDS FIC drugs represented 28% of the top 25 selling
drugs, and 7 of the top 15 selling drugs. Id. Profit on this group of drugs was $39.7 billion US
dollars in 2006. Id. Combined, SNDS Me Too and SNDS FIC drugs accounted for 19 of the top
25 most profitable drugs, for a total of $85,470,000 USD in sales in a single year. Id.
178. Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 130-33.
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48:1),179 even though the standards for approval and patents may be
similarly low. In this way, the economic value of both patents and
drug approvals are tied together and change iteratively as product
clusters grow with time. The result is the large percentage of the most
profitable drugs is not NDS MI drugs; rather, they are line extension
drugs generally and line extension Me Too drugs in particular.
While patent listing was not assessed in this work, relevant data
are available for the MP Patenting Cohort. In earlier work, 180 the MP
Approval Cohort was sub-divided into the top 95 drugs that did
(Priority Review, n= 40; NOC/c, n= 16; PR-NOC/c, n= 6) and did not
(MP, n= 33) undergo some form of expedited review. We noted that
both the number of patents per drug and the percent of patents listed
per drug changed with different cohorts. For example, there were 41,
56, 32, 24, and 63 patents per drug for the Total, MP, PR, NOC/c, and
PR-NOC/c Cohorts representing a variance across cohorts of about
40%. The percentage of these patents listed on the register ranged
between 3-6% per drug: 5.2%, 6.0%, 4.3%, 6.0%, and 3.0% for Total,
MP, PR, NOC/c, and PR-NOC/c Cohorts.
Not surprisingly, the number of patents listed on the patent
register can increase, at times dramatically, as most profitable drugs
reach true blockbuster status. For example, in our pilot study of the
top 16 most profitable drugs,181 we observed 772 patents granted in
association with 16 drugs, with an average of 48 patents per drug. Of
these, 77 were listed on the patent register.182 This amounted to 10%
total listed patents, with an average of 5 listed patents per drug. In the
same study, we noted that two forms of the blockbuster drug
Omeprazole (Prilosec and Nexium) had 82 associated patents, 22 of
which were listed on the register. This amounts to 27% of total
patents, a greater fraction compared with the larger MP Cohort of 16
drugs (10% total) and a much greater fraction than observed for the
largest cohort of 95 drugs (5% total). Similar results have been
observed for blockbuster drugs after major amendments to linkage
laws in order to minimize evergreening. For example, in 2010 Lipitor
had 16 listed patents. As with Omeprazole, many additional patents
were not listed. As of 2009, 42 drugs had ≥ 5 patents listed.183
Emerging data therefore reveals a demonstrable relationship

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1495; Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 192, 218.
Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 184.
Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1483.
Id. at 1495-96.
Grootendorst et al., supra note 42, at 7.

15 BOUCHARD (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/23/2012 11:41 AM

INNOVATION INDEX FOR PHARMACEUTICALS

357

between the profit of a given drug and the fraction of listed patents, a
conclusion that can easily be obstructed when larger cohorts of drugs
are analyzed. As a result, it is important to understand that drug
product-patent clusters grow over time, and the value of these clusters
and the importance of the fraction of listed patents generally track
increased regulator and market vetting of clusters over time.
As demonstrated previously, strategic listing of as few as five
patents per drug may prolong cumulative market exclusivity on older
blockbuster drugs by as much as two-fold.184 Thus, as one moves
from the high end of the LOI index with lower but still appreciable
numbers of patents (baseline LOI ≥ 5= 650 patents) to the low end of
the index occupied by SNDS and SNDS Me Too drugs (ceiling LOI ≤
3 = 2,091 patents), the increasing number of patents across the LOI
index (Fig. 3; Tbl. 8) provide enhanced fodder for patent listing
efforts in order to delay generic entry. Such delay may be facilitated
by the observation that the majority of these patents are conducive to
the development of line extension drugs, including patents with
claims directed to combination therapies, new uses and routes of
administration, and several classes of chemical derivatives.185
3. Drug Chemical Components
The patterns and trends observed for approvals and patenting
continued to develop into the MP Chemical Cohort. The primary
reason for investigating chemical components in addition to approvals
and patents was to gain some understanding of the utility of chemicals
to cluster-based drug development. This was based in part on our
earlier and somewhat surprising observation that chemical patents
represented the lowest quantity of patent classifications for the MP
Approval Cohort.186
First, as with the Total Approval, MP Approval, and MP Patent
Cohorts, there was a negative correlation between the number of
chemicals associated with the MP Approval Cohort and the associated
level of LOI as evidenced by the innovation index data (Fig. 4).
Analogous to the patenting data, this is somewhat unexpected, as one
might predict more innovative chemicals to be associated with highly
innovative products. This is particularly so given the wide evidentiary
berth permitted by regulators for designation of NDS NAS status and
184.
1475.
185.
186.

See Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 105; Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at
See Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 222-25.
Id. at 202-03 fig.6.
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SNDS approvals, both of which permit a substantial array of chemical
modifications such as dosage form, route of administration, salts,
crystalline forms, enantiomers, etc.187 However, it is plausible that the
lower number of chemicals associated with the most innovative drugs
likely reflects the simple difficulty of developing truly unique
chemical forms, particularly in the NDS FIC class, compared to
obtaining patents or approvals.
Based on the observations above, it is not surprising that the
three categories with the greatest number of chemicals were in
relation to SNDS (LOI= 2), NDS (LOI= 3), and SNDS Me Too
(LOI= 3) drugs or that the classes with the lowest LOI values were
NDS MI (LOI= 15), NDS FIC (LOI= 9), and NDS NAS (LOI= 6).
This is borne out in the normalized cumulative data in Figure 4d. The
data here indicate that, as with the Total Approval, MP Approval and
MP Patenting Cohorts, the majority of growth in cumulative
chemicals in the MP Chemical Cohort occurs at the lower end of the
innovation index. That the greatest numbers of chemicals had the
lowest LOI values and were in the SNDS and SNDS Me Too classes
supports the theory of cluster-based drug development, as well as the
conclusion that this model of drug development is encouraged by
linkage laws operating in conjunction with existing patent and food
and drug laws.
As noted above, however, the news is not all bad in that the trend
observed going from Total Approval to MP Approval to MP
Patenting of increasing levels of innovation associated with products
with LOI values ≥ 3 continued to play out with the MP Chemical
Cohort. This can be seen in the bar graphs and fits in Figures 5 and 6
as well as in the CNV50, CNV80 and Peak-Baseline calculations in
Figure 6 and the broadened core in the spider plots (Fig. 7). As with
the MP Patent Cohort, the CNV50 continued to hover around the low
value of about 4.0. However, the movement in the mid-range of the
LOI index is reflected by the jump up to 8.2 for the CNV80 calculation
(Fig. 6). This is shown graphically in Figure 5, which compares the
fits to the cumulative normalized data between cohorts. The fitted
curves clearly indicate that the greatest fraction of indicator studied is
in higher LOI bins for the MP Chemical Cohort. Similarly, the PeakBaseline value increased substantially from a little over 25% in the
MP Patenting Cohort to 46% in the MP Chemical Cohort (Fig. 6a).
Combined, these results suggest the largest fraction of indicator
187. See, e.g., Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 55; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra
note 75, at 106.
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associated with high LOI values was in the MP Chemical Cohort
compared to all other cohorts investigated.
These data suggest that chemical compounds may have the
largest functional utility compared to either drug patents or approvals.
Having said this, only approvals and patents provide a license to
market drug products with defined legal boundaries, whereas
chemicals, in and of themselves, do not. This supports the conclusion
that patenting, along with patent listing, is a better indication of value
to firms than approvals per se, provided that one or more approvals
per product cluster are in place. Even so, tracking the development of
new chemicals and the degree of social benefits associated with
chemical innovations appears to be a reasonably valuable method for
assessing the innovative nature of drug products.
4. Class Trends Across Indicators
Several observations in the current data were maintained
throughout the entire data set. The first, and most remarkable, among
these was the negative correlation between the level of innovation and
the numbers of approvals, patents, and chemicals observed in the four
cohorts (Figs. 1-4). Not only was there a negative correlation, but all
four data sets could be reasonably well fit to declining exponential
functions, signifying that the large majority of approvals, patents, and
chemicals resided in comparatively low value bins. As such, the data
reported here cast some doubt on the validity of arguments that more
intellectual property rights necessarily lead to more innovative
products or that more patenting will lead to products with higher
social value.
The second general observation is that substantial differences
were observed among classes as one moved from one indicator and
cohort to the next. The primary difference was the slow but gradual
rise in the numbers of indicators with higher baseline LOI values as
one moved from Total Approval to MP Approval to MP Patenting to
MP Chemical Cohorts. As noted in the discussions relating to
individual indicators, the baseline level of innovation was generally
observed to increase across indicators and across the MP Cohorts.
This shift was demonstrated by the gradual increase in CNV50 and
CNV80 values and Peak-Baseline calculations (Figs. 5 and 6).
The details of this shift in baseline LOI value can be seen by the
data in Figure 7 and Table 8. For approvals, by far the greatest class
was SNDS Me Too drugs. However, this was followed by a
significant number of approvals in the NDS and SNDS ER classes,
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consistent with the data peak at an LOI value of 12 and 8 in Figures 2
and 7. In the patenting cohort, there was also a significant spike in
SNDS Me Too patents. However, we also observed large numbers of
NDS ER and SNDS ER drugs and follow-on SNDS FIC drugs. As
noted in the discussion around the data in Table 8, the pattern
switches up for the chemical cohort, where there is a very large spike
in NDS ER drugs and NDS NAS drugs compared to NDS or SNDS
FIC drugs. The data for each cohort are consistent with the patterns
identified in Figure 7.
These differences were also assessed using rank order data for
combined NDS and SNDS classes. The rank order of NDS and SNDS
drug classes was Me Too > ER > FIC > NAS for the MP Approval
Cohort. This can be compared with FIC > NAS > ER > Me Too in the
MP Patent Cohort and NAS > FIC > ER > Me Too for the MP
Chemical Cohort. These rank orders differ substantially from one
cohort to the next, and contribute to the changing baseline values in
different cohorts.
While the classes responsible for the increased baseline LOI
values at index values ≥ 3 differed between cohorts, the common
denominator driving changes in all of the cohorts assessed was an
increased focus on both NDS and SNDS ER and FIC drugs. A
secondary consideration was an increased focus on NDS and NDS
NAS drugs, especially for the MP Chemical Cohort.
The data indicate that compared to MP Approvals, the MP
Patenting Cohort was more strongly focused on new chemical forms
for both follow-on (SNDS FIC) and new (NDS FIC, NDS NAS)
drugs as well as new uses (SNDS FIC, NDS FIC). Significant
increase also occurred for both SNDS and NDS ER drugs. By
contrast, Me Too drugs received less attention, although the number
of NDS Me Too drugs increased by nearly 200%. A similar pattern
was observed with the MP Chemical Cohort, with the exception that
chemicals associated with FIC and NAS drugs exchanged places in
the rank order (NAS > FIC > ER > Me Too). Chemicals directed to
NAS drugs increased 250% beyond approvals so directed. Both
SNDS and NDS FIC chemicals increased about 200% compared to
MP Approval, while chemicals associated with NDS and SNDS ER
drugs were 170% of corresponding MP Approval values. Continuing
the trend observed with the MP Patent Cohort, chemicals associated
with NDS Me Too drugs increased by 250%, but this was offset by a
22% drop in SNDS Me Too chemicals from a larger baseline.
Data demonstrating a shifting baseline across indicators support
the conclusion that the degree of functional utility per indicator
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generally increases across cohorts. The rank order for indicators in
this regard would be Chemicals > Patents > Approvals, with the MP
Patent Cohort having a higher rank order than tha Total Approval
Cohort. As noted above, results such as these suggest that chemical
compounds may have the largest utility to multinational
pharmaceutical firms in their drug development efforts compared to
either drug patents or approvals. A second conclusion is that
regulators could contemplate allocating a greater share of intellectual
property and regulatory rights incentives for drug classes
underpinning NDS MI drug development (NDS FIC; NDS NAS;
NDS ER), particularly the NDS FIC drug class. Data and market
exclusivity periods could be customized to provide proportional
incentives for new and follow-on drug development, especially in the
classes comprising NDS MI drugs or where unmet medical need is
greatest e.g., for pathways to expedited review in the new drug
category (Priority Review and NOC/c).
An observation applicable to all indicators and cohorts studied is
that the innovation index permits the observation of a long tail of
probability distribution. The long tail provides critical information, as
the drug classes with the highest LOI values were those with the
lowest number of indictors across all cohorts. The Total Approval
Cohort appeared to encompass a more well-developed long tail of
probability compared to the other data sets. As such, MP Approval,
MP Patenting, and MP Chemical Cohorts may reflect a somewhat
biased view of indicator traits, skewing to the high value side. Even
so, these are the most sought after drugs and so obtaining information
on their characteristics is highly desirable to stakeholders. This is
particularly true for the innovative characteristics of the most
profitable drugs and drugs going through some kind of expedited
review, the latter of which provides much of the basis for the elevated
baseline in the first place.
Finally, it is noteworthy that generic products represent a
substantial fraction of all indicators studied. Indeed, as demonstrated
by the raw data presented in Figures 1-4, the number of generic
indicators often exceeds those observed for brand approvals, patents,
and chemical compounds at LOI values ≥ 5. One caveat to this
assessment is that the degree to which generic indicators exceeded
brand indicators declined as one moves from the Total Approval
Cohort to the MP Approval, MP Patent, and MP Chemical Cohorts.
Nevertheless, the large number of approvals and patents granted to
generic firms suggest that generic drug companies are leveraging their
intellectual property resources in the same manner as brand firms.
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That is, towards the development of product clusters.
5. Limitations
There are two related limitations that apply to this study and the
companion paper. First is the limitation of the number of approvals
and drugs analyzed in the Total Approval Cohort (2,087; 608) is
smaller than that for the MP Approval Cohort (347; 95). Similarly,
the number of drugs assessed with respect to the MP Patent Cohort
and MP Chemical Cohort was smaller than that for the Total
Approval Cohort. A second limitation is that we report patenting and
chemical data only for drugs that have already been vetted by the
market and regulators to be high value drugs. Both have been dealt
with in substance in the companion paper.
An additional limit may be that the innovation index is based on
regulatory approval requirements and therefore may not represent real
technological advances or the technical difficulty in developing
certain kinds of new drugs. These are reasonable points. However, the
objective in creating the index was to define innovation in accordance
with social preferences expressed by drug regulators exercising their
public health mandate in legal terms. This differs substantially from
an index with a technological or, for that matter, an economic focus.
A fundamental distinction can be made with respect to
pharmaceutical products between an economic analysis (even one cast
in a law and economics light) and a patent law analysis. This is
because one is in service of utilitarian benefit and the other is in
service of the patent bargain interpreted in light of the public health
mandate of food and drug law. As noted by the Supreme Court of
Canada in its seminal decisions in Biolyse and AstraZeneca, linkage
regulations tying generic entry to brand-name patents must be made
in a “patent-specific” manner informed by the public health mandate
inherent to food and drug law, thus highlighting the terms of the
traditional patent bargain read in light of the so-called special
provisions of linkage laws when parsing pharmaceutical patents. In
any event, the MP Chemical Cohort does provide some valuable
information regarding the technological aspects of drug development.
This is supported by the conclusion above that this cohort appears to
have the greatest functional utility with respect to identifying
innovation compared to patents or approvals.
While the drug class preferences identified and prioritized in the
present study are those disclosed by government regulators rather
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than independently, the basis for their determination is found in the
public health policy inherent to the Food and Drugs Act,188 Food and
Drugs Regulations,189 and Canada Health Act,190 elaborated in
numerous government Guidance Documents and Regulatory Impact
Analysis Statements (RIASs)191 and Supreme Court of Canada
linkage jurisprudence.192 Relevant to this argument, the Supreme
Court has ruled that RIAS documents constitute proper evidence of
legislative intent, including in the context of litigation under the
regulations.193
188. Food and Drugs Act, supra note 111.
189. Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 111.
190. Canada Health Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 (2011).
191. Evidence of legislative intent regarding balancing patent enforcement and generic
entry can be found in early RIAS documents. See Regulations Amending the Food and Drug
Regulations, 138 C. Gaz. pt. I, 3712-13, 3714 (2004) (Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement—
not part of the Regulations); Regulations Amending the Food and Drug Regulations (Data
Protection), 140 C. Gaz. Pt. I 1598, 1601 (2006) (Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement—not
part of the Regulations); Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
Regulations, 142 C. Gaz. Pt. II 1586, 1588 (2008) (Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement—not
part of the Regulations); HEALTH PRODS. & FOOD BRANCH, HEALTH CAN., GUIDANCE
DOCUMENT: POST-NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE (NOC) CHANGES: FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT (2009),
available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/applicdemande/guide-ld/postnoc_change_apresac/noc_pn_framework_ac_sa_cadre-eng.pdf. An
articulation of the government’s pharmaceutical policy as it relates to the NOC Regulations can
be found in the June 17, 2006, RIAS, which states:
The Government’s pharmaceutical patent policy seeks to balance effective patent
enforcement over new and innovative drugs with the timely market entry of their
lower-priced generic competitors. The current manner in which that balance is
realized was established in 1993, with the enactment of Bill C-91, the Patent Act
Amendment Act, 1992, S.C. 1993, c. 2.
Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations,
140 C. Gaz. Pt. I 1611, 1611 (2006) (Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement—not part of the
Regulations). See generally Consultation Notice on the Voluntary Compliance Undertaking on
Humalog, 132 C. Gaz. Pt. I 553 (1998); Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) Regulations, 133 C. Gaz. Pt. II 2355 (1999). Evidence of legislative intent
regarding the “original policy intent” of encouraging development of new and innovative drugs
can be found in both RIAS and the related Guidance Document.
192. See Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, para. 2,
11 (Can.); AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, para.
15 (Can.). For discussion of these decisions in the context of linkage, see Bouchard 2011, supra
note 32, at 417-18.
193. See Biolyse, 1 S.C.R. at 599, para. 156. Justice Binnie stated:
It has long been established that the usage of admissible extrinsic sources
regarding a provision’s legislative history and its context of enactment could be
examined. I held in Francis v. Baker, at para. 35, that “[p]roper statutory
interpretation principles therefore require that all evidence of legislative intent be
considered, provided that it is relevant and reliable.” Consequently, in order to
confirm the purpose of the impugned regulation, the intended application of an
amendment to the regulation or the meaning of the legislative language, it is
useful to examine the RIAS, prepared as part of the regulatory process . . . .
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Consistent with the goal of creating an index that reflects the
social benefit associated with different new and follow-on drug
classes, the public policy values embodied by the nation’s health
legislation are communitarian,194 and reflect the public system of
health care that is not only specific to Canada,195 but is, generally
speaking, representative of public health systems in most if not all
developed nations. Thus, the various approval class preferences that
make up the innovation index and informs the multipliers used to
calculate LOI values reflect the duty of drug regulators to operate
within a public health mandate typical of developed nations as this
mandate is parsed through the trifecta of patent, linkage and food and
drug law. This conclusion is supported by the observation that the
standards for both drug approval and drug patenting have become
globally harmonized over the last two decades.196
B. Interpretation of the Model
1. Objective-Subjective Considerations
The innovation index described in this Article is both
quantitative and qualitative in nature. It is quantitative simply
because, by necessity, it reflects the raw number of drug approvals,
patents, and chemical components as they are distributed across the
various cohorts, indicators, and new and follow-on drug
classifications and classes reported here. As suggested by data
presented in tabular form and graphically in this and the companion
paper, raw numbers are amenable to normalization within NDS and
SNDS classification and the various drug classes across all three
Id.; RUTH SULLIVAN, SULLIVAN AND DRIEDGER ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 499-500
(4th ed. 2002).
194. The five principles are public administration, comprehensiveness, universality,
portability, and accessibility. Public Administration refers to the fact that all administration of
provincial health insurance must be carried out by a public authority on a non-profit basis, must
be accountable to the province or territory, and their records and accounts are subject to audits.
Comprehensiveness means that all necessary health services, including hospitals, physicians and
surgical dentists, must be insured. Universality means all insured residents are entitled to the
same level of health care. Portability means a resident that moves to a different province or
territory is still entitled to coverage from their home province during a minimum waiting period.
This also applies to residents which leave the country. Accessibility means all insured persons
have reasonable access to health care facilities. In addition, all physicians, hospitals, etc., must
be provided reasonable compensation for the services they provide.
195. See generally ROY J. ROMANOW, COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN
CAN., BUILDING ON VALUES: THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA (2002), available at
http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/CP32-85-2002E.pdf (final report).
196. See, e.g., Eichler et al., supra note 3.
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indictors. Its primary utility, however, is that it qualifies, or presents a
rationally derived set of values to estimate, the social value of drug
approvals and their associated patents and chemical components. As
such, the innovation index presented in this Article is both objective
and subjective in nature.
With any transformative index, there is always the risk of getting
the balance between objective and subjective elements wrong; the risk
of error being generally proportional to the uncertainties involved.
The manner in which risks are managed is thus a fundamental
element of any qualitative estimate, and it is reasonable to assume that
at the center of most successful risk management tools is a rational,
evidence-based method for identifying and minimizing risks in
service of an identifiable goal. An important observation is that the
innovation index model described in this Article has many features of
existing decision-making methods relating to drug approvals and
patents. As broached originally in Part V. Methods, the data
comprising the innovation index are transformed data in that
quantitative raw data representing the number of approvals, patents,
and chemicals investigated are converted into qualitative innovation
index data. The analytic method by which this conversion takes place
is provided by the qualitative prioritization of different new and
follow-on drug classes and their respective evidentiary hurdles.
Because the model transitions from raw data to transformed data, it
represents an objective-subjective hybrid model of analysis. As
argued below, the legitimacy of this hybrid analysis is supported by
decision-making models used by drug regulators, expert witnesses,
and the courts to decide whether regulatory approval and patents are
ultimately granted and upheld in courts of law.
One of the most recognized objective-subjective public health
indices relating to health technologies is that of the QUALY, or
Quality Adjusted Life Year. Developed in part by the National
Institutes for Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom, the
QUALY is a quantitative estimate of disease burden that attaches a
qualitative monetary value to medical interventions.197 As widely
discussed in the Health Technology Assessment (HTA)198 and Cost

197. See National Institutes for Clinical Excellence, Measuring Effectiveness and Cost
Effectiveness: The QALY, NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE,
http://www.nice.org.uk/newsroom/features/measuringeffectivenessandcosteffectivenesstheqaly.j
sp (last updated Apr. 20, 2010).
198. See, e.g., Egon Jonsson, Development of Health Technology Assessment in Europe,
18 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 171 (2002).
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Effectiveness Research (CER)199 literature, the QUALY is a utilitybased, and thus trade-off based, model of determining which health
technologies can be funded within the parameters of relevant public
health and economic considerations. The QUALY is primarily
concerned with economic efficiency as opposed to equality or social
justice.200
A quantitative value-for-money calculation such as the QUALY
is not explicit in the model described in this Article. Yet, it is possible
to argue that a parallel assessment is built into the innovation index
implicitly. As reviewed previously,201 according to drug regulator
guidelines, firms must have well-defined “benefit-risk” ratios and
meet designated evidentiary standards for “unmet medical need” or
“significant therapeutic advantage” to gain approval in the first
instance, or to move from a simple NDS up to an NDS NAS or NDS
FIC designation or from the NDS to the SNDS classification. The
same is true for moving up from a simple NDS or SNDS designation
to either of the two expedited review pathways (Priority Review or
NOC/c approval). Economic considerations do not drive approval
decisions, and therefore do not inform innovation index values at the
front end of the model. However, economic considerations are
embedded in the model at the back end through the terms of the
patent bargain, which offers strong economic incentives for
development of prioritized drug products in the form of monopoly
pricing and the extended cumulative patent duration afforded to drug
clusters via pharmaceutical linkage.
Thus, while a monetary value measurement such as the QUALY
is not built into the innovation index, a qualitative benefit-risk
analysis which is informed by economic incentives provided by the
combination of patent and linkage laws is encompassed by the index.
The innovation index values associated with various drug classes

199. See generally COMM. ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION,
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE
EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH (2009); Fed. Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness
Research, Report to the President and the Congress, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
(June 30, 2009), http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/cer/cerannualrpt.pdf; Jerry Avorn,
Debate About Funding Comparative-Effectiveness Research, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1927
(2009); John K. Iglehart, Prioritizing Comparative-Effectiveness Research—IOM
Recommendations, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 325 (2009).
200. See Michael F. Drummond, Output Measurement for Resource Allocation Decisions
in Health Care, 5 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 59, 71 (1989); Adam Wagstaff, QALYs and the
Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off, 10 J. HEALTH ECON. 21, 22 (1991).
201. Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 55-56; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75,
at 89, 106.
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enumerated in this study have been qualitatively ranked according to
the manner in which drug classes have been prioritized by drug
regulators. As discussed in more detail in our earlier work, 202 these
“value statements” by drug regulators strongly track the types of
drugs that are the target of pharmaceutical policy in developed nations
(e.g., drugs that are “new” and “innovative”). In this regard we have
endeavored not to stray from the axis of patent law and food and drug
law connected by linkage law, because it is around this axis that the
activities of drug approval, marketing, patenting, and patent listing
revolve. Compared to the QUALY, the index provides a means of
assessing, incentivizing, and rewarding innovation in a manner that is
less utilitarian, more equality-based, and more informed by the first
principles of patent law.
The primary decision-making matrix for drug approval for close
to fifty years has been the precautionary principle, strong
formulations of which entail absolute proof of safety prior to
approval.203 In this model, pharmaceutical firms carry the burden of
proof to introduce necessary and sufficient evidence of drug safety in
their drug submissions. Despite its successes, it is now recognized
that over-reliance on this principle presents a significant barrier for
drug development, especially when viewed through the lens of
evolving risk management frameworks.204 Risk management
mechanisms generally acknowledge the non-linear and uncertain
nature of clinical research, even when conducted under the most
rigorous and controlled circumstances. The acceptance of inherent
uncertainty and risk in the context of product development and
regulation clearly breaches the requirement in strong articulations of
the precautionary principle for absolute proof ex ante. In its widely
lauded Future of Drug Safety report, the US Institute of Medicine
adopted a position that respects the various types of risks involved in
202. See, e.g., Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75;
Bouchard 2009, supra note 31; Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37; Bouchard 2011, supra
note 32.
203. Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 60-61.
204. See, e.g., Eichler et al., supra note 3; Comm. for Medicinal Prods. for Human Use,
European Meds. Agency, Guideline on the Scientific Application and the Practical
Arrangements Necessary to Implement Commission Regulation (EC) No 507/2006 on the
Conditional Marketing Authorisation for Medicinal Products for Human Use Falling Within the
Scope of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, EMEA/509951/2006 (2006) [hereinafter EMEA CHMP
1]; COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE US DRUG SAFETY SYS., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L
ACADS., FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC
(Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IOM Report]; COMM. ON DATA STANDARDS FOR
PATIENT SAFETY, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PATIENT SAFETY: ACHIEVING A NEW
STANDARD FOR CARE (Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2004).
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scientific investigation,205 acknowledging that even the best drug
safety system in the world will not prevent serious adverse reactions
to marketed pharmaceuticals due in part to the complexity of their
mechanisms of action.206 Probing the connection between post-market
withdrawals and the effectiveness of drug regulation more generally,
the Institute of Medicine noted that regulatory approval does not
represent a lifetime guarantee of safety and efficacy, and that even the
best drug safety system would not prevent adverse reactions to
pharmaceuticals on the market.207 Regulators who review new drug
applications must strike a delicate balance in judging the drug’s risks
and benefits and whether the need for more study to increase certainty
before approval warrants delaying the release of the drug into the
marketplace.208
The factors comprising the decision-making process for approval
in the context of benefit-risk were recently assessed by the European
Medicines Agency (EMEA).209 The EMEA concluded that a hybrid
objective-subjective (or “semi-quantitative”) framework that
incorporates both objective evidence-based and subjective expertisebased decision-making methods is the best scheme available to
regulators in the exercise of their public health mandates.210 Perhaps
in order to allay concerns expressed over supplanting the
precautionary principle, the EMEA stipulated that “quantitative
benefit-risk assessment is not expected to replace qualitative

205. IOM Report, supra note 204, at 1; For general references regarding the role of
uncertainty in scientific systems and daily life, see GUNTHER S. STENT, PARADOXES OF
PROGRESS (1978); JOHN L. CASTI, SEARCHING FOR CERTAINTY: WHAT SCIENTISTS CAN KNOW
ABOUT THE FUTURE (1990); PAUL W. GLIMCHER, DECISIONS, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE BRAIN:
THE SCIENCE OF NEUROECONOMICS (2003).
206. IOM Report, supra note 204, at 2.
207. Id.
208. IOM Report, supra note 204, at 2.
209. Comm. for Medicinal Prods. for Human Use, European Meds. Agency, Reflection
Paper on Benefit-Risk Assessment Methods in the Context of the Evaluation of Marketing
Authorisation Applications of Medicinal Products for Human Use, EMEA/CHMP/15404/2007
(2007) [hereinafter EMEA CHMP 2], available at
http://www.emea.europa.eu/pdfs/human/brmethods/1540407enfin.pdf. See also EMEA/CHMPThink Tank Group on Innovative Drug Development, European Meds. Agency, Innovative Drug
Development Approaches: Final Report from the EMEA/CHMP-Think-Tank Group on
Innovative Drug Development, EMEA/127318/2007 (2007) [hereinafter EMEA Innovation],
available at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2009/10/WC500004913.pdf;
European Medicines Agency, The European Medicines Agency Road Map to 2010: Preparing
the Ground for the Future, EMEA/H/34163/03/Final (2005) [hereinafter EMEA Road Map],
available at http://www.emea.europa.eu/pdfs/general/direct/directory/3416303enF.pdf.
210. EMEA Road Map, supra note 209.
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evaluation” as the cornerstone of the drug approval process.211 Rather,
“expert judgment is expected to remain the cornerstone of benefit-risk
evaluation for the authorization of medicinal products” for the
foreseeable future.212
Noting that to date there is no universally agreed-on approach to
estimate benefit-risk or to describe the manner in which evidence
should be properly weighed and balanced,213 the EMEA stressed that
over-reliance on purely quantitative models has the potential to
improperly skew benefit-risk calculations.214 This is because such
models do not adequately reflect the contextual “intellectual process
of assessing the empirical evidence, accommodating risks and
balancing risks and benefits.”215 Hybrid objective-subjective models
were deemed to most effectively weigh uncertainties inherent to drug
development and regulation as well as to take into consideration
different stakeholder interests while also minimizing the dangers of
oversimplified quantitative models.216 In a recent review of regulatory
decision-making, Eichler et al. also underscore the importance of
inherent uncertainty in developing, regulating, and consuming
therapeutic products.217 Particular attention was given to commercial
risks, and their relation to idiosyncratic, rare, or otherwise unexpected
adverse drug reactions. Indeed, the pervasive nature of scientific and
commercial risks involved in drug development has prompted
numerous jurisdictions, including Canada,218 the European Union,219
and the United States,220 to base drug approval on both objective and
subjective metrics rather than solely on objective evidence and
quantitative models.
Thus, conversion of raw data to transformed data occurs in both
drug approval and innovation index models and the output of both
decision-making processes is an evidence-based yet qualitative
judgement. For drug approval safety, efficacy, and quality data
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

EMEA CHMP 2, supra note 209, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2, 4-7, 13.
Eichler et al., supra note 3, at 818.
HEALTH PRODS. & FOOD BRANCH, HEALTH CAN., BLUEPRINT FOR RENEWAL:
TRANSFORMING CANADA’S APPROACH TO REGULATING HEALTH PRODUCTS AND FOOD (2006),
available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/hpfb-dgpsa/blueprintplan-eng.pdf.
219. EMEA CHMP 1, supra note 204; EMEA Innovation, supra note 209.
220. IOM Report, supra note 204.
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obtained from Phase I-III clinical trials are parsed through the
qualitative filters of “unmet clinical need,” “significant improvement
over existing therapies,” “benefit-risk,” and other decision endpoints.
For the index model, raw approval, patenting, and chemical data are
parsed through the filter of drug class prioritization and evidentiary
hurdles disclosed by government. All drug classes approved by
regulators, and hence their corresponding innovation index rankings,
are supported by an array of legal and policy mechanisms directed to
the speed and mechanism of reviewing new and follow-on drug
applications that in turn determine the duration of a drug’s lifecycle
and intellectual property protection.221
As with the approval exercise, the importance of identifying and
ameliorating risk in patent law and innovation policy using a
combination of objective and subjective means cannot be overstated.
It is well known that the act of invention is subsumed within the
wider arc of innovation,222 and constitutes only a small fraction of the
risks and uncertainties encompassed by the therapeutic product
lifecycle. As discussed in terms of the pancake analogy in the
Introduction,223 broad patent rights have been historically advocated
in order to recoup transaction costs and to mitigate the risks and
uncertainties involved in bringing pharmaceutical products to market.
These risks are inherently unpredictable and thus parallel those in the
drug development process. While regulatory rights are evolving such
that the duration of regulatory protection now rivals that of patent
protection,224 patents nevertheless remain the touchstone for global
innovation policy and provide the mechanism for managing the risks
of commercializing therapeutic products.
It has been the role of the courts to police the balance between
private and public interests in commercializing medical research.225

221. Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 58-60, 63-65; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra
note 75, at 118; Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1498-99, 1501, 1506, 1510-12; Bouchard
2010, supra note 51, at 176-77, 181-82, 220-21.
222. The act of invention creates a new product or process, whereas the broader act of
innovation includes the work necessary to revise, develop, and bring that new product or process
to commercial fruition. This distinction has been attributed to Schumpeter. RICHARD R. NELSON
& SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 263 (1982).
223. See supra Part III.A.
224. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 67, at 482-83; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the
FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 345-88 (2007);
Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 73, 76-77, 91-92.
225. See SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF
PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH (2003). For a pharmaceutical specific view, see,
for example, Bouchard 2007, supra note 99; Bouchard & Lemmens, supra note 99.
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This is particularly true of pharmaceutical law and policy, where the
United States has lead the way globally, both in encouraging
commercialization of technologies developed in universities and in
balancing the competing interests of stimulating the development of
novel therapeutic products and the timely entry of generic substitutes
by fundamentally linking patent law to food and drug law.226 The
result has been the development of a strong generic industry
paralleled by strong domestic pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries.227 Poor government oversight of patent policy, by contrast,
can lead to significant social inefficiencies where monopoly pricing is
improperly extended due to overly broad, overly narrow, or otherwise
poorly thought out patent and regulatory rights. Reasoning of this
nature permeates English,228 American,229 Australian,230 and
Canadian,231 high courts. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada
noted in one of its leading patent cases that there is a high economic
cost attached to uncertainty and that it is the proper policy of patent
law to keep it to a minimum.232 Similar statements are to be found in
the U.S. Supreme Court’s KSR decision.233 Pharmaceutical laws are
226. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984).
227. Epstein & Kuhlik, supra note 38.
228. See, e.g., R.C.A. Photophone, Ld. v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp., (1936) 53 R.P.C.
167, 195 (A.C.) (Eng.); Société Technique de Pulverisation Step v. Emson Eur. Ltd., (1993) 21
R.P.C. 513, 519 (A.C.) (Eng.).
229. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 266 (1851); Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3-4, 10-11, 17 (1966); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415-16
(2007).
230. See Aktiebolaget Hässle v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., [2002] HCA 59, 164 (Austl.). See
also BUREAU OF INDUS. ECON., DEP’T OF INDUS., TECH. & REG’L DEV., THE ECONOMICS OF
PATENTS 45 (1994).
231. See, e.g., Free World Trust v. Électro Santé, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, para. 13
(Can.); Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, para. 37 (Can.).
232. See Free World Trust, 2 S.C.R. at para. 42 (citing R.C.A. Photophone, Ld. v.
Gaumont-British Picture Corp., (1936) 53 R.P.C. 167, 195 (A.C.) (Eng.)).
The patent system is designed to advance research and development and to
encourage broader economic activity. Achievement of these objectives is
undermined however if competitors fear to tread in the vicinity of the patent
because its scope lacks a reasonable measure of precision and certainty. A patent
of uncertain scope becomes “a public nuisance.” Potential competitors are
deterred from working in areas that are not in fact covered by the patent even
though costly and protracted litigation (which in the case of patent disputes can
be very costly and protracted indeed) might confirm that what the competitors
propose to do is entirely lawful. Potential investment is lost or otherwise directed.
Competition is “chilled.” The patent owner is getting more of a monopoly than
the public bargained for. There is a high economic cost attached to uncertainty
and it is the proper policy of patent law to keep it to a minimum.
Id. (citation omitted).
233. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415.
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intended to operate in such a manner so as to maximize legal stability,
predictability, and certainty and thus minimize market disruption.234
Even so, in light of the public interest at stake, pharmaceutical patents
must be carefully scrutinized to determine if they merit the grant of a
monopoly privilege.235
So, on the one hand, we have a range of scientific, medical and
economic risks and uncertainties involved in developing,
commercializing and marketing therapeutic products. These
uncertainties are said to be inherent, or “indeterminate,” in nature;
that is, they are unavoidable. On the other hand, a legal mechanism is
required to manage these risks and uncertainties in a way that does
not cause undue physical or economic harm to members of the public,
who not only consume patented drug products but also participate in
clinical trials and other research necessary for discovery. Fortunately,
leading patent courts worldwide have evolved such a mechanism;
otherwise known as the PHOSITA, or the Person Having Ordinary
Skill in the Art. The legal standard of the PHOSITA provides the
mechanism by which drug patents are assessed in litigation ex post
which, in turn, influences how patent applications are parsed by
patent examiners ex ante and how patents are understood and valued
at various stages of the product lifecycle by a range of stakeholders in
the drug development and commercialization cascade.
The PHOSITA represents the statistical average of all decisionmaking characteristics and inventive capacity of the ordinary
scientist.236 Important for the present purpose, knowledge accrued by
the PHOSITA is both focal and tacit in nature.237 Focal knowledge
234. See, e.g., Regulations Amending the Food and Drug Regulations (1390—Data
Protection), 138 C. Gaz. pt. I, 3712, 3714 (2004), available at
http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/p1/2004/2004-12-11/pdf/g1-13850.pdf; Regulations
Amending the Food and Drug Regulations (Data Protection),140 C. Gaz. pt. I, 1598, 1601
(2006), available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/SP2-1-140-24.pdf; Regulations
Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, 142 C. Gaz. pt. II,
1586, 1588 (2008), available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2008/2008-10-29x13/pdf/g1-142x13.pdf.
235. Comm’r of Patents v. Farbwerke Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft Vormals Meister Lucius
& Bruning, [1964] S.C.R. 49, 56 (Can.).
236. See Ron A. Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 1: Impact of U.S. Supreme Court Patent
Law on Canadian Intellectual Property and Regulatory Rights Landscape, 15 HEALTH L.J. 221,
238, 245 (2007) [hereinafter Bouchard, Landscape]. For an excellent review of the role of
creativity in the legal determination, see, for example, Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 041350); Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of Twenty-Four Intellectual
Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350).
237. See Bouchard, PHOSITA, supra note 49, at 1, 7, 20.
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refers to formal knowledge sources such as books, the Internet and
other technical sources, while tacit knowledge refers to information
gained as a result of informal person-to-person mentoring and the
personal conversion of information into useful knowledge.238
Therefore, the PHOSITA makes decisions on patent validity,
obviousness, utility, etc. using formal knowledge sources typically
available to a skilled technician in the art parsed through and
prioritized in a personal manner by the PHOSITA’s creative mind.
Therefore, the method used by the PHOSITA to render a decision is
both objective and subjective in nature.
The hybrid nature of the PHOSITA’s decision-making ability is
exemplified by the recent decision in KSR.239 In its decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court held expressly that the PHOSITA is not an
automaton,240 underscoring that the PHOSITA is endowed with
creative abilities that enable them to look not just at explicit prior art
relative to the problem at hand but also to elements of the prior art
designed implicitly to solve different problems within the same
industry or parallel problems in different industries.241 In addition to
using traditional knowledge sources to render decisions, the
PHOSITA also does so by exercising inherent creativity.242 The level
of skill and common sense are pitched neither at the level of the
ordinary citizen nor at that of the inventor, but rather at the level of
the ordinary person skilled in the particular art at issue informed by
tacit and focal knowledge.243 As with the “semi-quantitative” method
employed for drug approval reviewed supra, the legal standard for
patent assessment is thus an objective-subjective hybrid model.
Based on the above reasoning, it is concluded that the objectivesubjective hybrid model used for data transformation in the
innovation index is internally consistent with the first principles and
methods used for decision-making by drug regulators, patent
examiners, expert witnesses, and the courts. Decision-making in each
instance is both quantitative and qualitative in nature, reflecting the
value to global drug regulators, patent examiners, expert witnesses,
238. See id. at 26-33.
239. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419-20 (2007).
240. Id. at 421.
241. Id. at 401-02, 417.
242. Id. at 401, 418; See also Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 891-92; Bouchard, PHOSITA,
supra note 49, at 26-33; Bouchard, Landscape, supra note 236, at 232-39.
243. See Bouchard, PHOSITA, supra note 49, at 26-33; See also Eisenberg, supra note 49,
at 887, 891-92; Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s PHOSITA
Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH., 227, 233 (2009).
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and the courts of using both objective evidence-based and subjective
expertise-based methods. As noted by the EMEA in its assessment of
approval methods,244 compared to alternative methods, hybrid
objective-subjective models effectively weigh uncertainties inherent
to drug development and regulation as well as different stakeholder
interests.245 Interest balancing of this nature can be seen to operate in
a patent law context in two ways. First, the patent bargain evolved
over time to encourage risk-taking behavior in exchange for a patent
monopoly only on inventions with sufficient public benefit. Similarly,
patents are granted only for inventions that are sufficiently novel, nonobvious, and useful. Sufficiency in both instances is decided using a
combination of subjective and objective methods. In a similar
manner, judges work the middle ground between the twin poles of
being overly “activist” (subjective) or “black letter” (objective) by
following statutory direction to base their decisions on the guidance
of the PHOSITA. As a result, their decisions are sufficiently evidencebased and expertise-based to heed the Constitutional mandate to
“[p]romote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” while also
avoiding appeal or judicial review.246 Given the tenacity of different
stakeholders in attempting to control the direction of pharmaceutical
law and policy, it is reasonable to say the utility of objectivesubjective hybrid models of decision-making can be reasonably
extended to creating an innovation index which balances the need of
various public and private stakeholders.
2. Intellectual Property Law Considerations
In addition to considerations revolving around the objective and
subjective nature of the model, the proposed method is also in line
with prevailing legal jurisprudence on the patent bargain. As noted
supra, the term “patent bargain” is typically taken to refer to the grant
of a limited patent monopoly in exchange for public disclosure of
socially valuable knowledge.247 In a public health context, where both
the availability and costs of brand and generic products are
determined by the trifecta of patent law, linkage law, and food and
drug law, the essence of the patent bargain is the exchange of
244. EMEA CHMP 2, supra note 209, at 3-6.
245. Id. at 5.
246. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
247. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966); KSR, 550 U.S. at 427;
Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, 1086 (Can.); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,
52 U.S. 248, 260 (1851); Free World Trust v. Électro Santé, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, 1049
(Can.).
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extended patent protection for spatiotemporally increasing drug
clusters for public health benefits that are proportional to the extended
market exclusivity granted to clusters. In more common parlance, the
term patent bargain means that inventors get what they pay for: if an
inventor provides society with substantial innovation in exchange for
a patent, that is what was intended by the patent bargain in the first
instance. The ancillary of this statement is that, if an inventor
provides society with a poor level of innovation the inventor does not
obtain the full monopoly, or market exclusivity. This second
statement assumes more importance under conditions where drug
approval is contingent on pharmaceutical linkage and where, as one
set of authors recently put it, “the era of the individual patent is
over.”248 Indeed, in nations that have brought in provisions for
pharmaceutical linkage, the same inventor has typically already
established a higher level innovation on the same or similar product
within a given cluster. A simple measure of how often this occurs can
be seen by the fact that the vast percentage of all brand approvals are
directed to Me Too drugs (81% in the MP Approval Cohort) and the
fact that, of these, 70% are for SNDS Me Too drugs.
In this way, the innovation index is in a position to do what the
patent bargain itself cannot; to discriminate between the qualitative
values of the first, second, third etc. order entrants in a complex
cluster of legally related drug approvals, patents, and listed patents. It
allows regulators to reward drug development in proportion to how
well firms innovate in the same or chemically-related product clusters
as time goes on. The patent bargain demands proportional incentive
for inventors and society but depends on the courts to arbitrate this
quality. This arbitration has become progressively more difficult for
all stakeholders to manage as the basket of patent and regulatory
rights attached to drug products has become progressively larger over
the last fifty years. This problem is most substantial in nations with
pharmaceutical linkage, as linkage not only conduces to product
clusters but also provides ample legal grounds for their
spatiotemporal growth over time.249 The index allows governments to
recalibrate the already recalibrated quid pro quo of the patent bargain
as it applies to pharmaceutical linkage. On the one hand, society
incentivizes, and pays for, innovators to innovate with a full patent
monopoly and monopoly pricing, but, on the other, it can withdraw a
248. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 51.
249. Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 443-44, 447-48; PATENTLY INNOVATIVE, supra
note 37, at 251, 255.
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portion of the monopoly on product clusters in proportion to how
poorly innovative the cluster evolves cumulatively over time.
The compound-indication classification data in Table 3 makes
this point, illustrating how the innovation index works for two drugs
moving through the approval system. The data show that, as a given
drug fans out over time from (a) initially presenting with significant
objective evidence of innovation, (b) evolves into a series of less
innovative products, and (c) then finally to products with the least
amount of innovation, the innovation index tracks and quantifies the
product lifecycle at each stage of cumulative drug development and
rewards or penalizes firms for their efforts over time. For example,
the first drug (Compound X; Indication A) begins life as a pioneering
drug. This compound moves through the new drug pathway (NDS),
contains a New Active Substance and is directed to a First in Class
chemical form or use, and goes through expedited review. Based on
the nomenclature used in this study, it receives the NDS MI
designation and has the highest LOI value, 15. After a time the drug
firm decides it is time for a line extension (Compound X; Indication
B), putting substantial effort into developing a new use. Indeed, based
on the data in this Article, there is a two-fold greater number of SNDS
FIC compared to NDS FIC drugs, so the example here is via the
SNDS route. A typical example is moving from one type of salt, ester,
crystalline, or dosage form to a second related form which still
qualifies as a FIC when combined with a new use e.g., indication. In
addition, even though the submission is directed to a line extension
drug, the compound meets an unmet medical need or has a sufficient
high benefit-risk to move through expedited review. Consequently,
while Compound X is “only” a line extension drug, the innovative
characteristics of the candidate are such that it receives a high LOI
value of 8, higher than three classes of new drugs. As the drug moves
through a second SNDS approval with fewer innovative
characteristics (here, a new, but likely related, use combined with
another change in the type of salt, ester, crystalline, or dosage form
employed), its LOI value goes down correspondingly (LOI= 6). The
drug moves through a third line extension phase, with no further FIC,
ER or Me Too designation, with a corresponding low LOI value
(LOI= 2). The final step in this drug’s product lifecycle is
genericization, with an LOI value= 1.
As illustrated by the second chemically-related drug (Compound
aX; Indication A-C), one does not have to begin the process of drug
development at the highest LOI value. Here we have NDS, FIC, and
NAS designations but lack the ER designation, which drops the value
to LOI= 9. However, the drug firm then goes through the SNDS route
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for the next round approval maintaining the ER designation while
exhibiting a new use (Compound aX; Indication B) in comparison to
its first generation parent drug (Compound aX; Indication A). For its
efforts, the brand firm receives a relatively high LOI= 8. The next
step in the product lifecycle is another chemically-related line
extension with a new use (Compound aX; Indication C), yielding an
LOI= 2. Over time, this drug too is genericized, dropping the LOI
value for the drug first to 1.0 (ANDS), then to 0.5 for the generic line
extension (SANDS).
From the examples in Table 3, it is not hard to imagine the wide
array of permutations and combinations of indicators across classes
owing to the broad range of potential mixes of new and follow-on
drug classes across indicators. An important attribute of the index,
therefore, is that it rewards innovators both at the new and follow-on
levels, provided they indeed innovate. As illustrated by the examples
in Table 3, it is possible in a number of ways for “line extension”
drugs to have higher LOI values than “new” drugs when class
evidentiary requirements vetted by regulators have been satisfied. To
the extent they do not in either category, the index penalizes firms
with a lower LOI value. Thus, the index rewards drug development in
proportion to the degree of innovation objectively demonstrated by
marketed products when they are gauged against publicly disclosed
regulatory priorities.
Based on the examples outlined above, the LOI values
determined by the innovation index reward pharmaceutical companies
for both new and follow-on drugs in proportion to the degree of
innovation gauged against publicly disclosed requirements and
priorities. As noted in Part V. Methods,250 the proportional output of
the index is particularly useful for assessing pharmaceutical products
given claims that incremental innovation in this sector may be
uniquely important to later breakthrough developments,251 but in and
of themselves.252 The proportionality function of the index is also
consistent with the claim by Jayadev and Stiglitz253 that an effective
reward structure for innovation should balance the marginal benefit
for products specifically targeted by innovation policy with their
250. See supra Part V.C.
251. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 101, at 79, 84.
252. See, e.g., DiMasi & Faden, supra note 35, at 23, 25; DiMasi & Paquette, supra note
35, at 12.
253. Arjun Jayadev & Joseph Stiglitz, Two Ideas to Increase Innovation and Reduce
Pharmaceutical Costs and Prices, HEALTH AFFAIRS, w165, w166 (Dec. 16, 2008),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/1/w165.full.pdf+html.
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marginal cost. In this regard, innovation is to be parsed in a manner
that extends beyond mere patentability,254 a claim that, as already
pointed out in Part II and III supra, takes on additional significance in
the context of a regulated therapeutic product lifecycle (rTPL) that is
dominated by the twin pillars of pharmaceutical linkage and clusterbased drug development.
C. Relevance to Pharmaceutical Law and Policy
1. Patent and Innovation Policy
As noted in the Introduction, much of what governments
understand about innovation is currently shaped by measurements of
patenting activity. If, as accumulating arguments suggest, patenting
behavior may not stimulate innovation to the degree assumed, or even
impede it in some circumstances, much of the empirical basis for
comparative evaluation of the innovative performance of industries
and countries is called into question, as is the effectiveness of
innovation policies that are linked closely or even exclusively to
providing stronger protection for intellectual property. The outcomes
of this debate will be particularly significant for future research policy
and strategy in technology-intensive sectors like pharmaceuticals,
where patents are generally considered to be essential to the business
models of drug companies.
Critics who argue that patents do not necessarily stimulate
innovation tend to allow at least partial exemption for the
pharmaceutical industry.255 Clinical drugs have long product cycles,
determined in part by the requirement to submit to external regulatory
processes. These can create substantial and unpredictable time-tomarket delays, which, given the limitations on patent terms, can
shorten the period during which the drug producer can generate
revenue from a new drug sufficient to recoup its development costs
and yield a profit. Especially in the face of escalating R&D costs,256
the argument is theoretically stronger that without some form of
extended intellectual property protection, the incentive to invest in
pharmaceutical R&D will diminish.257

254. Id. at w166.
255. Macdonald, supra note 44, at 136-37.
256. JOSEPH A. DIMASI, PRICE TRENDS FOR PRESCRIPTION PHARMACEUTICALS: 19951999 (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/Drug-papers/dimassi/dimasifinal.htm.
257. Cohen, supra note 101, at 80.
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As noted previously, public policy in many developed nations
still tends to presume a linear model of innovation, i.e., a product
“pipeline” that begins in universities, moves through private research
and development, and then to commercialization in the form of
products and services.258 This model implies a strong imperative to
legally protect knowledge that has been reduced to practice in the
form of limited-term monopolies.259 For pharmaceutical innovation,
the process is complicated by regulatory requirements to gain market
authorization, which is perceived as the output of the innovation
pipeline. Accordingly, there is a considerable body of policy that
identifies intellectual property rights, and, in particular, patent rights,
as the major economic driver of innovation, national productivity, and
translational research in the medical sciences.260
In light of this policy background, it is not surprising that one of
the claims of emerging lifecycle or “real world” models of drug
development is that many of the problems associated with the linear
model of innovation would be addressed in part through a new regime
of regulation, clinical testing, and intellectual property exploitation.261
258. See Bouchard & Lemmens, supra note 99; see generally VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE:
THE ENDLESS FRONTIER 14-15 (1945); DONALD E. STOKES, PASTEUR’S QUADRANT: BASIC
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (1997); Benoît Godin, The Linear Model of
Innovation: The Historical Construction of an Analytical Framework, 31 SCI. TECH. HUM.
VALUES 639, 639 (2006).
259. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 581
(1999); Simson L. Garfinkel, Patently Absurd, WIRED, July 1994, at 104, 140; James Gleick,
Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44; Lawrence Lessig, The Problem with
Patents, THE STANDARD (Apr. 23, 1999),
http://www.lessig.org/content/standard/0,1902,4296,00.html (site no longer available); Lemley,
supra note 7, at 1500-01.
260. In its “Roadmap for Medical Research,” the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH)
defines “translational research” as research that successfully makes the transition translated from
the laboratory bench to the patient bedside: “To improve human health, scientific discoveries
must be translated into practical applications. Such discoveries typically begin at ‘the bench’
with basic research—in which scientists study disease at a molecular or cellular level—then
progress to the clinical level, or the patient’s ‘bedside.’” Translational Research, NAT’L INSTS.
HEALTH, http://nihroadmap.nih.gov/clinicalresearch/overview-translational.asp (last visited Feb.
17, 2012). Similarly, the Canadian Institutes for Health Research (CIHR) has embedded the
concept of “knowledge translation” into its statutory mandate: “The objective of the CIHR is to
excel, according to internationally accepted standards of scientific excellence, in the creation of
new knowledge and its translation into improved health for Canadians, more effective health
services and products and a strengthened Canadian health care system.” Canadian Institutes of
Health Research Act, S.C. 2000, c. 6, § 4 (Can.). For discussion of research in the specific
context of commercialization of publically funded medical research, see generally KRIMSKY,
supra note 45; 1 EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, supra note 2; GUTHRIE & MUNNVENN, supra note 2, at i; COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 2, at 10, 32.
261. Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 112, 117.
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The rationale for this modified bargain between drug producers,
clinicians and regulators, is that by expanding patent and regulatory
rights protection, drug companies will have greater incentive to
produce more innovative new treatments and patients will benefit
from these treatments sooner.262 Obvious questions generated by this
new regime concern the degree to which there has been a positive
welfare effect for public health in terms of the availability and
effectiveness of new treatments in the clinical environment.263 If the
link between patent rights in particular and socially beneficial types of
innovation is indeed strong and direct, it can be inferred that both of
these outcomes should be affected positively. If, on the other hand,
the effect on these outcomes is small, neutral, or even negative, the
opposite inference could be made. The danger, of course, is to infer
too much from a primarily quantitative patent analysis.
Confusion over the value of patents and what kind of innovation
is most effectively incentivized by patents and regulatory preferences
raise several questions for research policy in the public sector. First, it
raises definitional and technical questions about how governments
conceptualize, monitor, and measure public investment in R&D. The
patenting system provides one of very few extensive, well organized,
and easily accessible sources of data about the production of
inventions by firms and individuals. Accordingly, on the assumption
that invention is at least one of the most significant inputs into
innovation, governments in developed nations rely heavily upon
patent data as one of the main general indicators of innovation
activity at firm, industry, and country levels. Second, it raises
fundamental policy questions as to whether strengthening the patent
regime will yield more positive outcomes in terms of the commercial
exploitation of new knowledge, especially where this knowledge is
produced with public funding264 and is intended to have substantial
public value.265
262. Eichler et al., supra note 3, at 825; Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 86, 118.
263. See ANGELL, supra note 4; Avorn, supra note 199, at 1927; Iglehart, supra note 199,
at 326; Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, at MM38,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/magazine/19healthcaret.html?pagewanted=all; Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Use of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in HealthCare Resource Allocation Decision-Making: How Are Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds Expected
to Emerge?, 7 VALUE IN HEALTH 518, 520-21 (2004).
264. Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 67, at 337; Bouchard 2007, supra note 99, at 127,
134.
265. Richard R. Nelson, The Advance of Technology and the Scientific Commons, 361
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 1691, 1691-92 (2003). See generally KRIMSKY, supra note
45.
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The qualitative innovation index reported here may fill some of
the gaps in patent valuation discussed above. First, the innovation
index provides a qualitative measure of patent quality that is specific
to the products being assessed. That is, the index is based on
regulatory preferences for various types of new and follow-on drugs.
As noted elsewhere, these regulatory preferences accord with the
legal values and mechanisms underpinning public health policy.266
The result is not only a graded index, but also an index that reflects
the social value of the products being valued. This differs not only
from counting patents, patent cites, and related litigation data, but
may also help to avoid incurring the costs of unnecessary litigation.267
As policy-makers no longer need to wait for licensing or litigation to
occur, decisions regarding policy and law making can be made earlier
and more rapidly.
Moreover, the index is sufficiently flexible to be used at several
stages of the product lifecycle and for multiple purposes within a
given stage of drug development. For example, the innovation index
may be used to assess the quality of approval, patents, and chemicals
during the approval stage, when regulators are making important
decisions as to expedited review. For products that receive early
approval compared to other products, it allows continual assessment
of products through the post-market surveillance stage. It is plausible
to assume that governments might customize the index by using
progressively greater multipliers to increase or decrease the
innovation value of serial products that occupy the same NDS or,
particularly, SNDS, class under conditions where no other class value
changes but where there has been a small but significant increase in
benefit-risk to permit approval. This would allow detailed
discrimination of the innovative value of serial line extensions within
a given drug cluster. Similarly, the index is sufficiently flexible to be
customized by other nations that have regulatory approval
frameworks using different approval nomenclature for new and
follow-on drugs, provided that the drug classes assessed are grounded
in a parallel evidence-based system of rational decision-making.
266. See supra Part V.A-B (for the reasoning underpinning the specific increments in LOI
with regulatory prioritization); Bouchard 2012, supra note 75, at Part VI.A-B.
See also Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1507-10 (providing the rationale for describing a
given drug as “new and innovative”); Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 106-11
(providing a purposive analysis and a plain reading analysis of the terms “new” and
“innovative”).
267. See generally Grootendorst et al., supra note 42, at 6-7, 10.
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Similarly, the index may provide a flexible means for governments to
qualify technology-based indicators outside of drug products,
provided that regulatory requirements and prioritizations are publicly
disclosed and rationally justified by regulators.
Regarding market push-pull mechanisms, data from the
innovation index may be useful for drug pricing or payer
reimbursement systems. For example, weighting methods could be
employed to underscore the value of different drug classes for costing
and reimbursement depending on desired public health and economic
endpoints. As noted in the literature,268 linking drug price, and thus
reimbursement, to a metric of social value for pharmaceuticals will
incentivize drug manufacturers to produce products with value
beyond Me Too and line extension drugs. The index reported here
circumvents criticism relating to the lack of empirical data in the
pharmaceutical sector as well as criticisms to the effect that new
chemical entities (equivalent to NDS NAS here) are too often treated
as the most innovative drugs. On the other hand, the index could also
be used to provide objective evidence of the need for governments to
support pharmaceutical R&D for specific types of high risk-high
reward drug products. For example, the innovation index analysis
identifies which drug classes represent the lowest common
denominator for the most innovative new drugs approved by
regulators. These data in turn could be used to develop specific drug
targets for layering of innovation incentives, including extended
patent and regulatory rights.
Finally, there has been substantial criticism and wide pendulum
swings in relation to the value of incremental innovation in the
pharmaceutical sector that may be mitigated by the innovation index
described in this Article. The reason for making this statement is that
the innovation index rewards brand pharmaceutical companies
equally for both new and follow-on drugs. It rewards firms in
proportion to the degree of innovation expressed through the relevant
LOI value. Thus, follow-on drugs cannot be simply dismissed based
on their incremental nature alone.
Provided that brand firms innovate, and the LOI evidence
presented in relation to the MP Patent Cohort and MP Chemical
Cohort indicates that they do, in the follow-on category, there should
be a proportional reward. This reward applies both to drug approvals
and patents associated with these drugs. The data reported here
suggest that if there is one area of particular concern to policy-makers
268.

Jayadev & Stiglitz, supra note 253, at w166; see also Hollis, supra note 35, at 1189.
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and drug makers it is the NDS FIC designation. The reason for this
conclusion is that low levels of NDS FIC drugs pulled down the value
for the most innovative drugs (NDS MI) in all four indicators studied.
Thus, the NDS FIC group may be an excellent target for the
development of customized innovation incentives of the type referred
to above.
2. Listing of Patents on the Patent Register
The two competing policy goals underpinning pharmaceutical
linkage are to stimulate the development of new and innovative drugs
while also facilitating the timely entry of generic drugs.269 One of the
greatest nodes of resistance to the latter policy goal is the practice of
brand firms to list multiple patents on the patent register in order to
delay generic entry. In this light, it is possible that the innovation
index reported here could be used as a tool by governments to list
patents on the patent register according to their LOI value.
A time and intellectual property-sensitive definition for listing of
patents under linkage law is consistent with policy debates preceding
the coming into force of Hatch-Waxman in the United States270 and
the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations in
Canada.271 While acknowledging that multiple patents could be listed
on the patent register in the context of Hatch-Waxman, the legislative
Committee on Energy and Commerce noted that the ability of brand
firms to delay generic entry should be narrow both in scope and time;
the proper time for generic entry being “the expiration date of the
valid patent covering the original product” and that “there should be
no other direct or indirect method of extending patent term.”272 A
report by the sister Committee on the Judiciary similarly
269. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14-15, 17, 19 (1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at
30 (1984); Regulations Amending the Food and Drug Regulations (1390—Data Protection), 138
C. Gaz. pt. I, 3712, 3718 (2004).
270. Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 58.
271. Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/2011-93-133 (Can.).
272. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 46.
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to grant
exclusive rights to an inventor for a limited time. That limited time should be a
definite time and, thereafter, immediate competition should be encouraged. For
that reason, Title I of the bill permits the filing of abbreviated new drug
applications before a patent expires and contemplates that the effective approval
date will be the expiration date of the valid patent covering the original product.
Other sections of Title II permit the extension of the term of a patent for a
definite time provided certain conditions are met. There should be no other direct
or indirect method of extending patent term.
Id.
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acknowledged that FDA rules restricting generic entry prior to HatchWaxman “had serious anti-competitive effects” and that the “net
result of these rules has been the practical extension of the monopoly
position of the patent holder beyond the expiration of the patent.”273
The report went further stating that it “accepted the rationale . . .
concerning the need to avoid multiple patent term extensions” to the
effect that “the only patented product which experiences any
substantial regulatory delay is the first product patent (or if there is no
product patent, the first process patent).”274 As a result, any
“subsequent patents on approved drug products are frequently not the
same magnitude of innovation as occurs with respect to the initial
patent” and that “on public policy and health policy grounds that only
the first patent on a drug-type product should be extended.”275 An
analogous approach was taken by the federal government in Canada
before the NOC Regulations came in; a new and innovative drug was
said to have “[one] main patent” and “w[h]en that main patent
expires, anyone may copy that product and bring it to market.”276
Thus, there is substantial evidence in both the United States and
Canada that the nexus between drug approval and patents should be
narrow, both in scope and time.
From the above discussion, it is clear that a certain degree of
expediency with regard to generic entry was articulated by North
American policy makers in the context of linkage, and that this
expediency was limited both in time and scope regarding patents that
were amenable to listing on the patent register in order to delay
generic entry. However, up to this point, there have been few means
at the disposal of drug regulators to gauge which patents should be
listed on the register.277 Regulators, in the absence of knowledge
relating to patent validity, have settled on such broad definitions for
listing such as whether the patent listed was in relation to an NDS or
SNDS category, or whether listing was deemed relevant to a general
drug form or a form that is specific to the submission for which it was
listed as determined by the courts.278 Deliberations of this nature by
drug regulators globally have come under fire.279 Indeed, there is
273. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4.
274. Id. at 8.
275. Id.
276. Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 104.
277. Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 180; Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 412-13, 421.
278. Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations,
142 C. Gaz. pt. II, 1586, 1588-90 (2008).
279. EC Preliminary Report, supra note 91, at 261; Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, No.
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ample public policy in Canada,280 the United States,281 the European
Union,282 and India283 to the effect that assessing patents is beyond the
purview of drug regulatory agencies. There is also Supreme Court
jurisprudence to this effect in Canada284 and India,285 although,
interestingly, these courts reached opposite conclusions on the same
point of law.286 Importantly, the issue of how weak patents can delay
generic entry is not limited to nations with pharmaceutical linkage.
The lack of expertise by regulators to assess patent value was used
explicitly by European policy-makers to reject union-wide
pharmaceutical linkage laws.287
The innovation index described in this paper potentially provides
regulators with a tool to decide which patents should be placed on the
register that is rational, evidence-based, and sufficiently flexible to
identify the qualitative value of approval, patents, and listed patents at
various stages of regulatory approval. It is flexible enough such that
governments that oversee linkage regimes in different global
jurisdictions can modify the index according to their own policy
debates or to provide the means of doing so to an independent
regulatory authority, much like that already done for drug pricing
LPA 443/2009, ¶ 14, 28 (Delhi H.C. Feb. 9, 2010) (India), available at
http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/SMD/judgement/09-02-2010/SMD09022010LPA4432009.pdf. For more
recent empirically based criticism of patent listing, see, for example, Bouchard 2010, supra note
51; Bouchard 2011, supra note 32; Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33; C. Scott Hemphill &
Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents? (Columbia Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 379, 2011).
280. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 56872 (Can.); Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2003] 3 F.C. 140, 149-51
(Can.); Wyeth Canada v. Ratiopharm Inc., [2007] 60 C.P.R. (4th) 375, para. 22 (Can.).
281. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33, at 8 n.13.
282. EC Final Report, supra note 72, at 130-31.
283. See Bayer Corp., No. LPA 443/2009 at 17.
284. AstraZeneca, 2 S.C.R. 560 at para. 12.
285. Bayer Corp., No. LPA 443/2009 at 17.
286. Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 422-24.
287. This issue was discussed more fully in the context of a comparative analysis of global
pharmaceutical law and policy. See id. at 440-42. See also EC Final Report, supra note 72, at
315 n.514:
Article 81 of Regulation (EC) 726/2004 and Article 126 of Directive (EC)
2001/83 provide that an authorisation to market a medicinal product shall not be
refused, suspended or revoked except on the grounds set out in the Regulation
and the Directive. Considering that patent status is not included in the grounds set
out in the Regulation and the Directive, it cannot be used as an argument to
refuse, suspend or revoke a marketing authorisation. The Commission may
launch infringement proceedings against any Member State which infringes the
Directive.
Id.
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alone288 and in combination with comparative effectiveness
considerations,289 and high risk-high reward drug development.290
In providing a qualitative index that grades, so to speak, the
value of the various components making up a pharmaceutical product
cluster, it is recognized that the patent system may not be a “one size
fits all” system. This is because some of the drugs and patents in a
product cluster (assuming all patents are equally easy to obtain) will
be of low value while others will be of high value. A grading system
of this nature may be particularly useful under circumstances where
there are a great many patents in the product cluster and it is not clear
which patents have the most relevance to a drug product that has
already been determined to be “new and “innovative.” In counting
studies, one must wait for sufficient licensing, prior art, and litigation
data to be gathered. During this gap, patentees maintain monopolies
on potentially poorly innovative products,291 and it is reasonable that
firms will pass on the costs of both to consumers sooner or later. The
costs of a system of this nature would be proportional to the degree
that it allows weak or poorly innovative patents to maintain market
exclusivity on earlier breakthrough drugs.
Therefore, a major attribute of the innovation index described in
this Article is that it potentially allows assessment of a patent’s value
before licensing or litigation and, indeed, independent of both. The
practical utility of such an index would increase in proportion to the
prevalence of product clusters and patent portfolios, and where only a
small percentage of issued patents actually have commercial value.292

288. PATENTED MEDICINE PRICES REVIEW BOARD, ANNUAL REPORT 2000 18 (2001),
available at http://www.pmprbcepmb.gc.ca/cmfiles/Publications/Annual%20Reports/2000/ar00e712NOE-482003-8656.pdf.
289. Adrian Towse & Trevor Leighton, The Changing Nature of NCE Pricing of Second
and Subsequent Entrants, in RISK AND RETURN IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 91, 95-96
(Jon Sussex & Nick Marchant eds., 1999); About the Common Drug Review, CAN. AGENCY
DRUGS & TECH. HEALTH, http://www.cadth.ca/en/products/cdr/cdr-overview (last visited Feb.
18, 2012). For review of relevant Comparative Effectiveness Research, pricing and rationing
literature, see references in, supra note 199.
290. See Gardiner Harris, A New Federal Research Center Will Help to Develop
Medicines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, at A1, A25.
291. See, e.g., FTC 2002, supra note 34, at 6-7; Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at
113; Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1495; Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 38, at 13-14;
Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33, at 2-4; HORE, supra note 34, at 276-377.
292. For a discussion of patent value generally, see, for example, Lemley, supra note 7;
Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7. For a discussion of patent value in the context of
fractional listing on the patent register in nations with pharmaceutical linkage, see, for example,
Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 130-33; Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 194;
Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, 1509-12.
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The qualitative value of the index may also be enhanced where, as
appears to be true in the pharmaceutical sector,293 the average value of
patents is low compared to other industries.294 Indeed, we have
previously shown that high value drugs typically have between 40 and
50 patents per drug.295 A significant number of these patents are listed
on the patent register to delay generic entry, the number of which
generally increases with drug profitability.296 From the perspective of
both drug regulators and competing generic firms, it is difficult to
know which of these patents are associated with a “new and
innovative” product other than merely being associated with a
blockbuster drug.297 While profit offers some measure of patent value,
at least with regard to the percentage of patents that are listed on the
register,298 it is nevertheless a post hoc indicator and is of little help to
regulators at the earlier stages in the product development and
litigation processes where the need to understand which patents
should be listed on the register arises. If, as is more or less true today,
one arbitrarily lists all patents on the register and then waits to assess
value of patents as a result of litigation, neither regulators, competing
firms, nor the public have any way of knowing which of the patents
on a given drug have value before events reach the so-called black
swan stage.299
The index described here goes at least some way to rectifying
these problems, as regulators have the ability to calculate the
innovation index value not only before the drug is approved, but also
on a running basis while the drug moves through its product lifecycle.
This observation does no violence to the integrity of the patent
bargain, as patents were always intended to provide reward to an
inventor in proportion to the benefit gained by society from disclosing
293. Lemley, supra note 7; Schankerman, supra note 21.
294. Lemley, supra note 7, at 1529-30; Pakes, supra note 28, at 779.
295. Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 192; Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1495, 1499.
296. Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 194; Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1498-99. See
also Grootendorst et al., supra note 42, at 5-7.
297. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 279.
298. Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 194, 204-05; Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at
1493; Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 279, at 23.
299. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE (2007). The Black Swan Theory developed by Nassim Taleb refers to the notion
that high-impact events (and it is fair to say low impact ones too that don’t receive attention at
the time) often come as a surprise to observers. It is only post hoc, or after the fact, that events
are rationalized through hindsight. This dilemma is, of course, very familiar to the intellectual
property bar in the form of a caution to avoid hindsight in patentability analyses such as
obviousness. Indeed, this very dilemma led the U.S. Supreme Court to accept the U.S. Solicitor
General’s recommendation supporting certiorari in KSR.
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the invention and offering it for sale to the public. To this one can add
the further obligation on patentees to provide to society benefits that
are proportional not just to the value of a single patent, but in
proportion to the rewards emanating from the entire product cluster in
which the patents are embedded. Because leading patent law in both
jurisdictions where linkage first came into existence explicitly accepts
this view of the patent bargain,300 including in linkage cases
specifically,301 an index based on the principal of reciprocity would be
internally consistent with the first principles of patent law.
3. Cluster-Based Drug Development
Empirical data demonstrating that, not only are there a
substantial number of patents that are of low worth,302 but that even
when drug patents do have value, this value is much lower than
expected,303 already provide a good answer to the question of why it
is necessary to qualify intellectual property. The impetus for doing so
in the context of pharmaceutical linkage is increased considerably.
This follows the possible scaling effects of a portfolio-based strategy
for drug development304 that provides an opportunity for weak or
worthless patents to nevertheless restrain competition.305 Portfoliobased innovation strategies can lead to consolidation of invention
within or between groups of firms that are focused on narrowly
defined or jointly developed products.306 A narrowing of innovation
objectives of this nature would have increased social costs to the
extent that the resulting products conflict with policy directives by
governments to use patent and linkage law specifically to encourage
the development of new and innovative drugs while also facilitating
the timely entry of generic substitutes.307 In addition to a narrower
300. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418-19 (2007); Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6, 9 (1966); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 265 (1851); Free World
Trust v. Électro Santé, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, para. 3, 13 (Can.); Whirlpool Corp. v.
Camco, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, para. 37 (Can.).
301. See Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533 (Can.);
see also AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560 (Can.).
302. See Lemley, supra note 7, at 1499.
303. See Schankerman, supra note 21, at 93.
304. See Kingston, supra note 48, at 332; see also Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra
note 7, at 62.
305. See Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1510-11.
306. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 71.
307. See JOHN DINGELL, COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, REPORT ON DRUG PRICE
COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1
(1984); see also KASTENMEIER, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON DRUG PRICE
COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984, H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2
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range of products, patent portfolios could also be used to achieve a
greater share of market power, or more prolonged market exclusivity
per cluster, than would otherwise be available.308 Finally, as claimed
by Hollis, the more brand firms focus on Me Too products, the less
they can focus on breakthrough products.309
In our previous work, we hypothesized that product clusters
enabled by linkage laws might reflect the prevailing drug
development strategy by multinational drug firms.310 These clusters
were hypothesized to comprise an expanding number of new and
follow-on drugs over time centered on a single new and original drug.
Products in the cluster are surrounded by a constellation of patents, all
of which are interconnected between products within a given cluster
through different forms of patent law. These patents serve two
primary functions. First, they provide support for follow-on drug
development within the cluster via traditional infringement law.
Second, they provide fodder for listing patents on the patent register
in order to delay generic entry via newer forms of linkage laws.
Importantly, generic entry may be delayed not only for the original
new and innovative drug, but also for all other follow-on drugs in the
cluster for which the patents are deemed legally relevant.
Of note to law-makers and other relevant stakeholders, the
capacity of a product cluster to delay generic entry is a specific
function of patent law operating in conjunction with linkage law and
food and drug law. At least in our hands, the scope of the legal nexus
between patent law and food and drug law depends on at least four
discrete mechanisms provided for by law: the type of drug
submission, the type of drug patent, the legal standard for patent
listing, and how many patents are listed on the patent register.311 As
such, the nexus can be broad or narrow. The lower the evidentiary
standard for new or follow-on drug approval, the easier patents are to
come by, the easier it is to list patents on the patent register, and the
more patents that can be listed on the patent register, the weaker the
legal nexus between approval and patenting and the greater the ability
of patents to support a long-term product cluster.
Similar observations have been made in the European Union,

(1984).
308. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 66-67.
309. See Hollis, supra note 35, at 1189.
310. See Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37; see also Bouchard 2011, supra note 32;
see also PATENTLY INNOVATIVE, supra note 37.
311. Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 130.
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where certain provisions in domestic patent laws and food and drug
laws of Member States have been effectively gamed by brand firms to
create a kind of “ghost linkage” system of drug regulation.312 Indeed,
the European Commission (E.C.) Pharmaceutical Enquiry recently
reported several instances where member nations have attempted to
institute pharmaceutical linkage regimes even though European
Union law prohibits linkage.313 Evidence in support of ghost linkage
is provided by the wide-sweeping detailed empirical investigation of
strategies and behaviors of brand and generic pharmaceutical firms
conducted by the European Commission. The report of the
Commission gives rise to reasonable speculation supporting the
concept of ghost linkage, even though the Commission explicitly
concluded that pharmaceutical linkage is contrary to the law of the
European Union.314 The implications of the report for cluster-based
drug development not only arise at the level of infringement-based
litigation between brand and generic firms, but span a wide range of
legal and regulatory activities relating to drug approval, patenting,
pricing, promotion, reimbursement, and cross-border movement.315
The starting point for a comparison of pharmaceutical law in
jurisdictions with and without linkage is relevant public policy.
Indeed, in its Final Report, the Commission notes that EU policy is
“committed to the promotion of innovation through industrial
property rights, including patents” and that such promotion is in
service of “high quality patents granted in efficient and affordable
procedures and providing all stakeholders with the required legal
certainty.”316 In the next paragraph, the Commission goes on to say:
At the same time, it is generally acknowledged that public budgets,
including those dedicated to cover health expenditure, are under
significant constraints. Competition, in particular competition
provided by generic medicines, is essential to keep public budgets
under control and to maintain widespread access to medicines to

312. See PATENTLY INNOVATIVE, supra note 37, at 247.
313. See EC Final Report, supra note 72, at 315. This theme is extensively developed in
the EC Pharmaceutical Report. See also EC Preliminary Report, supra note 91.
314. EC Final Report, supra note 72, at 315-16. This theme is developed extensively in
the EC Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary Report. See also EC Preliminary Report,
supra note 91, at 14, 113. The Commission states, “Patent-linkage is considered unlawful under
Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 and Directive (EC) No 2001/83.” EC Preliminary Report, supra
note 91, at 15.
315. See generally EC Final Report, supra note 72.
316. Id. at 12.
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The Commission underscored the point that generic medicines should
reach the market without unnecessary or unjustified delay, and that to
fully benefit from the cost savings brought about by generic products,
its Member States would need to have in place policies that facilitate
timely generic uptake in terms of both volume and price
competition.318
Statements such as these are fully in line with policy grounds
said to underpin linkage in both originating North American
jurisdictions319 and, indeed, much global innovation policy. As
observed by one commentator, the Commission’s report is predicated
on the assumption that patent protection favors competition because it
encourages investments into new and innovative products by brand
firms while also encouraging the marketing of generics at lower
prices; cost savings from generics feeding back into the system,
which in turn contributes to positive consumer welfare outcomes and
creates incentives for further innovation.320 Thus, the policy grounds
for pharmaceutical law in the European Union are very similar to
those in jurisdictions with linkage that explicitly speak of the need to
balance the competing goals of stimulating the development of new
and innovative drugs and facilitating timely generic entry.
One of the greatest concerns in jurisdictions with formal linkage
regimes is that the combination of a weak relevance requirement for
patent listing and the grant of weak patents combine to delay generic
entry on patents that are potentially invalid or not infringed by generic
substitutes. An important observation in this regard is that the
majority of brand claims as to validity or infringement in litigation
between brand and generic firms were unsustainable on review by the
court.321 Data reported in the E.C.’s Preliminary Report illustrate that
generic firms won the majority of all patent litigations reported in
which a final judgment was delivered (62%), whereas brand firms
were successful in considerably fewer cases (38%).322 When initiated
by generic firms in litigation that can be seen to be analogous to that
which begins under linkage, generic companies won nearly three
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 407-08; see also Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra
note 37, at 108-09.
320. Shan Hu, European Commission Issues Report on Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, 15
COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 27, 27 (2009) (citing EC Final Report, supra note 72, at 29).
321. See, e.g., EC Preliminary Report, supra note 91, at 265 fig.118.
322. Id. at 188.
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quarters of all patent cases (71%).323 By comparison, brand firms
were successful in slightly over half of the cases they initiated
(51%).324 Not dissimilar to early qualitative and quantitative data on
linkage in the United States325 and Canada,326 cumulative E.U. data
indicated that generic companies won in excess of 60% of all patent
litigation. As noted by the Commission, this outcome was achieved at
the expense of repetitive, lengthy, and costly litigation before
different national jurisdictions, with the result of increased costs to
consumers and increased financial and legal uncertainty for generic
firms.327
Of specific relevance to the product cluster theory of drug
development, generic companies won nearly 75% of all cases
concerning secondary patents on follow-on drugs.328 By contrast,
brand firms were successful in slightly greater than one quarter of
litigations over such patents.329 As noted by the Commission, this
litigation led to a substantial delay of generic entry and increased
costs to the system.330 The Commission also found clear evidence
relating to portfolio-based innovation despite the lack of linkage
laws.331 As stated by the Commission: “[o]ne common strategy is the
creation of patent clusters by the filing of numerous additional patents
for the same medicine.”332
The report continued, “[t]he strategy today is to try and provide a
solid protection for the substance (has a limited time though) and a
portfolio protecting different aspects of product providing extended
protection both in breadth and time but inevitable less solid and
robust.”333 Before the end of the 1980s, pharmaceutical products were
comprised mainly of NCE/NAS drugs “which were protected by one
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. FTC 2002, supra note 34, at vi.
326. HORE, supra note 34, at 11.
327. EC Preliminary Report, supra note 91, at 188.
328. Id. at 189.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 5.
331. For a full discussion of patent clusters, see EC Final Report, supra note 72, at 183-92
(Figures 59-60 are especially relevant). See also id. at 14-15, 60-61; EC Preliminary Report,
supra note 91, at 5, 9-10, 154-59.
332. European Comm’n, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry - Preliminary Report: Fact Sheet:
“Originator-Generic Competition”, at 1 (July 8, 2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/2_Originator_Generic_competit
ion.pdf [hereinafter EC Fact Sheet].
333. Id. (quoting an originator company confirming objective to delay or block market
entry of generic medicines).
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patent.” However, by the early 1990s the intellectual property
protection scheme had changed to encompass “[e]xpansion of the
portfolio to cover lifecycle initiatives, to extend protection time for
product and the breadth of the protection trying to keep competition
further away.”334
Using a strategy familiar to those in jurisdictions with linkage
laws, brand firms in the European Union were reported to frequently
attempt to transition patients using brand products facing imminent
loss of exclusivity to follow-on products from the same company. The
Commission found that brand firms launched such follow-on drugs in
relation to 40% of the medicines in the sample selected for
investigation, which had lost exclusivity between 2000 and 2007.335
The launch of follow-on drugs is accompanied by intensive marketing
efforts designed to convert patients to follow-on drugs before generic
entry,336 with the result that generic entry and generic market share
once entry is accomplished is delayed and reduced.337
The Commission further noted that brand firms file an onerous
number of patent applications in order to create “patent clusters”
around one product, and that the result of this strategy is an increase
in the number of weak patents.338 An increase in weak patents is
supported by the finding that, in patent litigation between brand and
generic firms, the majority of litigated patents were revoked. 339 Not
surprisingly, the picture is bleaker when follow-on patents are
assessed where generic firms won nearly three quarters (74%) of all
cases concerning secondary patents in which a final judgment was
levied. By contrast, brand firms won only one quarter of cases over
follow-on patents (26%).340 The Commission found that generic firms
won the vast majority of litigation over second medical use patents
(83%), and had equal success challenging first medical use patents,
with final judgments favoring generics in “the overwhelming majority
of litigations (88% of all cases) compared to only 12% in favor of the
originator party.”341

334. EC Final Report, supra note 72, at 188 (quoting an originator company illustrating a
trend to broader and more patents).
335. See EC Fact Sheet, supra note 332, at 4-5; see also EC Final Report, supra note 72,
at 354, 367.
336. EC Final Report, supra note 72, at 351.
337. Id. at 365-66.
338. EC Preliminary Report, supra note 91, at 190, 521.
339. See EC Final Report, supra note 72, at 224.
340. See id. at 226.
341. See id. at 227.
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The product cluster approach is also the focal point of the
Commission’s assessment of the “toolkit” of drug strategies employed
by brand firms in order to delay generic entry using loopholes in
relevant drug law. The Commission found that brand firms “use a
variety of strategies and instruments to maintain revenue streams
from their medicines, in particular blockbusters, for as long as
possible.”342 These practices can “delay generic entry and lead to
healthcare systems and consumers paying more than they would
otherwise have done for medicines.”343 The strategies identified by
the Commission include: (1) strategic patenting, (2) patent disputes
and litigation, (3) patent settlements, (4) interventions before national
regulatory authorities, and (5) lifecycle strategies for follow-on
products.344
While it was noted that the intended effects of patent clusters to
delay generic entry is “generally in line with the underlying objectives
of patent systems,” the strategy nevertheless appears to be aimed
exclusively at “excluding competition and not at safeguarding a
viable commercial development of own innovation covered by the
clusters.”345 The Commission elaborated in its report, stating that the
“denser the web created by patent clusters . . . the more difficult it
will be for a generic company to bring its generic version of the
original pharmaceutical to the market.”346 The strategy for the
extension of exclusivity in the context of patent clusters was seen to
be:
[E]ven though the main patent protecting the product, e.g. the basic
substance patent, may have expired, the generic version may still
infringe one of the multiple patents surrounding the original
pharmaceutical. This can occur either because patents cover all
economically interesting or viable salt forms, enantiomers or
formulations of the compound or all efficient ways of its
347
manufacturing.

Given that linkage allows brand pharmaceutical firms to do
formally (and up front) what they must expend greater time and
resources to do informally (around the back end) in jurisdictions
without linkage, it may be surmised that the pharmaceutical linkage

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

EC Fact Sheet, supra note 332, at 1.
Id.
Id.
EC Preliminary Report, supra note 91, at 161.
Id.
Id.
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regime presents the “path of least resistance” to cluster-based drug
development. This helps to understand why similar patent and drug
development strategies are being leveraged in jurisdictions with and
without linkage regimes. Nations cannot simply opt out of effective
linkage without going out of their way to ensure systems of ghost
linkage are not permitted.
From the discussion above it is plausible to conclude that patent
portfolio and product clustering comprise a dominant feature of
global pharmaceutical intellectual property law. Practices such as
these occur in nations with and without pharmaceutical linkage,
though it appears safe to say that nations with linkage offer the most
efficient economic path to cluster-based drug development. Using an
objective evidence-based mechanism such as the innovation index
described here to list patents on register only if they have an LOI
value deemed sufficient by federal regulators would provide a tool to
mitigate the negative effects of patent portfolios.348 Importantly, the
index tool is amenable to use at the level of the individual patent. This
would require minimal amendment to the section of the linkage
regulations dealing with patent listing.
It can be reasonably argued that firms will continue to engage in
the practice of defensive patenting and building patent portfolios.
However, the ability of the numerous layers of patents, drugs, and
listed patents to combine such that the whole is greater than the sum
of its parts can be restrained by limiting the listing of patents in
accordance to the qualitative framework set out in the innovation
index. In this way, only patents that are in relation to new and
innovative drugs and that would not improperly delay generic entry
would find their way onto the patent register.
4. Impact on Competition
The possibility of restrained competition in a system where drug
development, approval, and marketing are regulated by the trifecta of
patent law, linkage law, and food and drug law is potentially endless.
Here, three candidates have been identified by us and others that may
be working in an interactive manner to restrain competition.
Analogous to cluster-based drug development and patent portfolios, it
is possible that the three candidates interact together to yield a result
where the anti-competitive effects may be greater than the sum of the
three candidates in and of themselves.
348. See generally Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 51-66 (Part IV
specifically reviews the negative effects of portfolios).
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First, brand firms might be colluding with one another,349
leveraging a harmonized portfolio strategy to minimize both the
economic and legal risks and uncertainties involved in breakthrough
drug development.350 If this is so, we might expect to see a smaller
number of NAS drugs over time and a smaller fraction of NDS Me
Too and NDS FIC drugs while also seeing comparatively more SNDS
Me Too and FIC drugs. Indeed, the available evidence from our own
research appears to be consistent with this conclusion.351 Secondly,
competition between brand and generic firms may be restrained as a
result of listing multiple weak patents on the patent register in relation
to a single or multiple products in the cluster. In this case we might
expect to see abuses of the automatic stay and patent listing
provisions specifically undertaken to delay generic entry, consistent
with a large body of empirical evidence on point.352 The third
possibility is that brand and generic firms may be colluding with one
another, in which case we would expect to see abuses of the 180-day
exclusivity period for generics. This too seems to be supported by
wide evidence demonstrating settlement agreements to keep generics
off market to the detriment of the public.353
It could be argued that the locus for each of these nodes of
restrained competition is the multiple patent-listing model
encompassed by linkage laws. It is here that the three potential
implications of the innovation index for patent and innovation policy,
cluster-based drug development, and competition in the
pharmaceutical marketplace converge. The index provides a means to
qualify whether patents should be listed on the patent register, and
thus influence legal and other commercial interactions between brand
firms and between brand and generic firms. This conclusion is based
specifically on a reading of the law and policy of pharmaceutical
linkage that accords with the first principles of both statutory
interpretation and leading patent jurisprudence.354
349. Id. at 65-66.
350. Id. at 38-39.
351. Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75 at 98-99. See also Bouchard 2009, supra note
31, at 1488-89; Bouchard 2012, supra note 75, at 14-24.
352. Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1495-96. See also Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at
226-27; Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 114-16, 127-31.
353. Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 38 passim. See also Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33,
at 23-29; Bulow, supra note 38 passim; Avery, supra note 38 passim.
354. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1851); Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 8 (1966); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); R.C.A. Photophone,
Ld. v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp., (1936) 53 R.P.C. 167, 195 (A.C.) (Eng.); Farbwerke
Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v. Comm’r of Patents, [1966]
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Up to this point, listing of patents on the register has been based
on relevance ascribed by the courts to be either generally relevant to a
drug product355 or relevant to the specific submission.356 Even the
latter interpretation has not prevented a significant number of patents
being listed on the register to prevent generic entry.357 The issue of
listing is an important one for nations with linkage regulations owing
to the fact that as high as 50-75% of all listed and litigated patents are
invalid.358 As noted by Hemphill and Lemley,359 that the number of
patents deemed by courts to be invalid has dropped in the last few
years is not cause for confidence in the linkage system, as the number
of settlements between brand and generic firms has increased
reciprocally. Invalid patents are known to drive up the costs of rivals
and increase legal uncertainty. As such, they are deemed to be anticompetitive and contrary to the public interest.360 Therefore, any
mechanism which reduces the listing of potentially invalid patents on
the patent register before litigation occurs, and enhances competition
between pharmaceutical firms would be a social benefit.
The index provides regulators with an objective evidence-based
method to allow or disallow listing on the register in accordance with
the original policy goal of protecting only drugs that are new and
innovative and that patents listed on the register should be narrowly
circumscribed both in scope and time.361 Rather than simply using
specific new or follow-on drug status to trigger listing, the innovation
index allows a more discrete and rational basis for which to select
patents on the register. Listing can be triggered by a certain level of
innovation, independent of whether patents are associated with, or
primarily associated with, new or follow-on drugs. Moreover, as
noted above, different multipliers can be used for serial innovation
S.C.R. 604 (Can.); R. v. Nova Scotia Pharm. Soc’y, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 (Can.); Whirlpool
Corp. v. Camco, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, 1086-87 (Can.); Free World Trust v. Électro Santé,
Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, 1035 (Can.).
355. Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Canada, [2003] 3 F.C. 140, 155 (Can.).
356. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 57476 (Can.); see also Wyeth Canada v. Ratiopharm Inc., [2007] 60 C.P.R. (4th) 375 (Can.).
357. See Grootendorst et al., supra note 42, at 6-7.
358. See FTC 2002, supra note 34, at 17, 20; see also HORE, supra note 34, at 5; Lemley,
supra note 7, at 1496; Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33, at 16.
359. See Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33.
360. Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91
MINN. L. REV. 101 passim (2006).
361. The U.S. Committee on Commerce, Committee on the Judiciary, and Government of
Canada stipulate clearly that the nexus between patent law and linkage law is to be kept to an
absolute minimum for identical policy reasons in both jurisdictions. See Bouchard 2011, supra
note 32, at 432; Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 113.
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increments within a given drug category or class, thus providing
regulators with a more detailed, but still evidence-based, criteria for
patent listing.362
Finally, as noted above, there has been wide criticism of the role
of regulatory agencies to take jurisdiction to select patents on the
register based on the lack of expertise as to patent quality.363 The
innovation index side-steps this problem to a significant degree. This
is because it is grounded in regulatory value preferences expressed by
public health agencies exercising their mandate to set evidentiary
benchmarks for an “increase in benefit-risk,” “unmet medical need,”
or “significant advance in therapeutic value” required for approval in
the various new and follow-on drug classes.364 Such decisions, unlike
those relative to patent validity, are wholly within the expertise and
mandates of health agencies such as the FDA, Health Canada, and
EMEA.
VIII. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
A qualitative innovation index for pharmaceuticals is described
that provides a measure of patent quality that is specific to
pharmaceutical products. The index is based on regulatory
preferences and evidentiary requirements for various types of new
and follow-on drugs and yields a method that is not only graded
incrementally but reflects the social value of the products being
valued. Importantly, the innovation index rewards innovation both in
the new drug approval stream and for follow-on approvals. The index
rewards equally in proportion to the degree of innovation evidenced
by the resulting products. Given that policy-makers no longer need to
wait for licensing, litigation, or prior art citations to occur, the

362. See supra Part VII.C.1.
363. EC Preliminary Report, supra note 91, at 370; Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, WP(C)
No.7833/2008 (Delhi H.C. Aug. 18, 2009) (India). In AstraZeneca, the Supreme Court of
Canada held that that a general patent listing provision would allow undue evergreening, which
would be inconsistent with the intent of Parliament in enacting pharmaceutical linkage.
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 575-76 (Can.). A
broad interpretation of listing was seen by the court to undermine the balance sought by
Parliament between the objectives of food and drug law and patent law, with the result that the
public would not derive appropriate benefit from patent legislation—in this case from properly
listed patents. Id. For a discussion of the changing legal standard and intense debate surrounding
this standard in Canada, the United States, and globally, see, respectively, Bouchard,
MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 97-126; Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 181-82; Hemphill &
Lemley, supra note 33, at 29; Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 410-34.
364. See Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 85; Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114,
at 50-51.
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innovation index reported here may allow for regulatory decisions to
be made earlier and more rapidly. The index is sufficiently flexible to
be used at several stages of the product lifecycle, including during the
regulatory approval stage, post-market surveillance stage, and in the
context of deciding which patents should be properly listed on the
patent register in order to delay generic market entry. The index may
also provide regulators to make judgments about which types of
patents should be listed on the patent register under linkage laws in an
objective and evidence-based manner. Finally, the attribute of
flexibility may also lend itself to customization of the index by
jurisdictions with analogous food and drug law. Importantly,
customization is not limited to qualification of technology in the
pharmaceutical sector, but may be used to qualify any technologybased indicator, provided that regulatory requirements have been
stipulated and prioritized by federal or state regulators ahead of time.
The innovation index provides a means of weighing legitimate
patent protection against perceived societal benefit. As such, it yields
a qualitative measure of the innovative nature of drug patents that,
when compared to counting methods, may more adequately reveal the
outcome of development incentives for firms and regulating bodies
insofar as these parties have conflicting interests. The results from our
analysis indicate that it is not the most innovative or even strongly
innovative drugs that are attracting the greatest firm patenting effort.
Rather, when gauged against development priorities disclosed by
regulators, it is the least innovative drugs of all classes investigated
that display the strongest patenting efforts. The data obtained fully
support the conclusion that cluster-based, or portfolio-based, drug
development has become the dominant innovation strategy for both
brand and generic firms. An important conclusion from the analysis in
this regard is that the data suggest that the perception on the part of
governments, industry and the public to the effect that societal benefit
comes as a kind of “natural consequence” of patenting may need to be
reconsidered.
Taken together with earlier work from our group, the data
reported here continue to challenge the assumption that strong patent
rights are essential to motivate and increase the amount of high value
innovation in the pharmaceutical sector. The data also cast doubt on
the claim that public health goals can be well and efficiently met by
providing strong intellectual property incentives to private industry by
merging public health goals with industrial goals. As discussed in
terms of the regulated Therapeutic Product Lifecycle (rTPL) that
characterizes pharmaceutical products, blending of industrial and
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health policy goals may be ineffective and possibly counterproductive
in terms of public health outcomes. Indeed, avoidance of this
convergence of health and economic policy was explicitly claimed by
the European Union and India as grounds to reject pharmaceutical
linkage. More generally, the data provide empirical support to an
emerging consensus that stacking intellectual property rights may
actually be an inhibitor of innovation, particularly to the extent it pulls
firms away from high risk high reward drug development activities
towards lower risk but also high reward incremental innovation.
Data from this Article and the companion paper also provide a
number of important observations about the workings of the current
patent system alone and in conjunction with linkage regulations. The
strong negative correlation between the level of innovation and the
various classes of new and follow-on drug approvals, patents, and
related chemical components suggests that traditional patent
incentives, alone and in combination with linkage laws, are providing
poor encouragement for the development of breakthrough drug
products. Paradoxically, patent legislation working in tandem with
linkage laws and food and drug laws, seems to be providing a superb
incentive for the development of line extension drugs with low LOI
values, particularly SNDS Me Too drugs. Secondly, it is unlikely,
absent legislation to the contrary, that any new type of patent bargain
inherent to lifecycle models of drug regulation will change this result.
Data revealing the dominance of SNDS Me Too drugs suggest
that brand pharmaceutical firms are competing primarily within their
own drug development departments than with other brand firms. This
is suggested by the two-fold increase in all four SNDS Me Too
indicators compared to corresponding NDS Me Too indicators. The
data suggest that the main thrust of competition appears to have
shifted under the linkage regime away from brand-to-brand
competition to brand-to-generic competition. Support for this
conclusion is provided by the low level of innovation for the vast
majority of all approvals observed in this study and smaller number of
NDS NAS, NDS Me Too, and NDS FIC drugs compared to SNDS
Me Too and FIC drugs. Similarly, between 70-82% of all brand
approval and patenting activity in the Total Approval, MP Approval,
and MP Patent Cohorts was in relation to line extension drugs. As
noted above, the economic incentives for follow-on drugs generally
parallel, and are likely secondary to, the regulatory preference for
follow-on drugs. Evidence to support this conclusion is found in the
observation that 19 of the 25 most profitable drugs in recent years
were follow-on Me Too and follow-on FIC drugs, totaling an
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astounding $85,470,000 USD in sales in a single year.365
A related finding arises from the fact that the LOI index is based
on regulatory preferences that reflect comparatively higher LOI
values in drug classes that have the greatest benefit to society. Thus,
not only do the vast majority of drug approvals, patents, and chemical
components have a low qualitative LOI value, they also have a
comparatively low social value. This is a problem in and of itself with
regard to the output of the rational policy system as discussed above,
but is worsened knowing that these patents can be used
indiscriminately to extend the cumulative patent life on blockbuster
drugs. This offends both sides of the balance of pharmaceutical policy
in jurisdictions with pharmaceutical linkage. At one end of the legal
disequilibrium there is increased cumulative patent life on one or
more blockbuster drugs with a corresponding decrease in the “timely”
entry of generic substitutes. At the other end, there is a strong and
demonstrable decline in the production of truly “new and innovative”
drugs in favor of poorly innovative drugs, in particular follow-on Me
Too drugs. Combined these output of the system yield a greater legal
disequilibrium than with either output alone.
An outcome favoring brand pharmaceutical firms from the
innovation index analysis is that law-makers could allocate a greater
share of intellectual property and regulatory rights incentives for drug
classes underpinning NDS MI drug development. This would include
NDS FIC, NDS NAS, and NDS ER drugs. Given it is the lowest
common denominator in calculation of NDS MI values across
indicators, additional rights could be granted for drugs developed in
the NDS FIC class. For example, data and market exclusivity periods
could be customized in order to provide proportional incentives for
new and follow-on drug development, especially in the classes
comprising NDS MI drugs or where unmet medical need is greatest
e.g., for pathways to Expedited Review in the new drug category
(Priority Review and NOC/c).
Finally, the innovation index reported here is consistent with the
first principles of patent law articulated in the United States and
Canada, where linkage first came into force. The Supreme Courts in
both nations have consistently articulated the primacy of the patent
bargain when analyzing patent cases, and have maintained over 150
years of jurisprudence that an inventor can take no more of a
monopoly than is equivalent to what he or she discloses.366 The
365.
366.

See supra note 177 (explaining data and data source).
See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1851); Graham v. John Deere Co.,
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bargain between patentee and public is in the interest of both sides
only where the patentee receives a monopoly reward that is
proportional to what it discloses to the public; a patentee who
evergreens an invention via successive patents on uninventive
additions prolongs its monopoly beyond what the public has agreed to
pay.367 Importantly, analogous pronouncements have been made in
the specific context of pharmaceutical linkage.368 The innovation
index is consistent with this jurisprudence as it not only rewards both
new and follow-on innovations, but does so in proportion to the
degree of social value associated with innovation.

383 U.S. 1, 8 (1966); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); R.C.A. Photophone,
Ld. v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp., (1936) 53 R.P.C. 167, 195 (A.C.) (Eng.); Farbwerke
Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v. Comm’r of Patents, [1966]
S.C.R. 604, 614 (Can.); R. v. Nova Scotia Pharm. Soc’y, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 (Can.); Whirlpool
Corp. v. Camco, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, 1086-87 (Can.); Free World Trust v. Électro Santé,
Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, 1035 (Can.).
367. Whirlpool Corp., 2 S.C.R. at 1086; see also Free World Trust, 2 S.C.R. at 1024.
368. See Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533 (Can.);
see also AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560 (Can.).

